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Askari   Soldier, policeman, watchman (Swahili) 
Bazinqir A trader‟s „army‟ of armed Arab servants and soldiers 
(Arabic) 
Boma Compound, military camp (Swahili) 
Busaa   locally produced maize beer 
Chang‟aa  Locally distilled alcohol 
DC   District Commissioner 
Debe   Large tin of 17-20 litres. 
DO   District Officer 
Dholuka  Traditional Nubi dance. 
FGC   Female Genital Cutting 
Gurbaba  Traditional colourful skirt-like garment of Nubi 
womeHn 
Habooba  Grandmother (Kinubi) 
Haraam  Forbidden (by Islam) 
Halaal   Allowed (by Islam) 
Jellaba   Petty, itinerant trader (Arabic) 
Jenga yangu, jenga yako “build mine, build yours” (Swahili) 
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Jihadiya  Egyptian army of black slaves (Arabic) 
Kangara  Locally produced beer  
Kanzu    Long Muslim dress (for men) 
KAR   King‟s African Rifles, the British colonial army in 
East Africa 
KENSUP  Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme 
Kibra   Forest, bushy area (Kinubi) 
Kinubi   Native language of the Nubis 
KLC   Kibera Land Committee 
Ksh.   Kenyan Shilling (national currency of Kenya).  
Labi Original meaning: “slave” (Juba Arabic). Refers (in 
Kinubi) to every „non-Nubi‟ (derogatory). 
Mzee  Elder. Respectful term of address / reference for “old 
man” (Swahili). Plural: wazee. 
Mzee wa Kijiji Village elder (Swahili) 
MP   Member of Parliament 
Muna   Fermented (fermenting) brew, to be used for 
distillation 
NCC   Nairobi City Council 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation 
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Pipa   Oil drum of 200 litres (used for fermentation) 
PC    Provincial Commissioner 
PoW   Prisoner of war 
Shamba  Farm, field for agriculture (Swahili) 
Shayba  Elder (Kinubi) 
Uhuru   Independence, lit. freedom (Swahili) 
Waragi  Nubian gin (Kinubi, Arabic) 
Zariba Camp / village fortified with palisade or thorn fence, 






In the early twentieth century the East Africa Protectorate‟s army 
administration allowed its “Nubian” ex-soldiers and their families to settle 
on a military exercise ground near Nairobi. Today that military area is a 
sprawling slum called Kibera, with hundreds of thousands of people packed 
in an area of 550 acres, where the descendants of these ex-soldiers form 
only a small minority. They distinguish themselves from the other people by 
religion, language, food and dress code. And they still claim to be the only 
and rightful “owners” of Kibera, given to them as their pension after 
retirement from the British colonial army. 
 
This thesis is about this particular group of „Nubians‟, and their „homeland‟, 
Kibera. It will follow the Nubians from their creation in the late nineteenth 
century in southern Sudan, through their „migration‟ into East Africa, 
settling in Nairobi, and through the transformation of Kibera from rural area 
to slum, up to today, the beginning of the third millennium. The name 
“Nubian” is confusing, though: these “East African Nubians” have little to 
do with the ancient Nubian civilisation of northern Sudan
1
; their origin lies 
mainly in the („primitive‟) tribes of southern Sudan, northern Uganda and 
eastern Congo. To avoid confusion with the northern Sudanese Nubians, it 
makes sense to use the term that the “East African Nubians” use to refer to 




All over East Africa one can find these Nubi communities; they are 
essentially „recent immigrants‟, descendants of (slave) soldiers of the 
Egyptian army in southern Sudan, that were cut off from the rest of the army 
after the fall of Khartoum in 1885; they were then recruited into the British 
and German East African colonial armies and moved out of Sudan into East 
Africa. In those days, retired and demobilised soldiers were allowed to settle 
around the military barracks or garrison towns – they were allocated land to 
build a house and to cultivate. In this way „Nubian‟ villages were 
established in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. Most of these villages still 
exist, but the Nubi communities have developed differently in these three 
                                                          
1
 Many (East African) Nubians seem to believe this, though; see for example the booklet 
„The Nubian culture‟ (no date) by Ibrahim Kirsonaka, a Nubian from Uganda, or the 
website of the Nubian Cultural Information Center in Kampala: 
http://www.nubiancenter.org/ourhistory.html (16/05/2010). 
2




East African countries. In Tanzania the Nubis have more or less 
disappeared, assimilated into the Muslim culture of their new homeland. In 
Uganda they have gone through an episode of turmoil during Idi Amin‟s 
stint in power – due to the Nubis‟ close link to the centre of power, many 
people changed their identity: “becoming Nubi” was almost as easy as 
putting on another hat. After Amin went into exile, many Nubis fled the 
country. In Kenya the Nubi identity appears to be under pressure as well, 
due to increased contact and intermarriage with people of other ethnic 
groups; many Nubis in Kibera fear that the Nubi identity could disappear in 
a few generations, as Kibera has turned into one of the largest slums of 
Africa, where the Nubis have become an insignificant group.  
 
For the Nubis, Kibera is their „tribal land‟, inextricably associated to the 
Nubis as a group, and to the continued existence of that group; hence their 
never-ending claim on the Kibera land. While the British, during the 
colonial era, tried to relocate the Nubis to be able to use the Kibera land for 
the expansion of Nairobi, the Nubis have always refused to leave Kibera. In 
the first place because they consider Kibera their tribal home area, the place 
where they were born, and grew up. Secondly, with Kibera being so close to 
Nairobi, the Nubis benefited from a huge market for the alcohol they illicitly 
distilled, Nubian gin. This must have been an important reason for them to 
want to stay in Kibera, as moving away from Nairobi would have 
jeopardised the alcohol business and the income it generated. From the 
1930s to the 1960s the Nubian gin business provided the Nubis with the 
means to maintain a relatively high standard of living, and to support their 
idea of being different, and better, than the other Africans – they had all the 
money they needed to prove that. The British also thought the Nubis were „a 
better class African‟, and the other Africans living in Kibera agreed: to them 
the Nubis were like „wazungu‟, white people. In the long run, however, the 
Nubis were not able to hold on to this comparative advantage. With the 
unstoppable influx of other people, Kibera became a slum area where the 
Nubis are now only a small minority; they control only a small part of the 
rental rooms that have been constructed over the years, and Kibera is no 
longer recognised as a „Nubi area‟. Violent episodes in the last two decades, 
most recently after the 2007 elections, have given other, larger, tribes the 
opportunity to take over parts of Kibera. The Nubis have lost their 
supremacy in Kibera, where „politics‟ is now dominated by other tribes. 
Moreover, without the Nubian gin to provide an income, and dwindling 
income from the rental business, the Nubis have not been able to maintain 
their former standards of living. Their final hope is pinned on a possible 
12 
 
(promised?) communal title deed for part of the Kibera land, which has, 
however, so far not materialised.  
 
 
The Nubis as „strangers‟ 
 
The Nubis have always been „strangers‟ in the areas they went as soldiers 
and settled. Created as a group in southern Sudan, they moved into Uganda 
as a foreign group, known as „the Sudanese‟, a group of foreign mercenaries 
– strangers were often used as soldiers to oppress populations.
3
 They later 
moved to Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania, where they were also strangers. 
Towards the end of the colonial era in Kenya, considering a move back to 
Sudan, they found they were strangers even there. 
 
Strangers have always been normal phenomena in every society – in 1908 
the German sociologist Georg Simmel tried to come up with a sociological 
characterisation of „the stranger as a social type‟.
4
 The stranger is here 
described as „the man who comes today and stays tomorrow‟, rather than 
someone that just passes through. The stranger is an element of the group 
itself, at the same time close by, if he settles there, and remote: he remains a 
stranger, emotionally detached, with „the specific character of mobility, 
which occasions the synthesis of nearness and remoteness – he comes 
incidentally into contact with every single element but is not bound up 
organically, through established ties of kinship, locality, or occupation, with 
any single one.‟
5
 Simmel‟s characterisation of the „stranger‟ has several 
shortcomings. He failed, for example, to „resolve the ambiguity in his 
treatment of the stranger, in one context, as an individual, in another, as a 
member of a social aggregate‟. Moreover, strangers don‟t really constitute a 
„sociological type‟, but are rather a social category in dynamic relationships 
with other social categories in human societies. Despite its shortcomings, 
and its initial incorrect translation and interpretation, Simmel‟s concept has 




Strangers or stranger communities have been present in many pre-colonial 
African societies, forming marginal as well as integral parts of African 
society – often as clients to chiefs, or in occupations disdained by the wider 
society: trade, pottery, or traditional medicine, while in other cases the 
                                                          
3
 Parsons 1999: 5, 61-2. 
4
 “Der Fremde”, translated by D. Levine, 1971 (1908). 
5
 Levine: 29; Simmel: 145. 
6
 Levine 1979; Shack 1979b: 38-9; Skinner: 279. 
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strangers were more numerous or powerful and conquered the hosts‟ 
territory and becoming the dominant community. Strangers were often 
tolerated only to some extent, not enjoying the same rights as the rest of the 
population (like for example in access to land or land ownership). Their 
status was not always lower than the local population, though: sometimes 
strangers became advisors to kings, in other cases they took over trade or 
fishing opportunities, or became the main business community (Lebanese, 
Asians). Differences in values and behaviour between host and strangers 
sometimes made strangers suspect to the wider population: they were 
blamed for problems, even if they were innocent. On the other hand, 
individual strangers (even smaller groups) were often adopted (they had to 
adapt) and assimilated into the host community – and thus stopped being 
„strangers‟. They became part of the wider, local community, and after some 





Under colonialism there was more protection for strangers; to the 
Europeans, they were all Africans, and were therefore often placed, by the 
colonial authorities, at the same level of the original population – „strangers‟ 
became „citizens‟, just like the „hosts‟. This was not always the case; in 
Kenya for example, the Somalis and Asians were not considered at the same 
level as the ordinary „natives‟, but a step higher, resulting in higher food 
rations during World War II, as well as higher hut and poll taxes (...), but 
also in a higher standing (a position that the Nubis also coveted, but never 
got). 
 
Independence brought again changes; political and economic competition 
for resources often re-marginalised the strangers, and increased intolerance 
towards them. In several former colonies strangers have been expelled after 
independence, especially if they were introduced and protected by the 
colonial administration, or if they were economically better off than the 
local population.
8
 A well-known example is the expulsion of the Asians 




The Nubis only came into being during the colonial era, under particular 
circumstances in what is now southern Sudan. In Uganda and Kenya they 
were strangers: foreign soldiers, Muslims, and speaking Arabic. They were 
                                                          
7
 Shack 1979b: 43, 44; see the collection of case studies in Shack & Skinner 1979; Shack 
1979a. 
8
 Challenor: 67; Levine 40-2; Shack 1979a/b. 
9
 See  J. Kuper 1979, Twaddle 1975. 
14 
 
however powerful „strangers‟; they had nothing to fear of a lower status or 
rejection by the local people, because they were „under the protection‟ of the 
British – they were part of the colonisers, not the colonised. Their task was 
to beat the „hosts‟ into submission rather than start friendly relationships and 
assimilate. However, despite their violent past as colonial henchmen, the 
Nubis were never expelled from Independent Kenya, probably because they 
were economically, educationally and politically speaking no threat to other 
Kenyans, and because more than 50 years had passed since those „punitive 
campaigns‟; moreover, at Independence the Nubis became Kenyan citizens 
and were therefore no longer „strangers‟ that could be expelled. 
 
In the last decades the Nubis have tried hard, though without much success, 
to become officially recognised as Kenya‟s 43
rd
 tribe. The question has been 
raised whether the Nubis can be at all regarded as a „tribe‟, as they are in 
essence a mix of people from other tribes, while in Uganda they are claimed 
to be a „Muslim Club‟ rather than a tribe.
10
 But, what exactly is „a tribe‟? 
 
 
The invention of „tribe‟  
 
There is a general consensus among academics that the African tribes as we 
know them, are inventions (or „imaginations‟) of the colonial era.
11
 The 
colonial administrators needed manageable administrative „units‟ to be able 
to govern their territory with more ease. They believed that, like in Europe, 
people in Africa belonged to a nation, a fixed group, a „tribe‟, with chiefs or 
other formal institutions of centralised political authority.  
 
However, in pre-colonial Africa people identified themselves more in local 
(territorial or kinship) terms, at village level, belonging to this clan, lineage, 
family, or as subject of that particular chief, rather than as ´Kikuyu´ or „Luo‟ 
– „political tribes‟ did not exist. As Igor Kopytoff has argued, African 
societies were reproduced through continuous segmentation and fission, 
migration, and merging of groups whose size, power and alliances varied 
over time. Africans lived in centres and peripheries, networks, clusters, with 
high mobility, multiple membership of groups (lineages, religious cults, 
clans, etc), overlapping networks, shifting coalitions, and fluid boundaries 
depending on situation or context, and often without centralised political 
system; groups were often culturally related while clusters of dialects 
shaded into each other. According to Kopytoff, groups of people leaving 
                                                          
10
 See for example Kokole 1985. 
11
 See for example Haugerud 1993, Lonsdale 1992, Lynch 2006, Ranger 1985, 1994. 
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established society (because of arguments, overpopulation, struggles for 
power and supremacy etcetera), would move to what he calls the „African 
frontier‟, the (politically) open spaces in between existing societies, where 
no one (or hardly anyone) lived. They would, if all went well, establish 
themselves as a new „group‟ (sometimes chasing away or incorporating the 
few people living there), develop their own (social, cultural, political) 
institutions, and in the long run incorporate new members and grow in local 
or even regional importance. Or they would merge with other, larger groups 





There were obviously differences between people and their neighbours, 
often related to differences in ecological niche, in livelihood (pastoralist 
have a different „culture‟ from agricultural people), but there were usually 
no strict boundaries between groups – there was intermarriage, movement of 
people during dry periods, trade, adoption, causing the boundaries between 
different groups to be blurred and fluid. The pastoralist groups in the Rift 
Valley (Maasai) for example were very open to new „Maasai‟ – anyone 
could become a member of the group by simply learning the language, 
taking over the pastoral lifestyle, and participating in pastoral social 
relations. One could move from one (ethnic) group to another and become 
one of the „other‟ – a person‟s ethnic identity was open to negotiation (or 
manipulation), not a fixed given. A Kikuyu with many heads of cattle could 
„become Maasai‟; a Maasai who lost his livestock would move to Kikuyu 
area and „become Kikuyu‟. Belonging to an „ethnic group‟ determined a 
person‟s access to resources – for example to land for agriculture or for 
grazing; without being a member of the group, this access would be denied, 




The ethnic boundaries between different groups became less flexible during 
the colonial times. For the colonial administrators, a tribe was a group of 
people linked together by descent, with common language and culture, 
living in their particular territory, and with some sort of a leader; and, each 
man belonged to a tribe, and one tribe only. They wanted to have it clear to 
which „tribe‟ someone belonged, to know where that person belonged, in 
order to be able to control the native people and their movements. 
Moreover, another reason for emphasising the existence of African tribes 
was to „divide and rule‟: as Leroy Vail argues, if ethnic units could be 
strengthened (through indirect rule), it would slow the emergence of a 
                                                          
12
 Kopytoff 1987. 
13
 Spear 1993: 12; Vail: 14; Waller 1993. See also Cronk 2004. 
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potentially dangerous territory-wide political consciousness that might 
develop.
14
 Movement of African communities „on the frontier‟ therefore 
was longer possible, but was „frozen by the arrival of colonial 
administration‟. In the same way, African traditions and customary law, 
always open to negotiation, variation and change, were „frozen‟ by the 





There are many examples of tribes that were „invented‟, or assumed to exist, 
by the colonial officials to facilitate colonial rule
16
; however, tribes were 
also actively constructed by Africans, who did not always simply accept the 
„tribe‟ imposed from above. They contributed to the „making of tribes‟ by 
complying with the British categories to use them to their own advantage – 
in dealing with the colonial state, it paid to conform, to adapt to the new, 
colonial context. Some tribes, like the Kalenjin or Luhya (in Kenya), were 
consciously created by Africans to form a larger group that could more 
easily compete with other groups at national level. Local elite and leaders 
used the new „tribes‟ to gain more power and wealth (it‟s good to be leader 
of a big tribe), using ethnic sentiments in political competition with other 
groups, in order to secure political power („political tribalism‟).
17
 Others 
would simply change their ethnic identity whenever that was beneficial to 
them in their struggle for access to resources, for example to be able to stay 
in Maasai land without being labelled „illegal settler‟, a Kikuyu would claim 
to be a Maasai. Another aspect of the „invention of tribes‟ was the use of 
stereotypes: some tribes were thought (by the Europeans) to make good 
houseboys, others were hard workers or „good for nothing‟. Again others 
were „martial‟; the British considered the Nubis a „natural martial race‟, 
reason to (initially) recruit boys from amongst the Nubi soldiers‟ sons for 
the army: “... walk through their village and select the most likely looking 
youngsters. ... you‟ll find them ready-made soldiers”.
18
 Africans looking for 
work would claim an ethnic identity that would help them in securing jobs 
with the highest wages.
19
 These stereotypes could change over time; the 
Nubis for example were later replaced in the army by other „martial tribes‟.  
 
                                                          
14
 Spear 1993; Vail: 13. 
15
 Kopytoff 1987: 6; Ranger 1994; Spear 2003. 
16
 See for example Beidelman 1978; Janmohamed: 188; Ngolet 1998;   
17
 Lonsdale 1994; Lynch 2006.  
18
 Parsons 1999: 6, 61-2, 104. 
19
 Eriksen: 80-2; Lonsdale 1992; Ranger 1985; See Gordon: 221 or Pendleton 1978 for 
some examples.  
17 
 
With the invention of tribes came, by necessity, the „invention‟ of traditions, 
of „tribal‟ history and other cultural artefacts to „cement‟ the people 
together, to „give meaning‟ to „being Kikuyu‟ or „being Nubi‟. The 
continuous group formation on the African frontier required such re-
invention of traditions as well.
20
 These „new‟ traditions were usually based 
on what people knew, on their own pre-existing conceptions. Sometimes 
they were consciously constructed; Ranger describes how Zulu customs and 
native laws were used (by the British administration, together with the 
Ndebele chiefs) to draw up, in a few days, a „native law‟ for Matabeleland. 
In other cases this inventing of tradition could involve a redefining of 
existing customs or a „re-interpretation‟ (falsification?) of the group‟s 
history or ancestry, sometimes even a (conscious) review of the language, 
often by missionaries, thus contributing to a perception (also in the native 




In this way Africans made the Europeans believe that indeed tribes existed, 
and always had existed, in Africa. Thus Iliffe concluded: “Europeans 
believed Africans belonged to tribes; Africans built tribes to belong to.”
22
 
This statement appears to suggest that there were no real, existing social 
groups in Africa. However, even if the concept of „tribe‟ is an artificial 
colonial construction, and even if Africans could take on another ethnic 
identity to their own (immediate) advantage, it does not mean that there was 
„nothing‟ before the „tribe‟ was invented. There certainly was a „group 
identity‟ – people were born in a group, and were automatically part of that 
group, with its cultural and social characteristics. They identified with their 
group on the basis of having been born into and socialised by that group. 
Moreover, people need to belong to a group, to identify with and to give 
meaning to their existence (psychological comfort). Furthermore, according 
to Vail, migrant workers (in southern Africa) needed their group in order to 
maintain their positions in their rural societies back home, and keep, through 
their group, rights and access to land, and thus exercise some control over 
their own lives. With the breaking up of groups and formation of new 
groups (on the African frontier), these group identities could change, they 
were constantly „under construction‟, being manipulated, but they were a 




                                                          
20
 Kopytoff 1987: 33-9. 
21
 Ranger 1985: 8-9, 14-6; Ranger 1989. 
22
 Iliffe 1979: 324. 
23
 Vail: 14-5. See also Ranger 1985: 4. 
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Moreover, „tribes‟ were also actively constructed by Africans before the 
colonial era. There are examples of big groups, like the Anlo-Ewe or the 
Asante in Ghana, or the Zulu in South Africa, which may have had a sense 
of nationhood, or a specific ethnic identity. Clearly Africans were 
manipulating their ethnic identities already a long time ago; according to 
Spear, „ethnic concepts, processes and politics predated the imposition of 
colonial rule‟. There are limits to the „invention‟ theory, and „colonial power 
and ability to manipulate African institutions‟ has often been overstated, 
though obviously, colonial rule did have an impact on the ethnic processes 




The Nubis are a case in point: they were not simply „invented‟ by the 
Egyptians or British imposing an ethnic identity upon them. The Nubis did 
this themselves, to some extent consciously, because they set themselves 
apart from the local population. They regarded themselves a separate group, 
possibly even already in southern Sudan, but certainly in Uganda and 
Kenya, being Muslims and a military group/community, and „strangers‟ in 
the areas where they lived. Certainly, the „invention‟ of the Nubis was 
forced by events beyond their control, facilitated by the specific 
circumstances created by colonialism and political interests – without 





Until the 1960s the „tribe‟ was the typical socio-cultural unit of investigation 
for anthropologists (as well as for historians and other scientists) in Africa; 
it then became increasingly clear that „tribes‟ were a product of colonial 
invention and had little to do with the reality on the ground. Moreover, 
anthropologists were accused of conniving with the colonial governments to 
give legitimacy to the concept („tribe‟), to divide and oppress the African 
people – the term „tribe‟ fell therefore into disuse in the academic world; 
„ethnic group‟ became the preferred term.
25
 Though the word „tribe‟ is 
currently commonly used in Kenya (and in other parts of Africa) without 
any negative colonial connotations, here „ethnic group‟ will be used.  
 
„Ethnic group‟ can be loosely defined as „a group of human beings that 
identify with each other, usually based on a real or presumed common 
origin‟. In contrast to other groups, they usually also recognise some 
                                                          
24
 See for example Akyeampong 2006; Ngolet 1998; Spear 2003: 20-7. 
25
 Ranger 1994: 25; Kuper & Kuper, Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 1995, pp 1039-40. 
19 
 
common cultural, linguistic, religious or behavioural traits (real or 
presumed). Moreover, the group must also be recognised by others as being 
distinctive. This definition implies certain flexibility: ethnic groups are not 
static and unchangeable ethnic units – their size, composition and „cultural 
content‟ may change over time.  
 
However, there are no clear rules or criteria for considering a group an 
„ethnic group‟. The traits mentioned earlier can play an important role in 
some groups, but less, or none, in others. People may have similar cultures 
but not belong to the same ethnic group; language and religion can also be 
shared with other groups, or members of one recognised ethnic group may 
speak different languages (like the Luhya in Kenya). The groups are often 
endogamous, but not necessarily or exclusively so, or not anymore, with 
increased contact between different groups (mainly in urban areas). Most 
ethnic groups have a territorial basis (tribal land), but this is not necessarily 
so, as Newman shows for the Sandawe in Tanzania: there is no exclusive 
Sandawe domain that is perceived as inviolable, and the uncultivated land is 
open to anyone, even to non-Sandawe.
26
 With such vague criteria, it has 
been suggested that, in deciding whether a group of people can be 
considered an ethnic group, what matters most is how these people define 
themselves vis-à-vis others -do they consider themselves to be „different‟, in 
an ethnic sense, is there a „group consciousness‟ (even if based on a 
presumed or constructed common origin)?- and secondly, whether they are 
recognised as a separate ethnic group by others.
27
 These two criteria are the 
most basic: without them there would be no ethnic group – even one of 
them alone would not be enough. 
 
Returning then to the question whether the Nubis can be considered a tribe, 
or rather, an ethnic group, or not, it seems clear that both basic criteria are 
fulfilled. The Nubis perceive themselves as a distinct community; in Kibera, 
the Nubis set themselves apart from the rest of the population, consciously 
creating a social distance. It is clear from many references in colonial 
documents that also the colonial British considered the Nubis a separate 
„tribe‟
28
, while the Kenyan „tribes‟ have always perceived the Nubis as a 
different group as well, with its own language, dress code, and food. 
Moreover, even if some of the more „traditional‟ criteria for ethnic group are 
considered, one can claim that the Nubis do have their own language, 
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Kinubi, while the „King‟s African Rifles‟ represent for many Nubis today a 
„myth of origin‟. Kibera (and Bombo in Uganda) could well be considered 
Nubi tribal land: most African ethnic groups have migrated to other areas 
before settling down in the place where they were found at the start of the 
colonial era; for example, the Luos are believed to have come to Nyanza 
from southern Sudan only a few hundred years ago, while the Kikuyu 
migrated into Kenya from Central Africa – the Nubis are simply a fairly 
recent group of „immigrants‟.
29
 Johnson argues that the move into Uganda 
„was the beginning of the “Nubi” community in East Africa and the origin 
of their perception of themselves as a distinct community‟, and Atieno-
Odhiambo is also very clear: “By the time they got to East Africa, they were 
already a separate ethnic group”.
30
 The Nubis can thus, without problem, be 
considered an „ethnic group‟, even if they are in essence a mix of people 
from a variety of backgrounds. They are of course not alone in this: many, if 
not most, or all, ethnic groups have at some point in their history 
incorporated strangers, accepted newcomers in their midst, and have moved 
to other places, merged with other groups. The Nubis may be different in the 
sense that they are a somewhat „artificial‟ community: a large number of 
individuals, complete strangers to each other, and from various ethnic 
groups, was brought together under specific circumstances, and grew to 
become a separate ethnic community. But also here they are not alone – 
there are similar cases in various parts of Africa: the Chikunda in 
Mozambique, the Griquas in South Africa and the Creoles in Sierra Leone 
are all examples of such „artificial‟ groups. These groups also have in 
common that they do not trace their origin back to one ancestor (and descent 
is therefore often less important), and that they did not occupy their tribal 
land in a normal process of migration but it was rather allocated to them by 
a powerful group of outsiders (usually colonial powers). 
 
Of these three groups, the Chikunda are the most similar to the Nubis: they 
also started as military slaves
31
 – from the mid-eighteenth century, on the 
Mozambican prazos, the huge Portuguese-run estates (run by individual 
settlers, not the colonial state). These military slaves came, like in the case 
of the Nubis, from many different ethnic groups, mostly from areas well 
away from the prazo; armed, they were used to collect taxes (and punish tax 
evaders) from peasants living on the estate, as well as to patrol and police 
the estate (including preventing peasants from running away). They were 
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also involved in slave raiding and trading for their „owner‟, while being 
allowed to take slaves of their own. Selling yourself into slavery was a 
survival strategy in dangerous or difficult times, but „becoming a Chikunda‟ 
had other advantages: it provided access to land, wives (often they were 
slaves, or from the local population, like in the case of the Nubis), imported 
goods, weapons, and power. The Chikunda lived in regimental villages 
located strategically throughout the prazo, separate from the local 
population. As „military slaves‟, they “developed shared behaviors and 
beliefs, a patrilineal system of kinship and inheritance, and a rich repertoire 
of cultural practices that celebrated their prowess as warriors and 
distinguished them from the indigenous peasant population”. The Chikunda 
also had their own language, a mixture of many local languages, and a 
special way of greeting each other; they filed their front teeth, and had facial 
tattoos, all to distinguish them from the other people. The collapse of the 
prazo system in the first half of the nineteenth century compelled the 
Chikunda to rethink their identity: some assimilated into the local 
population, others went back to their area of origin, and again others 
maintained their Chikunda identity and established or joined new „Chikunda 
states‟ which made a living by raiding and slave-trading. The Chikunda 




The Griquas of South Africa are another example of an artificial group, 
though one that existed only a relatively short time. In 1815, a community 
of „coloured‟ people of very mixed origins and backgrounds (local hunting 
groups, escaped slaves, etc.) calling themselves „Bastards‟ was renamed 
Griquas. Their story is marked by their struggle for acceptance and 
recognition, and their own land and independence: the Griquas tried to gain 
entry into and acceptance in the society of the Cape Colony, as respectable 
prosperous Christian people (while also living as aristocrats, dominating the 
Africans living around them). With the increasing racial stratification of the 
Cape society in the nineteenth century, there was no longer „space‟ for these 
people (they were not „white‟), and they were pushed further away with 
each expansion of the Cape Colony, forced to leave „their‟ land and move to 
a next empty space to start building up their lives all over again. The Griqua 
community grew by incorporating many newcomers – not so much through 
marriage (as in the case of the Nubis) but through immigration – groups of 
people, whole families, joined them, and again from many different ethnic 
groups or backgrounds, during their stays at Griqualand West and (later) 
Griqualand East, the small states they, for a short time, established. One 
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may question how thick that „layer‟ of „Griqua identity‟ in those newcomers 
was – it appears as if „being Griqua‟ was a „life-style‟ rather than an „ethnic 
identity‟, as if it was only a group of people with the same economical and 
political objectives, rather than an ethnic group (almost comparable to 
claiming that London stockbrokers are an ethnic group
33
). Nevertheless, 
according to the two basic criteria of „ethnic group‟ discussed earlier, the 
Griquas would also qualify as an ethnic group. The Griquas existed only till 
around 1879; they dispersed and disintegrated after the annexation (by the 




Yet another „artificial‟ ethnic group are the Creoles of Freetown in Sierra 
Leone. The Creoles are descendants of different groups of liberated slaves 
from the Caribbean and the United States, and were settled (by the British) 
on the Freetown peninsula between 1787 and 1850. Like with the Nubis, 
many local people were „creolised‟, assimilated into the Creole community, 
especially women, through marriage. The Creoles became, as senior civil 
servants in the colonial bureaucracy and the judiciary, an elite group in 
Sierra Leone society, a position they managed to maintain after 
Independence. Like the Nubis, the Creoles claimed, until the 1950s, to be 
„foreigners‟, Christian and civilised, not „natives‟; they exaggerated „their 
distinctiveness, segregating themselves sharply from the rest of the African 
population‟. Then, at the end of the colonial period, they denied that 
distinctiveness, something the Nubis did as well, in order to ensure their 
place in post-colonial society, in independent Sierra Leone (and the Nubis in 





The Nubis and ethnicity  
 
The above has shown that ethnic identities are actively made and remade, by 
people themselves, and used in a variety of manners, in changing political, 
social and economic contexts. This thesis will analyse the case of the Nubis 
of Kibera around a broad frame of „ethnicity‟
36
; it will show the Nubis as an 
example of an ethnic group that came into existence under specific 
circumstances created by colonialism (but not „invented‟ by colonial 
administrators). It will demonstrate how the Nubis created and consolidated 
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their ethnic identity to „become Nubis‟, and how they have used, 
manipulated, exploited and changed their Nubi identity over the years. The 
thesis tells the story of the Nubis, from the start, their „creation‟ in southern 
Sudan, to what and where they are now, in the third millennium, a 
marginalized ethnic group in a slum in Nairobi. In addition to this 
introduction, the thesis consists of a conclusion, three appendices (A 
describing my research methods, B on female circumcision in the Nubi 
community, and C with the survey form) and five chapters.  
 
The first chapter is about the ethno-genesis and early history of the Nubis. It 
explains how those soldiers, from diverse tribal backgrounds, amalgamated 
into a new community and developed from a group of slave soldiers into an 
ethnic group, and demonstrates how this was forced by the circumstances at 
the time. It shows the different routes the various Nubi groups took into East 
Africa and Kenya, and how they eventually all got to Kibera. This chapter is 
based on information from a multitude of books and articles, putting the 
pieces together to arrive at a general overview of the early history of the 
Nubis of Kibera. Some discussions and brainstorming sessions with older 
Nubis on how things could have happened or could have been, have 
contributed to this chapter. 
 
The second chapter, “From shamba to slum”, tells the story of Kibera, the 
new homeland of the Nubis in Kenya. Kibera started off as military training 
grounds, then turned into “Nubian villages”, and then, much later, into the 
(allegedly) largest slum of sub-Sahara Africa. This chapter shows how the 
Nubis have tried to use their „being Nubi‟ as a negotiation technique to deal 
with the colonial government and keep control over the land in Kibera – 
after all, the Nubis argued, while appealing to their special relationship with 
the colonial government, they were brought to Kenya as foreign soldiers to 
fight for the British, and helped them to establish their East African 
colonies. Therefore, they claim, the British have an obligation towards the 
Nubis, and certainly concerning the Kibera land which was given to them 
„in lieu of pension‟. This strategy was relatively successful considering the 
Nubis managed, throughout the colonial era, to remain in Kibera, despite 
several attempts at relocating them. However, at Independence, with the 
departure of the British, this strategy could no longer work; to be able to 
maintain their claim on Kibera the Nubis had to rethink and transform their 
ethnic identity, from „foreigners‟ to „Kenyans‟. This worked only to some 
extent: the Nubis were more or less accepted as „Kenyans‟, but were unable 
to stop the influx of outsiders, who were supported by the local authorities, 
into Kibera and the large-scale construction of rental rooms; in that process 
24 
 
they lost their grip on large parts of Kibera. The information for this chapter 
comes largely from the older and oldest Nubis of Kibera, as well as from 
documents found at the Kenya National Archives (KNA). 
 
The third chapter is about “Nubi ethnic identity”; it focuses on the 
development and growing (ethnic) identity of the Nubis as an ethnic group 
and on the many identity changes the Nubi community has gone through 
during its relatively short existence; it clearly shows that ethnic identity is 
not static, but open to change and manipulation. What started as a loose 
group of people from various Sudanese „tribes‟, held together only by 
military tradition and Islam, became a close-knit community when they 
were in Kibera. It had generally been expected that in African countries 
after the colonial era, under the influence of nationalism and modernity, the 
different ethnic groups and the accompanying ethnic identities and 
distinctions would disappear, especially (first) in urban areas.
37
 However, 
this has not been the case: ethnic identities often became even more 
important, especially in urban settings, playing a role in competition for 
jobs, housing, and plain (economic) survival. In urban areas there is much 
more contact between members of different ethnic groups than in rural 
areas, and in such situations ethnic identity often becomes more important – 
people feel more secure and at ease with people of the same ethnic 
background. Certainly in times of danger or threats to the whole group, 
people pull together and identify more with their „fellow tribesmen‟. The 
influx of (mainly Christian) outsiders into Kibera had that effect on the Nubi 
community: the existing differences between the Sudanese „tribes‟ 
disappeared, the Nubis pulled together and became „more Nubi‟. 
Nevertheless, the Nubi community had always been quite open to outsiders, 
mainly to women that married into the group; however, these women had to 
change their ethnic identity, and „become Nubi‟. In this chapter attention is 
also devoted to Nubi ethnic markers and specific cultural traits as integral 
part of the Nubi identity. Information for this chapter comes mainly from 
interviews in Kibera, and as well from the archives (KNA) and other 
literature.  
 
The fourth chapter deals with the important role distilled alcohol, the 
„Nubian gin‟, has played in the Nubi community in the past; it shows how 
the Nubi women created and exploited an ethnic economic niche in Kibera. 
The Nubis introduced the process of distillation into East Africa, and had 
nothing short of a monopoly on Nubian gin production and sale for at least 
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three decades. In the long run, though, local (Kenyan) people managed to 
enter the liquor market and took over the trade when the Nubi women 
moved on to the next economic niche in Kibera, the rental business, which 
was initially also almost completely controlled by the Nubis. The Nubian 
gin allowed the Nubis to maintain a relatively high standard of living (for 
Africans) and this helped them in maintaining the distinction between 
themselves and the „natives‟, strengthening their idea that they were better 
than the others. In that way the Nubian gin may also have contributed to 
keeping the Nubi community together and the Nubi identity alive. In 
addition, through the production and sale of alcohol the Nubi women 
became the economic force in Kibera, changing gender relations within the 
Nubi community. Most of the information for this chapter comes from 
interviews conducted in Kibera with “notorious offenders” (elderly Nubi 
women once involved in the Nubian gin production) and former Nubian gin 
consumers, as well as from the Kenya National Archives, where the large 
collection of files on Nubian gin is an indication of the obsession of the 
colonial government with alcohol. A shorter version of this chapter can be 
found in the International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 42, No. 
2 (2009), pp 201-220, published by the African Studies Center of the Boston 
University (USA).  
 
The fifth chapter is about the role of „ethnic politics‟ in Kibera (and Kenya). 
While describing what happened in Kibera during the 2007 post-election 
violence and previous violent episodes, it also analyses why this has 
happened. It shows that ethnicity, far from having disappeared after 
Independence, has become important as a mechanism for mobilisation in 
national Kenyan politics: politicians resort to the deliberate use and 
manipulation of ethnic identity in political competition with other groups, to 
secure political power and, often as well, their own wealth. It analyses how 
the situation in Kibera for the Nubis has changed in the last two decades, 
and how insignificant the Nubis have become within the context of Kibera – 
without political (ethnic) support, they lost their supremacy in Kibera, 
where the Luos have taken over as the main powerbrokers. Information for 
this chapter was collected while the post-election violence was on-going, 
while in-depth interviews were done in Kibera when calm had returned. A 
shorter and slightly different version of this chapter can, as “No Raila, no 
peace! „Big man‟ politics and election violence at the Kibera grassroots”, be 
found in African Affairs (Vol. 108, No. 433, October 2009, pp 581-598), 




The concluding chapter will briefly summarise the main conclusions of the 
thesis and then shift the focus from ethnicity to look closer at Kibera itself 
and the plans for its upgrading, comparing it with slums or unauthorised 
settlements in other African countries. Lastly, it will briefly look at the 
future of the Nubi community in Kibera.  
 
 
This thesis is about the Nubis of Kibera, a small community in a slum of 
Nairobi; despite this seemingly fairly limited subject matter, the Nubis 
represent a long and interesting story, which goes back to southern Sudan in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Their story will help us to understand better 
Kenya‟s colonial and contemporary history: it contributes to a greater 
general understanding of urban slums, in particular of Kibera. Kibera, 
though outside the city boundaries until Independence, was always 
somehow a functional part of Nairobi; this was due to the Nubis‟ presence 
which was perceived as an obstacle to the city‟s growth, while both the 
accommodation the Nubis provided to African workers and the Nubian gin 
which was sold all over town, attracted many town dwellers to Kibera. Not 
much has been written about Nairobi‟s colonial history, how it physically 
developed from a staging depot for the oxen and mules of the protectorate‟s 
Government to become a major African city. This thesis therefore 
contributes to Nairobi‟s urban history, describing how events in a small part 
of the town were closely related to changes in the city itself. This thesis also 
adds to the existing literature on (distilled) alcohol and its history in Africa, 
and on changing gender relations in African history. By presenting a case 
study of violence in Kibera, this thesis facilitates a perceptive view into the 
machinations of Kenyan ethnic politics at the grass-root level.  
 
It is in fact surprising that so little had been researched and written about the 
Nubi community of Kibera or about the history of Kibera slums, and so 
little known – this document will fill a vacuum in this respect. It will 
hopefully also be useful to the Nubi community, to maintain a sense of 
collective identity to pass on to future generations, and in their struggle for 






On the origin of the Nubis of Kibera 
 
 
Though the early history of the “East African Nubians” has been relatively 
well documented
38
, this has mainly been in small bits and pieces, covering 
different periods and different geographical areas, or in very general terms. 
This chapter provides a concise and more detailed overview of the origin of 
the Nubis, in which all the parts of the puzzle are put together in a more or 
less chronological order. The focus here is on the Nubis of Kibera: where 
did they come from and how did they make their way to East Africa and, in 
particular, to Kibera. 
 
Starting with the concept of military slavery, this chapter gives a brief 
overview of the regional developments that took place during the nineteenth 
century that created the circumstances for the ethno-genesis of the Nubis 
and the context in which these (slave) soldiers and their families could 
merge and “become Nubi”; it also highlights the events that contributed 
towards the creation of a Nubi identity. At the same time, it will follow in 
some detail the main (largest) group of “Nubis-to-be”, the soldiers that came 
to East Africa through Uganda, and briefly describe the ways some other 
groups of Sudanese soldiers came to East Africa and joined the others. Most 
of these soldiers have a similar military background and history, with the 
”jihadiya”, the Egyptian slave army, as their starting point. 
 
 
Pre-colonial history: military slavery  
 
The use of slaves as agricultural labourers, house servants or concubines 
was common in many parts of the Arab world and Africa. Probably less 
known is the use of slaves as soldiers (military slavery), which was also a 
very common practice in many parts of the African continent, in state or 
private armies. Many early states depended mainly on slave soldiers, 
captured during raids on surrounding tribes, or traded with neighbours.
39
 
Slave armies were often used to collect taxes and control the population. In 
order to be effective, it was important that the slave soldiers would not 
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identify with the local population - they therefore often belonged to other 
tribes. Furthermore, they were usually allowed to generate their own 
income, often by taking a percentage of the taxes they collected, or taking 
something extra from the population.
40
 The slave soldiers often set 
themselves apart from the local population, and (perhaps unconsciously) 
forged a new collective social identity in which they idealised military 




It is against such a background that the Nubis “emerge”. Sudan was for a 
long time a source of slave soldiers for Egypt, that, as early as 2700 BC, had 
its jihadiya, („black slave army‟), made up largely of Nubian slave 
soldiers.
42
 Nubia, roughly the area around the Nile between Aswan (1
st
 
cataract) and Khartoum, was famous for its high calibre soldiers, who were 
either part of tribute paid to Egypt by the Christian Nubian kingdoms, or 
traded with ivory and gold in exchange for Egyptian grain. The Nubian 
Kingdoms themselves, like other independent Sudanese kingdoms like 
Sennar-Funj and Darfur, depended also mainly on slave soldiers for their 
army, captured during raids on their respective hinterlands. Even though 
these soldiers came from the areas around Nubia (Kordofan, Nuba 
mountains, the northern part of southern Sudan and extending as far as 
Ethiopia), in ancient Egypt these black slave soldiers were all identified as 
“Nubian”. The term “Nubi”/“Nuba” was used to refer to anyone coming 
from the Sudan, and was almost synonymous with “slave”; it was later used 





The conquest of Sudan 
 
In 1805, during a period of near anarchy, Muhamed Ali, an Albanian officer 
in the army of the Ottoman (Turkish) rulers of Egypt, became Governor
44
 of 
Egypt, and within a few years managed to bring Egypt under his control. 
Muhamed Ali‟s ambition was to make Egypt independent from the 
Ottomans, and in order to realise this, Egypt had to become strong 
economically and militarily. He started modernising the country, focusing 
on agriculture (expanding area under cultivation, building irrigation works, 
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etc.) and industry (textile, glass and sugar factories), as well as establishing 
government trade monopolies. This policy required a lot of resources, which 
Muhamed Ali thought to get from the Sudan – in 1820 Egyptian forces 
invaded the Sudan with two main objectives: to acquire gold and other 
goods to increase revenue for the Egyptian treasury, and to obtain black 
slaves for his army (jihadiya).
45
 After Nubia was overrun, Kordofan 
conquered and the Funj Kingdom at Sennar swiftly defeated, a new capital 
was established at Wad Medani. To administer the conquered areas, the 
Egyptian administration developed an elaborate bureaucracy, which became 
marked by corruption, mismanagement and abuse of power. A Sudanese 
uprising in the Nile valley (in which Mohamed Ali‟s son Ismail was killed) 
lead to brutal revenge by the Egyptians, who devastated large parts of the 
country by burning villages and towns and massacring people; thousands of 
people fled.
46
 After this brutal display of authority, Egyptian rule was not 
seriously challenged until the 1880s.  
 
Sudan was not only to provide revenue to Egypt but should also be self-
supporting. To increase revenue, agriculture was forcibly transformed from 
subsistence to cash crop production; the new Administration established 
monopolies on newly introduced crops (sugar, indigo, cotton) and fixed 
prices well below world market rates. A side effect of this was that less food 
was produced and food prices went up. Other factors influencing (reducing) 
agricultural production was the forcible conscription of local people and 
(agricultural) slaves to the Egyptian army. Heavy taxation of agriculture, a 
new thing in Sudan, was brutally enforced and resulted in many Ja‟aliyiin 
and Danaqla (ethnic Nubians from Shendi and Dongola areas respectively) 
abandoning agriculture, and increased poverty and famine. Some of these 
Nubians joined the Egyptian army voluntarily, but there was also a certain 
amount of forced conscription, and possibly some were criminals, or people 
convicted for not able or willing to pay taxes.
47
  More and more people left 
their ancestral land, and moved to Khartoum, Dar Fur, Kordofan and 
southern Sudan to become small (slave) traders (jellaba) or to join larger 
(slave) traders, mainly as soldiers.  
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Egyptian rule disrupted the economic life of the people, and brought ruin 
and poverty to the Sudan.
48
 As a result, the Egyptians had to depend on their 
army to keep control of Sudan. The Egyptian army used for the initial 
invasion of (northern) Sudan consisted mainly of Turks, Albanians, Kurds, 
Circassians and Greeks, but they appeared to be ill-adapted to the Sudanese 
climate. Enrolment for the regular army was henceforth based on captured 
Sudanese, with the exception of the officers, who continued to be 
„foreigners‟.
49
  In 1821 a training camp was set up in Aswan where the 
black slaves were vaccinated, trained by mainly European military officers 
and instructed in Islam. Apart from service in the Sudanese garrisons, this 
jihadiya would later also be used for the Egyptian invasions in Syria, Greece 
and Turkey.
50
 Some soldiers even went as far as Mexico: in 1863 a 
contingent of about 450 Sudanese soldiers was lent out by the Egyptian 
Governor to Napoleon III, to take part in the French military campaigns in 




During those first years of Egyptian occupation, the black slave soldiers of 
the jihadiya came mainly from tribes of the northern part of Sudan: Nuba, 
Baqara, Fur and Danaqla and Ja‟aliyiin, though there were also Shilluk and 
Dinka from the frontier areas with southern Sudan.  
 
 




When Sudan did not bring the expected revenue, Muhamed Ali turned his 
eye further south. Central Africa and the White Nile were still relatively 
unknown areas, but the mystery surrounding the region gave way to wild 
speculations about commercial and strategic possibilities. In 1839 the first 
Egyptian expedition left Khartoum to explore southern Sudan. 
 
The people of southern Sudan were isolated from their neighbours by a 
series of formidable geographical barriers: mountains, hills, arid plains, 
swamps and water. Only the fringes of the region were penetrated by the 
outside world; Islam was unheard of, commerce was (relatively) unknown. 
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The population was divided into large numbers of small tribal or kinship 
groups without any central leadership; they would never be able to unite 




Initial contacts between the first Egyptian expeditions and the local people 
they met, the Dinka and Bari, were friendly, and brought rumours of a great 
abundance of ivory and of gold, copper and iron mines. It was however not 
Egypt that took the lead in exploiting these opportunities; Muhamed Ali 
lacked the resources after his expensive campaigns in Syria, and was not 
able to set up an administration in the southern Sudan. The development of 
Khartoum from fishing village to capital had attracted many Egyptian and 
Sudanese (Nubian) traders, as well as a small group of Europeans, and it 
was these European traders that took the initiative. They defeated, with help 
from the European nations, the Egyptian government‟s monopoly on ivory 
trade and gained, around 1851, unobstructed access to southern Sudan; not 
only for themselves, but also for Nubian, Egyptian and other traders.
54
 In the 
wake of the Egyptians and the traders came a motley collection of other 
adventurers, ranging from rich travellers („tourists‟), explorers (biologists) 
to missionaries. Missionaries (Italian Jesuits) tried to establish themselves 
amongst the Bari around Gondokoro (near Juba), but due to never-ending 
problems (robberies, hostility) with the Bari, difficulties of supply, the 
climate, disease, problems reaching the other tribes in the hinterland, the 
untimely death of many missionaries, and the Baris‟ lack of interest in 
Christianity, they finally gave up and withdrew in 1860.  
 
By far the largest group venturing into southern Sudan were the traders, 
large and small, attracted by the large amounts of ivory. In 1840, small 
Nubian traders were already in Shilluk area (border area); after the opening 
up of the ivory trade in southern Sudan, they penetrated ever deeper and 
deeper into southern Sudan. By 1859 they had already reached present day 
Uganda and established trading posts as far south as Falaro in Bunyoro. 
Ivory trade thus far had been in the hands of Arab traders going through 
Zanzibar and Tanganyika into Congo and Buganda; European traders, as 
non-Muslims, had always been excluded from this venture, and this was the 
moment for the Europeans to get a piece of that cake. Some big European 
traders made treaties with the Egyptians and got monopolies over large 
areas, and by 1860 there were eight European companies operating under 
Egyptian licence, apart from the many local traders without licence.
55
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Throughout the 1850s, the ivory trade and profits grew. Most ivory came 
from the Gondokoro area, along the White Nile, which became an important 
trading centre. Initially there were huge stocks of ivory to be found, as the 
natives killed elephants only for the meat: the tusks were left lying around 
where the elephant was killed, or were used as poles to tie cattle to. But 
these readily available supplies were rapidly depleted. At the same time 
ivory became more expensive as the value of the beads used for exchange, 
decreased; it was one of the reasons for the deteriorating relationship 
between traders and the southern Sudanese tribes, which resulted in conflict 
and hostility, increasingly violent. The ivory trade brought in the occasional 
slave, usually through purchase, but slaves did not yet play a significant role 
at this stage: it was still easier and cheaper to capture slaves in Nuba 
Mountains, Blue Nile and the border-lands of Abyssinia, which the 




In the late 1850s the European traders started to undertake expeditions into 
the interior of the White Nile and set up, like the Arab traders, their own 
permanent stations, zaribas (a camp fortified with palisade or thorn fence
57
). 
Sometimes the traders would live there themselves; sometimes they would 
visit once a year and have an assistant to supervise the zariba and the 
„work‟. They would bring in groups –the big traders sometimes had more 
than two thousand people- of armed Arab servants and soldiers (bazinqir). 
Many of them were Ja‟aliyiin and Danaqla fleeing the heavy taxation in the 
north, or Copts, Turks, Syrians, from further away. Local men and boys 
were increasingly incorporated into these traders‟ armies, often as slaves. 
Many of the Arab soldiers were in some form of bondage with their master, 
in debt and unable to repay. They were forced to buy their supplies from 
their master, at highly inflated prices, but were also allowed to rob and steal 
from the natives whenever they could; it was their only way of making some 
money. They instilled so much fear in the locals “by deeds of widespread 
cruelty and injustice” that the area around the zaribas would become 
depopulated. As the Arab servants and soldiers took local wives, slaves and 
servants, they gradually turned the zaribas into villages, reducing the local 
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The big traders would become virtual rulers of the area around their zariba, 
and form alliances with local chiefs, exploiting tribal warfare to their own 
benefit. The trader‟s army would assist the local chiefs to raid their 
neighbours for grain, slaves and cattle. The livestock was then exchanged 
for ivory with the surrounding villages; the local people could then also buy 
back their captured relatives. The slaves were often used to pay the soldiers, 
or soldiers could buy slaves from their master, that they could keep as wife, 





From the early 1860s, the declining rate of return of ivory forced the traders, 
who usually borrowed large sums of money from bankers in Khartoum at 
high interest rates, to look for other sources of income. Though the slave 
trade was officially abolished in Egypt in 1854, they soon developed a 
lucrative trade in slaves: most of them would have been bankrupt without 
it.
60
  By then, the European traders had all but disappeared from Sudan; they 
had been overtaken by the huge number of Arab traders, some of them had 
died and their „empire‟ disappeared, others had sold their business. 
 
The traders moved further and further away from the White Nile, 
establishing new zaribas, and creating the same havoc everywhere they 
went. The use of violence had by now become an integral part of trading, in 
fact, there was no trade anymore, only raiding, looting and destroying. 
However, sometimes the traders suffered heavy losses in battles with the 




After the discovery of the Bahr el Ghazal river, the western part of southern 
Sudan was also opened up for the large-scale ivory and slave trade. Until 
then, the area had only been in contact with petty north Sudanese traders 
(jellaba) and through slave raids from Darfur. This changed when the Bahr 
el Ghazal was opened to river-borne trade from Khartoum; it followed a 
pattern similar to the eastern part – first ivory then slaves – but violence 
from the start. More and more zaribas appeared, sometimes at short 
distances from one another, until practically the whole of southern Sudan 
was covered. There were also more and more small Nubian/Sudanese 
traders in areas further away from the White Nile; under protection of the 
zariba system they could travel all over, and they settled in zaribas as 
traders, or as agents for other traders from Kordofan or Darfur, where they 
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collected many slaves for transport to Egypt. Like the traders‟ soldiers, 
many of them married local women and started families, integrating to some 
extent in the local communities. 
 
 
The Egyptians in southern Sudan 
 
Despite the Egyptian Governors‟ promises to combat slave trade – to satisfy 
the European powers – slavery continued unabated, and policies put in place 
were hardly enforced. In 1860 the Governor (Khedive) Said himself ordered 
500 negro soldiers for his bodyguard, and in 1865 Egypt still had 27,000 
soldiers (of which 20,000 „negroes‟) stationed in the Sudan; forced 
recruitment into the army went on as before. As the Khartoum slave market 





In 1863 Ismail became the new Governor of Egypt; he followed in the 
footsteps of his grandfather Muhamed Ali, taking a keen interest in 
modernising and expanding the Egyptian empire. He saw potential in 
extending Egyptian control and establishing an “equatorial empire”, 
covering the area of southern Sudan and northern Uganda. Reports of 
explorers (Speke, Grant, Baker) talked of densely populated, well-
established kingdoms beyond the “utter savagedom” of southern Sudan, 
which had already developed, through contact with Arab merchants from 
Zanzibar, a considerable market for European goods. The easier line of 
communication with these kingdoms appeared to be through southern 
Sudan: a stretch of only 200 miles lay between Gondokoro and the 
kingdoms, much less than all the way to Zanzibar. An important target was 




In 1869 the Khedive
64
 Ismail hired Samuel Baker, a famous explorer and 
discoverer of Lake Albert, to establish that „Egyptian equatorial empire‟, at 
the same time securing the Nile Basin for the water on which Egypt 
depended, and „crushing the slave trade‟. Neither Baker nor his successors 
managed to set up a well-functioning administration, though by the late-
1870s the Egyptians had managed to establish some kind of nominal control 
over southern Sudan. They built military stations (forts) along the White 
Nile and to a lesser extent more inland in the Bahr el Ghazal, and further 
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south in the Equatorial
65
 kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda. These 
Egyptian forts were manned by their slave army, with Egyptian and 
northern Sudanese officers - under the overall command of the Governor of 
Equatoria (Province), usually a European. The most well-known of these 
was Charles Gordon, who later became Governor-General of Sudan. 
 
The Egyptian army, spread out over a large area, was forced to recruit large 
numbers of new soldiers. Quite a few of the new recruits were Danaqla from 
the north that had been living in the area for many years as small traders or 
as soldiers in the big slave traders‟ armies. Other new soldiers came from 
the surrounding local ethnic groups, conscripted or voluntarily, many of 
whom had also been soldiers for the big traders before.
66
 In the mid-1870s 
the Egyptian army in southern Sudan consisted largely of Egyptian officers, 
northern Sudanese (Fur, Nuba, Baqqara, Danaqla, etc.) and southern 
Sudanese (Dinka, Shilluk) slave-soldiers that had been conscripted earlier 
for the Egyptian jihadiya, some of whom were also officers by now. There 
were also Danaqla who had recently joined the Egyptian army (as soldiers 
or as civil servants) and newly added (conscripted or voluntarily) soldiers 
from southern Sudanese communities.  
 
Clearly, Egyptian control of the area was extremely slight, with those few 
forts scattered over a huge area and mainly along the White Nile. The 
garrisons‟ authority was confined to a radius of not more than a few miles, 
beyond which it was too dangerous to venture except with armed escort. 
Besides, these forts were manned by soldiers that were undisciplined and 
often (slave) traders in their own right, and basically lived off the country, 
looting and plundering. The European Governors‟ control over the army 
was equally difficult: scattered over a huge area, and without direct 
supervision, the officers and soldiers often did as they pleased. 
Disobedience, looting, stealing, slave hunting and rape were apparently the 







In 1877, a German Jewish doctor turned Muslim, later known as Emin 
Pasha, was sent to southern Sudan as Governor of Equatoria. He also had a 
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hard time controlling his stations and undisciplined soldiers, but by the early 
1880s the Egyptian forts seemed to have established good relationships with 
their neighbours, and some degree of peace existed. Hospitals were 
established in some of the forts, as well as mosques and Koran schools; 
there was a certain degree of islamisation around the stations and acceptance 
of the “imperial power”. This was, however, mainly limited to the vicinity 
of the military stations along the White Nile, which were well-established; 
more to the west the forts were without much supervision from Emin Pasha, 
and the situation there was more chaotic and violent, with continued slave 




In June 1881 the long-awaited Mahdi
69
 rose in northern Sudan and 
managed, with massive support from the Sudanese people, to defeat the 
Egyptian army on several occasions. While many of the northern Sudanese 
living in southern Sudan left the area to join the Mahdi, he was also widely 
supported by the arabicized ethnic groups of the northern part of southern 
Sudan. The Mahdi‟s agents tried to incite also the other southern ethnic 
groups to revolt, many of which joined the uprising; not necessarily for 
religious reasons, but to rid themselves of the unpopular (Anglo-)Egyptian 
administration.
70
 Also many of the Danaqla and other northern Sudanese in 
the Egyptian army deserted and took the Mahdi‟s side.
71
 They were, 
however, unable to entice any of the southern Sudanese soldiers to join 
them; the southerners were apparently oblivious of the Mahdist´s religious 
cause, and profoundly loyal and devoted to the Khedive, whom they looked 
upon „with mystical awe‟. Besides, being from Equatoria, it is possible that, 
as claimed by Collins, they felt they were defending their own country 




Emin Pasha withdrew with his remaining soldiers to the forts along the Nile 
and, when in early 1885 Khartoum fell to the Mahdists, the Egyptian army 
in Equatoria –whatever was left of it– was completely isolated, cut off from 
Egypt, and confined to their forts in a narrow strip of land along the Nile 
between Lado and Dufile, at Wadelai and the west bank of Lake Albert (see 
map 1, below).  
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This is an important episode in the history of the Nubis: without the rise of 
the Mahdi and the subsequent isolation of the soldiers in the south of Sudan, 
the Nubis would probably not exist. As it was, the remaining soldiers stayed 
isolated in their forts in southern Sudan for the next few years (the Mahdists 
did not come further south for a number of years); they lead a relatively easy 
life, to some extent mixing with the local population. They were able to 
develop some sense of community in and around the forts. It was the first 
step towards a Nubi community.  
 






The forts along the White Nile 
 
Both Gray and Soghayroun provide interesting descriptions of the Egyptian 
forts as semi-Arab, semi-native.
73
 The main group of inhabitants consisted 
of the soldiers, who came from Equatoria, northern Uganda, Congo, and 
even West Africa
74
, but were Islamised as soon as they joined the army; 
another group was the civil servants, clerks, storekeepers, etc. working for 
the Egyptian administration – they were often Egyptians or northern 
Sudanese (Danaqla), or even Greeks, Copts, Moroccans or Jews. The forts‟ 
dominant culture was clearly Arab and Islamic. 
 
The native population became increasingly incorporated in the daily life of 
the stations, often attracted by work for the administration and the soldiers. 
Boys and young men worked as porters or „gun boys‟, older ones joined the 
army as soldiers; some volunteered, others were conscripted locally as 
slaves.
75
  The soldiers continued looting the surrounding tribes for slaves for 
the army (as well as for servants, wives and concubines). Conscripted men 
were apparently allowed to bring their families to the station.
76
 Young slave 
boys could become part of a soldier‟s family, and later become gun-boys 
and soldiers. The number of local volunteers for the army grew with time, as 
the local population was aware of the advantages of having a family 
member in the army. Small businesses began to thrive around the forts; 
beads were exchanged for ivory and other produce. Whole villages moved 
closer to the stations, possibly also for protection. There was also the 
“inevitable string of Acholi, Bari, or Madi wives everywhere accompanying 
the soldiers”
77
; during campaigns, soldiers usually had at least one person 
accompanying him, a wife or a boy, to cook for him, carry his belongings, 
etc. The sons of the soldiers with these local women became later the logical 
new recruits for the army, starting their career as a „gun boy‟. The soldiers‟ 
wives and children lived within the fort as well, though it is unlikely that 
everyone could be accommodated there; soldiers with many dependents 
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Thus the population of the stations became an Arab-African mix of 
Egyptians (senior officers, civil servants, clerks), Danaqla (clerks, some 
officers, and soldiers), northern Sudanese soldiers and officers
79
, southern 
Sudanese soldiers, local servants/slaves, wives or concubines, and their 
children. Though by the late 1880s the majority of the soldiers would have 
been from southern Sudan, Islamic (Egyptian) culture remained dominant in 
the forts, and the lingua franca the northern Sudanese Arabic in its 
simplified form, „Juba Arabic‟.  
 
The diary of a European visitor, Mounteney-Jephson (1888), offers an 
interesting description of one of the military stations (Dufile): a well-
established station with clean, broad streets, shaded by huge trees; a large 
and spacious compound for the commander, one for visitors; fruit trees 
(orange, lime) and vegetable gardens (Mounteney-Jephson eats extremely 
well at the fort!); houses built with bricks, whitewashed inside, with doors 
and windows; and even a mosque. A palisade surrounded the fort, and a 
ditch filled with water for protection, making the fort impregnable. Outside 
the fort were some villages for the porters, interpreters and other local 





Apart from their immediate neighbours, i.e. the local people who were 
attracted to the stations and with whom they had good relations, the soldiers 
were quite isolated from the rest of the native people. One reason was that 
they were largely self-sufficient: they received a salary
81
, kept livestock and 
did some agriculture, including cotton growing. Another reason was their 
continuous looting of their neighbours, their raids for food, slaves and 
women (wives, concubines, servants). Another important factor may have 
been their attitude: due to their different “culture”, being military and 
Muslim, and possessing guns, they possibly felt superior to the local 
population.
82
 All men joining the army –conscripted or voluntary– received 
military training and they, like their wives, had to become Muslim, take on a 
Muslim name and be circumcised.
83
 A new social identity was created in 
this new group, based on military tradition and Islam, which, together with 
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the language, were important elements for cohesion. This new collective 
social identity, the group cohesion and attitude of superiority, setting them 
apart from the wider local population, formed the basis for the further 
development of the Nubi community. With time this social identity would 
only become stronger. 
 
 
The disintegration of the Egyptian army in southern Sudan  
 
For several years the southern Sudanese remnants of the Egyptian army 
remained isolated in their military forts: from 1881 they did not receive any 
news, supplies or salaries from the Egyptian government; the last steamer 
for Khartoum left March 1883.
84
  The soldiers became increasingly 
undisciplined and unmanageable, no longer obeying Emin‟s orders. Most of 
the (approx. 65 remaining) Egyptians in the army in Equatoria were 
criminals (“penal outcasts”) or had been involved in the nationalist rebellion 
in Egypt (1881-2); they had been sent to southern Sudan as a punishment. 
After the fall of Khartoum and the Anglo-Egyptian government (in Sudan) 
in 1885, they no longer felt the need to obey orders from „above‟, becoming 
increasingly unruly, and inciting the Sudanese soldiers. Emin Pasha became 
“Pasha in name and title only”, without much control over his army. The 
soldiers (mainly the ones that were not staying with Emin Pasha at the 





In April 1888, the explorer Stanley arrived at Lake Albert on the famous 
“Emin Pasha Relief Expedition”
86
, bringing letters from the Egyptian 
Khedive, in which he told the soldiers that he had given up Equatoria and 
ordered Emin Pasha to come to Egypt, at the same time permitting the 
soldiers to stay in Equatoria if they so chose, but then without further 
assistance from the Khedive. However, the Egyptian officers and clerks did 
not believe the letters were really from the Khedive, and incited the 
Sudanese soldiers. Emin Pasha had allegedly mentioned at some point that 
he would leave the soldiers with „his good friend Kabarega‟, the King of 
Bunyoro. They thought Emin Pasha might betray them, leaving them at the 
mercy of Kabarega when travelling through his country on their way to 
Zanzibar, from where they would travel to Egypt, or sell all of them as 
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slaves to the English. Most likely, and possibly more importantly, since 
most of the men were from southern Sudan, they probably did not feel like 
leaving their homeland and their comfortable stations, leaving behind 
slaves, servants and belongings, and walking all the way to Zanzibar 
through hostile territory. Moreover, they had become virtually immobile 
because of their huge number of dependents: there were about 1500 soldiers, 





As a result, at the end of August 1888, when Emin Pasha (with Mounteney-
Jephson, a member of the „relief expedition‟) was travelling to each fort to 
inform the soldiers of the Khedive‟s letters, a large part of the army 
mutinied. He was imprisoned at Dufile and put on trial for 
„maladministration of Equatoria‟, then deposed. There was merry-making in 
the forts, and “the afternoons and evenings were given over to drunkenness 
and debauchery”. As time passed, the rebel leaders (mainly the officers and 
Egyptian clerks) increasingly quarrelled among themselves, trying to divide 
the loot and secure the best promotions; the mood amongst the normal 





In October 1888 the Mahdists suddenly appeared to be advancing south, to 
remove the last remnants of Egyptian rule (and most likely also to procure 
slaves for the Mahdi‟s jihadiya
89
), creating chaos and confusion at Dufile 
and the other forts. The rebel officers, not knowing what to do, turned to 
Emin Pasha for advice. Lado, the northernmost fort was deserted by Emin‟s 
soldiers; the next station, Rejaf, was taken by the Mahdists (with help from 
local natives) after a short fight in October 1888. An expedition sent to fight 
the Mahdists was almost completely destroyed, causing enormous panic at 
Dufile. Selim Bey, a respectable Sudanese officer was chosen as the new 
leader; all garrisons were subsequently concentrated at Dufile, while stations 
to the north were abandoned. The long columns of fleeing soldiers, servants, 
women and children carrying all their belonging, were constantly attacked 
by the local Bari people, taking revenge for all those years of oppression and 
looting. Many soldiers, including Selim Bey, wanted Emin Pasha to resume 
his former position and take charge of this emergency situation, but he did 
not want to: he had taken his decision to leave with Stanley to Cairo. Emin 
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Pasha was subsequently allowed to go to Wadelai with the women and 
children.
90
 When the Mahdists eventually attacked Dufile in November 
1888, they were defeated with heavy losses; they then withdrew to Rejaf 





There was violent disagreement amongst the officers of the Egyptian army 
on whether to leave Equatoria with Emin Pasha or stay. In the end, after 
voting, Selim Bey‟s faction won and it was decided to go with Emin Pasha 
to Cairo. Stanley was meanwhile camping at the southern tip of Lake 
Albert, at Kavalli‟s
92
, and wanted to leave on March 26, 1889. Selim Bey 
went back north to evacuate all the remaining soldiers and dependents and 
bring them to Kavalli‟s, but before he could start, another Sudanese officer, 
Fadl el Mula, who had wanted to remain in Equatoria, mutinied, stole 
ammunition and, with the larger part of the soldiers, left for the hills. Selim 
Bey apparently tried to get his soldiers to regroup and follow him but did 
not manage to be back at Kavalli´s in time. This was partly because of Fadl 
el Mula‟s mutiny, but Stanley was also convinced that none of them, 
including Selim Bey, had seriously considered leaving with Emin Pasha. On 
April 10, 1889, Stanley and Emin Pasha (somewhat reluctantly) left for 
Zanzibar without Selim Bey; in the end only few of Emin Pasha‟s officers 
and soldiers (with dependants included they were less than 600 people, of 
which many absconded within the first few days) accompanied him to the 
coast.
93
 Having arrived at Kavalli‟s too late, and with no other place to go, 
Selim Bey decided to stay there with his small group of followers (only 90 
men and 300 women/children were remaining). Within days however they 
were first attacked by Fadl el Mula‟s group (to steal the remaining 
ammunition), and then by natives, after which Selim Bey remained with less 
than 40 men at Kavalli‟s, under the protection of the local chief, until more 




The break-away group under Fadl el Mula was involved in some more 
battles with the Mahdists. Fadl el Mula, however, was thought to be 
untrustworthy, trying to make secret deals with the Mahdists - subsequently 
a large part of his group, 800 men, deserted him in March 1891 to join 
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Selim Bey at Kavalli‟s. It was a long march with more than 10,000 
followers, subjected to attacks from the local population. They arrived at 







In the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, Uganda had been recognised as a 
British sphere of influence. As the British government did not want to be 
involved in the administration of Uganda, the Imperial British East African 
Company (IBEAC) was given that mandate. Captain Lugard was 
despatched as its representative.  
 
Lugard arrived in Kampala in December 1890; his small army consisted 
mainly of Sudanese soldiers, recruited in Cairo. Some of them had returned 
there with Emin Pasha, and from them he knew about the other Sudanese 
soldiers that must still be somewhere in Equatoria. From the beginning the 
IBEAC suffered from a chronic shortage of funds
96
, but as Lugard was 
desperate for more soldiers, he needed soldiers that would live off the land 
and not cost the IBEAC anything: he hoped to find them, the “best material 
for soldiery in Africa”, at Kavalli‟s. So he travelled west and met Selim Bey 
in September 1891, right at the time when that large part of Fadl el Mula‟s 
group was arriving at Kavalli‟s. Had he come a week earlier, he would have 




As it was, Lugard found a large group of undisciplined, destitute soldiers, 
„addicted to strong liquor‟, malnourished, and with a huge number of 
dependents. They were mostly dressed in hides and rags, or almost naked 
(the women and children), after having walked for several months. 
Nevertheless, Lugard was impressed by their prowess and loyalty to Egypt, 
and he was happy to be able “to secure so fine a body of men for the 
Company‟s service”
98
, even as he recognised that the group at Kavalli‟s 
must‟ve been “a terrible curse” to the locals, a “lawless band of soldiery, [..] 
recognising only the law of force”. We can imagine what would have 
happened had Lugard not taken these soldiers to Uganda, they would have 
left “a fearful path of desolation, rapine, murder and slavery”.
99
 
                                                          
95
 Collins: 80-83; Lugard Vol II: 205-6; Mounteney-Jephson: 450-2. 
96
 Vere-Hodge: 21. 
97
 Furley: 313-4; Lugard Vol. II: 133-4, 200. 
98
 Perham 1959: 332. 
99
 Lugard Vol. II: 216-, 231-2. 
44 
 
There may have been around 850-900 soldiers with 9-10,000 dependents 
(some officers apparently had more than 100 dependents), though available 
figures are vague and contradictory in much of the literature. According to 
Lugard himself the group that went into Uganda with him consisted of 
slightly more than 8000 people
100
, but, he thought, they must‟ve left “a great 
many women and children behind”.
101
 Most soldiers appeared to be of a 
rather high rank. The original officers (mainly from northern Sudan) had all 
assumed higher ranks, and the later recruits (the sons of the older soldiers, 
and the locals) had apparently been promoted in the last few years; there 
were only very few privates. The group still used coins, and the Egyptian 
clerks still wrote official dispatches, like before; they had somehow held on 




Selim Bey, firmly in charge of the “Egyptian army”, agreed to join Lugard 
at IBEAC on condition that the Khedive of Egypt would approve it (which 
he did one year later), and that he himself would be the commanding officer, 
taking orders from Lugard only. This was to create problems later on, just 
like the agreement on their payment, which was very low, and basically 




On 5 October, 1891, they left Kavalli‟s in three groups, at intervals of one 
day in order not to create queues too long to manage, for the 600 miles trip; 
they walked only a few hours in the morning to avoid the heat. Even in three 
groups, it was difficult: by the time to first people of the group arrived for 
camp, the last people still had to leave the camp of the previous night; the 
columns were seven miles long. They were attacked by local people, slaves 
deserted, children drowned; the “Sudanese were most callous to the 
sufferings of their dependents” –including small children– who were 
carrying all the belongings, and the weak. Lugard himself spent hours in the 
water helping women and small children across the rivers, and even had to 
establish a rear-guard to collect children that were simply left behind. The 
columns moved extremely slowly, also because the soldiers continued to 
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This is a crucial episode in the history of the Nubis: the fact that Lugard 
recruited and took them to Uganda opened a new chapter for them; it 
ensured their continuity as a military group. An essential element here is the 
large number of civilians within the group, which allowed their survival as a 
community and later development into an ethnic group.
105
 These soldiers 
and their dependents, moving into Uganda, were the first “East African 
Nubians”, though at the time they were usually called “Sudanese”. From 
this point onwards, they were “immigrants”, strangers in the countries 
where they worked, lived and settled. As a result, a stronger sense of 
community could develop, which may not have been present at that 
particular moment.  
 
Amongst themselves, this new community referred to themselves as „Nubi‟. 
The term “Nubi/Nuba” was apparently used in Egypt to refer to anyone 
coming from the Sudan, and was almost synonymous with “slave” – the 
Nubian kingdoms (in Sudan) supplied slaves to the Egyptian pharaohs for 
the black slave army, the „jihadiya‟. The term „Nubi‟ was later used for the 
Sudanese slave soldiers in Egyptian service. In southern Sudan, “Nubi” 
began to be used to refer to the communities of slave soldiers and their 
families. How, or why, the soldiers and their dependents would refer to 
themselves as „slaves‟ is unclear, though it is possible that in southern 
Sudan the term „Nubi‟ became so widely used for that particular (former 





The Sudanese soldiers in Uganda 
 
Along the way from Kavalli‟s to Kampala, a line of forts was built at 
strategic places, to keep the kingdom of Bunyoro under control. In each fort 
Lugard left a number of soldiers with their dependents, usually around 2000 
people, under command of a reliable Sudanese officer. They were to grow 
their own food, but they were also allowed (if not encouraged) to raid into 
Bunyoro for food. 
 
Towards the end of 1891, Lugard and Selim Bey arrived in Kampala with 
the remaining soldiers and dependents, much too far from the garrisons in 
the Western part of the country to actually control them, as they were only 
to take orders from Selim Bey or Lugard. Without close supervision and “a 
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firm hand”, discipline wavered and the Sudanese soldiers raided not only in 
Bunyoro, but also created havoc in the areas they were supposed to protect. 
The Toro king sent messages to Lugard “begging him to protect his people 
from the pitiless Sudanese”.
107
 Likewise, slavery, strictly forbidden by 
Lugard, persisted. The Sudanese continued their life as they had done in the 
stations in Equatoria as the Egyptian army: an isolated military group, 
taking wives, concubines and „servants‟ (voluntarily or involuntarily) from 
the local tribes, looting and robbing their neighbours. In the Sudanese‟s 
defence it is worth noting what Furley says about their behaviour: “No 
doubt in a cruel age the Sudanese behaviour was not remarkable.” Others 
agree: “It‟s in fact the traditional African system of warfare”, and apparently 
the Swahili soldiers‟ “reputation amongst the local inhabitants does not 




Lugard was later heavily criticised for his decision to bring the Sudanese 
soldiers to Uganda, certainly when the rumour was going around that the 
Sudanese had made a pact with other Muslims groups to take power in 
Buganda and establish a Muslim state, or even link up with the Mahdists 
and other Arabs.
109
 The rivalry between Muslim, Protestant and Roman 
Catholic groups in Buganda had caused civil war in Buganda between 1885 
and 1890, and created havoc; many people were killed (by war and famine), 
and even more had fled the country. In 1890 the „united Christians‟ with the 
Buganda king Mwanga, won the final battles; the „Mohammedans‟ fled into 
Bunyoro, from where they continued raiding into Buganda. After a second 
„Mohammedan war‟ (1891) in which the Muslims were beaten by a force 
led by Lugard, they accepted a peace offer in which they got three provinces 






 April 1893, with the IBEAC bankrupt, Britain took over the 
administration of Uganda. The Government Commissioner Sir Portal 
decided to abandon the western forts along the Toro-Bunyoro border and to 
bring the Sudanese soldiers to Buganda and Kampala as regular troops, to 
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In June 1893, when there was a serious threat for another “Mohammedan” 
revolt in Buganda, the Sudanese troops were quickly disarmed, and Selim 
Bey, who had continued to play an important role as commander of the 
Sudanese, was arrested and charged with „mutinous behaviour‟, and 
subsequently deported to the Kenyan coast on retirement pay.
112
 His role 
has never been completely clarified, though it seems quite clear that he 
sympathised with the Muslims, and even might have joined them in case of 
war.
113
 Selim Bey, who had long been sick, died in Naivasha, on his way to 
the coast.
114
 Some older Nubis in Kibera still tell a mythological story 
around the death of Selim Bey: where he died a well sprung up and the 
water formed the Lake Naivasha. 
 
The growing strength of the Bunyoro kingdom seemed to pose a serious 
threat to Buganda. In early 1894, a large force, comprising of 400 Sudanese 
soldiers
115
 together with eight Europeans and 15,000 Baganda spearmen, 
occupied Bunyoro. This was the first time the Sudanese soldiers could prove 
what they were worth, and even though they never engaged in serious battle 
with Kabarega‟s constantly withdrawing forces, they were praised for their 





The British were now anxious to enlist the Sudanese troops as „regulars‟ and 
even recruit more of them, because many Sudanese soldiers were now 
advanced in age, too old for active service or even garrison duties, and about 
to retire. Furthermore, the Sudanese remained the cheapest soldiers, and 
Uganda could not afford anything else. So, when in early 1894 a large group 
of Sudanese soldiers with more than 10,000 followers were reported to be 
trespassing into British territory, Captain Thruston was sent to bring them 
all into Uganda.
117
 It appeared these people were part of the original Fadl el 
Mula group (see above
118
) that served with the Belgians of the Congo Free 
State for about two years. In January 1894, after they had split up in two 
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groups on their way to Wadelai (to claim the area for the Belgians), Fadl el 
Mula‟s group was ambushed and annihilated by the Mahdists. The second 
group, of about 350 soldiers with a huge number of dependants, managed to 
reach Wadelai and, in search of food, continued further south along Lake 
Albert. Here they were approached by Captain Thruston, who convinced 
them to enlist with the British in Uganda. Like before with Lugard, they 
went in long columns, walking for many hours; more than half of the 
group‟s dependants (slaves, women, children) disappeared (deserted or died) 
during the journey and at arrival in Uganda only a little over 3000 were 
counted.
119
 Thus the second group of Sudanese, or „East African Nubians‟, 
entered East Africa.  
 
On 18 June 1894 Buganda was declared the Uganda Protectorate. The area 
excluded Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole, but extended to the east to include 
Naivasha in what is now Kenya. The area between Naivasha and the coast 
had for long remained a no-man‟s land, considered desolate and useless. 
However, the accessibility of the new Protectorate became an issue: the road 
north through Sudan was closed due to the Mahdists‟ presence and the long 
distance to the coast (800 miles) through inhospitable area would require 3-
4 months on foot. As it became clear that a railway from Kampala to 
Mombasa on the coast would solve that problem of inaccessibility, that “no 
man‟s land”, including the area up to the Juba River in Somalia, was, in 
June 1895, declared the “East Africa Protectorate”.  
 
On 1 September 1895, the official Ugandan army, the Uganda Rifles, was 
established and was made up almost entirely of Sudanese soldiers. They 
initially signed a 12-year contract and were organised in 10 companies 
which were under the command of European officers. In July 1896, the 
Uganda Protectorate was extended to include Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and 
Busoga, covering the area that is now Uganda, and including the area up to 
Naivasha.  
 
The following year, 1897, was a busy year for the Sudanese soldiers: they 
were almost continuously on the road, marching to and fighting in different 
places. First in Toro; then Kavirondo north of Lake Victoria; next a punitive 
expedition against the Nandi (Kenya), then back to Buddu in Uganda. This 
started to create problems. So far the soldiers had mainly been based in 
garrisons, without moving around much, and only engaging in the 
occasional raid. This garrison life had allowed for planting crops and having 
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the family almost constantly around; overall a rather comfortable lifestyle. 
This situation, however, changed with all the campaigns and punitive 
expeditions going on. 
 
 




After the campaign in Buddu, in September 1897, some Sudanese 
companies were almost immediately sent to Ngare Nyuki, near Eldama 
Ravine (Kenya), where they prepared for a long trip out of the Protectorate, 
into Equatoria. On the way from Ngare Nyuki to Eldama Ravine, from 
where they would start the long march north, they mutinied. 
 
No one denied that the Sudanese had the right to complain. As Thomas & 
Scott put it: “Ill-clothed; marched, with little consideration or promises of 
rest, from one end of the country to the other and thus deprived of any 
settled cantonment life with their families; earning but a fraction of the pay 
received by similar troops in the adjoining East Africa Protectorate, and that 
pay, in poor quality cloth, often six months in arrears, they now found 
themselves attached to an expedition of unknown destination and 
duration”.
121
 The Sudanese were paid only four Rupees/month (a private), 
even lower than the carriers, who earned 10-12 Rupees.
122
 Other complaints 
were that they were insufficiently fed, they were not allowed (on this 
expedition) to take their wives and children, their officers did not speak 
Arabic so they did not understand them, and they were treated „like 
donkeys‟.
123
 Clearly there was already a certain degree of discontent and a 
tendency towards mutiny among the Sudanese soldiers. Moreover, the 
campaign to Equatoria was to take place under the command of the British 
officer (MacDonald) the Nubis held responsible for the deportation and 
death of Selim Bey some years earlier.
124
 Wild however maintains that the 
leaders of the mutineers were determined to create trouble, no matter what; 
according to him, some of them still dreamt of that “Muhammedan 
kingdom” in Uganda, ruled by themselves, (secretly) feeling superior to the 
Christians.
125
  It seems the mutiny leaders did not inform the other soldiers 
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about what was agreed with the army commander, and exploited their 
sentiments in order for them to participate in the mutiny. Soghayroun points 
out that there was already a general Muslim unrest in the region, due to 
events in Sudan (the Mahdi), Congo and in German East Africa, and 
according to him this must have affected the Sudanese soldiers as well. 
They tried to get the Ugandan Muslims to take their side during the mutiny, 





The mutineers withdrew towards Uganda, looting the military stations and 
villages along the way, killing people, destroying bridges, and stealing 
livestock and whatever else they could carry. They tried to convince 
(Sudanese) soldiers of other garrisons to join the mutiny, but most remained 
loyal to the British. The mutineers, now around 500 men, occupied the 
garrison fort at Luba‟s (near Jinja, Uganda). Surrounded by British troops, 
negotiations and some clashes took place, with heavy losses on both sides. It 
seems that at this point most mutineers were ready to give up and surrender, 
but the Sudanese officers, fearing to be held responsible for the mutiny, 
executed some British officers they had taken prisoner, knowing that from 
then on the mutineers could no longer count on mercy. In this way they 
implicated all mutineers, expecting them to continue to fight till the end. 
They also lashed and locked up anyone hinting at surrendering.
127
 After 3 
months of siege, early January 1898, the mutineers broke out of the fort and 
fled northwards to Lake Kyoga. Some battles took place in which the 
mutineers were defeated; many were killed and the rest dispersed, while 
women and children, as well as belongings, were left behind. Nine 
ringleaders were executed; a large number of captured soldiers was sacked, 
and a smaller number acquitted. The remaining mutineers fled further north, 
causing some trouble over the years. They were finally defeated in 1901 
during the so-called “Lango expedition”, the punitive expedition against the 
remaining mutineers; the army returned with 1485 prisoners, most of them 






                                                          
126
 See Soghayroun: 56-122. 
127
 Austin: 48-9; Wild 1954: 38. 
128
 Dunbar 1965-i: 94-95; Moyse-Bartlett: 86; Soghayroun: 104. 
51 
 
The King‟s African Rifles  
 
After the mutiny, the Uganda Rifles were reorganised: the number of 
Sudanese soldiers was reduced (but still at least 75%) and they were to be 
gradually replaced by Swahilis, Somalis, Indians and native Ugandan 
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In 1901, all the armies of the regional British Protectorates
130
 were 
organised into battalions of one colonial army. On the 1
st
 of January 1902 
the “King‟s African Rifles” (KAR) was born. The Uganda Rifles became 
the 4
th
 battalion KAR, the East Africa Rifles the 3
rd
 battalion KAR; both 
battalions had a large number of Sudanese soldiers. Notwithstanding a 
certain degree of doubt regarding the loyalty of the Sudanese, they formed 
the backbone of the early KAR: until World War II they also dominated the 
ranks of KAR‟s native officers; many made their career in KAR and served 




There was enough to do in those early years for the Sudanese soldiers, as 
British rule met resistance in almost every corner of the Protectorates. There 
were punitive actions against the Nandi (1895-1906), the Kikuyu and Embu 
(1904-1907), and in 1909-10 in Somaliland against the “Mad Mullah”. 
Much of the work concerned securing the Uganda Road (from Mombasa to 
Nairobi to Kampala) for trade caravans, escorting mail and food caravans, 
and protection of the Uganda Railway construction.
132
 There were also 
military actions against the Giriama, Taita, Kamba, Kisii and Elgeyo tribes.  
 
In 1902, after the railway had reached Port Florence (now Kisumu), the 
Uganda Protectorate ceded its eastern province to the neighbouring East 
Africa Protectorate
133
, for the purpose of having the area crossed by the 
railway under only one administration. The new East Africa Protectorate 
territory consisted more or less of present-day Kenya plus the area further 
east, up to the Juba River in Somalia. Some 250 Sudanese soldiers were 
subsequently (in 1904) transferred from KAR 4
th
 battalion (Uganda) to the 
3
rd





It was the habit in those days, in Egypt, Sudan, in the military forts in East 
Africa and Somalia, to allocate some land to the soldiers to cultivate and 
grow food for their families. Retired and demobilised soldiers were also 
given land near the barracks. Like the Egyptians before them, the British 
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used the Sudanese soldiers‟ sons for the recruitment of new soldiers, and 
found it very convenient to have a reserve force of veterans close at hand in 
case they needed experienced soldiers on short notice.
134
 Moreover, the East 
African armies never had much money, and the protectorates tried to keep 
KAR as cheap as possible, so there was probably no money for pensions; 
giving land was a much cheaper option, and remained for a long time the 




Locally recruited soldiers usually returned to their rural home after leaving 
active service, but in East Africa, these Sudanese “detribalised” veterans had 
nowhere to go; they could not possibly go back to their original 
communities in Sudan. Being so inextricably tied to the military culture and 
life, soldiers for life, they settled permanently near or next to the forts, 
stations or barracks, with their families and dependents. Sudanese (Nubi) 
villages were established in Uganda, Somalia and Kenya, wherever the army 
had more permanent bases. In Kenya, they were established in Kiambu, 
Mazeras, Machakos, Kibigori, Kibos, Kisii, Kisumu, Mumias, Eldama 
Ravine and Nairobi, amongst others. Most of these places had been forts or 




Kibra, in Nairobi, became the main Nubi settlement in Kenya, being next to 
the main KAR barracks. Most of the Sudanese soldiers that served in the 
KAR in those days, would, at some point, have passed through Nairobi, 
based for a short or longer time at the KAR barracks. Many of them would 
ultimately settle in Kibera, after retirement or demobilisation. 
 
 
The second and third „road‟ to Kibera 
 
Apart from the Sudanese soldiers that entered East Africa through Uganda 
and settled in Kibera, there were two other ways in which Sudanese soldiers 
came to East Africa and eventually ended up in Kibera: one way was 
through direct recruitment by the British in Egypt and northern Sudan to be 
despatched to Somalia, and the other way led through Tanzania: recruited by 
the Germans in Cairo to assist in suppressing native uprisings along the 
German East African coast.  
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In 1882 Britain invaded Egypt to crush the Egyptian nationalists‟ rebellion 
and safeguard European investments and the Suez Canal; the Khedive 
Tewfiq, deposed by the nationalists, was reinstated, but remained a puppet, 
controlled by the British, who largely took control of Egypt and Sudan.  
 
Sudanese soldiers were recruited in northern Sudan and Egypt to be used for 
the reconstituted Egyptian army, and to be sent to Somalia (Jubaland), 
travelling by steamer from Suakin on Sudan´s Red Sea coast to Mombasa. 
Like the other Sudanese soldiers before, they were allowed to bring at least 
their wife.
137
 After the Anglo-Italian negotiations in 1886 the southern part 
of Somalia, Jubaland, was allocated to the British, and became part of the 
British East Africa Protectorate. A British KAR garrison was subsequently 
established at Kismayu, and at places further north along the Lower Juba 
River, like Serenli and Yonte; many of its soldiers were Sudanese.
138
 A 
number of the newly recruited soldiers were most probably (southern) 
Sudanese soldiers that were made redundant by the Egyptian army after they 
lost Sudan to the Mahdi in the early 1880s. Others may have been former 
soldiers of the jihadiya and sons of soldiers, but there were also unemployed 
young men, or „farmers without land‟ amongst them. Apparently the last 




The active soldiers were replaced from time to time, moving to other parts 
of the Protectorate to serve, and other Sudanese soldiers were moved to 
serve in Kismayu. In this way, the Sudanese soldiers coming from Egypt 
and Sudan straight to Somalia were mixed with the ones that had come to 
Kenya through Uganda. They came from a similar background and spoke 
the same language, making for easy integration. Some soldiers were retired 
in Kismayu or Yonte, and started Sudanese settlements of ex-soldiers there, 
often marrying Somali women. It was KAR policy to stimulate soldiers to 
have a wife or concubine, whether brought with them or „married‟ locally; it 
was considered “conducive to discipline and stability”. Many of those that 
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came through Uganda and moved to Kismayu at a later stage kept their 
families in Kibera (or in other Nubi villages in Kenya) for the time they 
were based in Somalia; others –possibly the officers– took their whole 
families with them to Somalia. A number of soldiers that married local 





In 1925, after the British had ceded Jubaland to the Italians
141
, the KAR 
soldiers were moved to the Kenya Colony. Many Sudanese ex-soldiers that 
had settled in Sudanese villages in Somalia came also to Kenya and were 
allocated land in Mazeras (near Mombasa), Meru or Nyanza; some of them 
later settled in Kibera. Others stayed behind in Kismayu, and even up to 




German East Africa 
 
The East African coast was claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, and fell 
therefore within the British sphere of influence. In 1884, the British were 
confronted with an accomplished fact after agents of the Society for German 
Colonisation (GDK – Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation, a private 
enterprise) secretly made their way inland and signed treaties with twelve 
chieftains, thus claiming large tracts of land for Germany. In 1885 the GDK 
became a chartered company, which was granted imperial protection by the 
German government.
142
 In their Agreement of 1886, Germany and Britain 
drew a line between the two main rivers in East Africa, the Tana and the 
Ruvuma, to divide the area up to Lake Victoria: Kenya, north of the line, 
was left to the British, who in return recognised Germany‟s claim on what 
was to become “Deutsch Ost Afrika” (German East Africa).
143
 The GDK –
which in 1885 had become the German East Africa Company (DOAG)– had 
meanwhile extended its territory through more „treaties‟ with indigenous 
chiefs; in 1888 they coerced the Sultan of Zanzibar to give them control of 
the customs throughout the coastal strip, which until then had remained 
under the Sultan‟s control. While the DOAG‟s administration of the area 
was marked by violence and repression, the taking over of the coastal ports 
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provided additional tension, which eventually resulted in the so-called 




After the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 the Sultan of Zanzibar was 
forced (by the British) to „cede absolutely‟ the coastal strip to the Germans; 
shortly afterwards, Zanzibar was proclaimed a British Protectorate.
145
 In 
1891, shortly after the Abushiri Revolt, the German government committed 
itself to colonial rule and assumed control over all areas claimed by the 
DOAG. The new colonial government continued the policy of violent 
repression that had started under the DOAG administration, and “the region 
was plunged into more than a decade of violence and continuous 
warfare”.
146
 There were several native uprisings, the main ones being the 
Hehe rebellion (1891-1898) and the Maji Maji rebellion (1905-1907); all 
were brutally crushed. This repressive phase in German rule in East Africa 
was to last till 1906. After 1906 German rule became more “enlightened”, 
resulting in a relatively prosperous economy with two railway lines at the 




In 1888, when the coastal people revolted, and the DOAG appeared unable 
to suppress it, army Captain Hermann von Wissmann was sent from 
Germany to assist. On his way to Mombasa towards the end of that year, he 
stopped in Cairo to recruit Sudanese soldiers he had noticed there some 
years earlier. After Egypt‟s defeat at the hands of the Mahdists, many 
Sudanese slave soldiers had been released from service in the Egyptian 
army. They were unemployed, living with their families in the slums of 
Cairo and Alexandria, where they created havoc, “stealing and harassing the 
Egyptian shopkeepers”. Von Wissmann eventually left Cairo with 630 
Sudanese soldiers originating from central and southern Sudan, 
accompanied by 486 women and 170 children. Apart from the Sudanese 
soldiers, the Germans also recruited other Africans: Somalis, Shangaan from 
southern Africa, and local (Tanzanian) tribesmen.
148
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The following decade, which saw the establishment of garrisons in the 
interior to facilitate the occupation and the German hegemony over 
Tanzania, was marked by brutal violence and continuous warfare between 
the Germans and the local population. Though discipline in the German 
army was very strict, stealing from the local population, extortion, rape and 
even murder were somehow tolerated.
149
   
 
In 1890, an additional 600 Sudanese were recruited from Egypt, but in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century, more and more local tribesmen were 
incorporated into the army. The number of Sudanese soldiers in the German 
army reduced further because they got old and retired, while others died on 
duty (though mainly of disease and fatigue); many went back to Egypt after 
their contract expired. Moreover, the Anglo-Egyptian government refused to 
give the Germans any more Sudanese soldiers. By 1900, the Sudanese made 
up only 15-20% of the German army; most of the remaining Sudanese of the 
first group had by then become officers. The Sudanese soldiers were 
involved in all the military operations, including World War I, the famous 
guerrilla war when the German army, led by Von Lettow-Vorbeck, managed 





Like in British East Africa, having experienced veterans around was seen as 
an advantage, just in case they were needed later on. Therefore, also in 
German East Africa, retired Sudanese soldiers were given land to settle, 
often in areas where the Government was not sure about the loyalty of the 
local population, thus creating “askari (soldier) villages”. By 1901, some 12 
villages of 150-260 inhabitants had been created, scattered all over the 
country. The families of the soldiers usually lived outside the barracks; an 
estimated 40% of their sons ended up as soldiers themselves. Some retired 
soldiers joined the police; others became bodyguards of local chiefs, or 
became merchants and traders.
151
 One World War I anecdote is still told in 
Kibera in which Sudanese soldiers fighting on the German and on the 
British sides discovered that the people they were shooting at spoke the 
same language and were in fact “their brothers”. It is said that they then 
decided that one group would surrender to the other group, to avoid killing 
one another. Some Sudanese soldiers fought in both armies, moving back 
and forth after having been taken prisoner, or even depending on who paid 
more. Apart from getting a better salary, German askaris who had served for 
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more than 5 years also received a pension (contrary to the British native 
soldiers): the last Sudanese ex-askari in Tanzania received his German 




In 1917, the Tanganyika (6
th
) battalion of the KAR was formed from former 
German askaris. Most Sudanese soldiers that retired from the 6 KAR 
between 1919 and 1939, when 6 KAR was moved to Nanyuki in Kenya, 
probably settled in Tanzania but some came to Kenya: a few Sudanese 
PoWs settled in Kibera. The Sudanese soldiers and their descendants that 
remained in Tanzania formed Sudanese/Nubi communities there, with main 
villages near Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Moshi and Arusha. Nowadays the 
Tanzanian Nubis have virtually disappeared, assimilated into the Muslim 





The Nubis are essentially a mix of individuals from many different parts of 
the Sudan and surrounding areas that merged to become a new, military and 
Islamic, community; they formed the basis of a new ethnic group that 
developed in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century. Not much is 
known, of course, about how exactly this particular case of „ethno-genesis‟, 
this „beginning of a new community‟, happened. It is likely that during the 
time in southern Sudan (Equatoria) the Nubi community did not really exist 
as such; it was basically a mix of people somehow connected through Islam 
and military life around the forts. It was also a time of rapid change for 
many people: joining the Egyptian army, they left behind their families, and 
existing social patterns were destroyed; new patterns, bringing these 
„strangers‟ together, had to be created to facilitate a modus vivendi for the 
new group.
153
 Though creating such a new community‟s traditions does not 
happen overnight
154
, new traditions and rituals would almost automatically, 
almost unconsciously, be invented – if someone got married, for example, 
they would have to agree on how to do that. Part of this was determined by 
Islam, the Egyptian army‟s religion: the marriage contract, the rights and 
duties of both groom and bride. The wedding ceremonies would have to be 
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invented and agreed upon: what shall the bride wear, where does the groom 
pick her up or meet her, do we sprinkle something over them once the 
marriage is sealed, and if so, what?; who provides the food for the guests, 
who pays what, etcetera. For these things they must have borrowed from the 
existing traditions, rituals and ceremonies of their own (former) Sudanese 
ethnic groups, from northern and southern Sudan and the extended region. 
Even up to today, the Nubis in Kibera make their own colourful food covers 
(tabaga and kuta) that show resemblance to the Darfurian „mtabag‟. Some 
elements were clearly taken from their Egyptian masters: the language and 
religion, as well as the practice of female circumcision, which was practiced 




Moving together out of southern Sudan and into Uganda may have created 
something of a „community feeling‟ amongst the Nubis. Once in Uganda, 
the Nubis must have felt themselves a separate community – being military, 
Muslims, „strangers‟, and powerful due to their link to the colonial 
administration, they were very different from the people they found there. 
Nevertheless, the Nubis had been „created‟ only some decades earlier – it 
seems logical that it would take some time before social and cultural 
institutions that provided order and meaning to the lives of the group 
members were created, before the group was really a community.  
 
Before they actually arrived and settled at Kibera, many other people were 
assimilated into the Nubi group: apart from other Sudanese soldiers that 
came to East Africa through Somalia or Tanzania, the Nubis also mixed 
with Ugandan, Tanzanian and Kenyan tribes and with the Somalis
156
 – 
everywhere they went on campaign, the soldiers took wives, concubines, or 
„house girls‟, some of whom would stay with the soldiers and later move 
with them to Kibera or another Nubian village. These women would have to 
adapt to the Nubi customs, in terms of religion, food, dress and language – 
eventually they had to “become Nubi”. Also men could become Nubi: 
slaves and gun-boys could become soldiers, and then become part of the 
community; KAR soldiers from other tribes would also often learn the Nubi 
language and if they were or became Muslim, and stayed long enough with 
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the Nubis, or settled with the Nubis in a Nubian village, they could become 
accepted as one of them, often also marrying into the community. In Kibera 
some Nubi families have Ethiopian or Borana great-grandfathers, who 
served with Nubis in the same KAR battalion, settled with the Nubis in 
Kibera, and “became Nubi”. This had logically raised the question whether 
this curious mix of people could be considered an ethnic group. That 
specific “Nubi-feeling” was probably not present at the time they migrated 
from Equatoria to Uganda, but rather something that grew over the years in 
Uganda and Kenya. A closer look at the Nubis in Kibera will show that this 





The next chapter starts at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the 
Nubis arrived in Kenya and settled together in their own „Nubian‟ villages, 
and in Nairobi, where they created over the years their own “tribal land”, 
Kibra.  
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From shamba to slum – a history of Kibera 
 
 
At the time when the Nubis settled in Kibera, in the early days of Nairobi, 
problems of cheap housing for Africans were already evident. Illegal 
African settlements, providing cheap accommodation, sprang up and were 
demolished again if they were in the way of the growing city. Kibera 
escaped that fate for historic reasons: it was probably the first legal African 
settlement in Nairobi, albeit for a limited group of people, the retired and 
demobilised soldiers of the King‟s African Rifles (KAR), the British 
colonial army in East Africa. Most of these soldiers being Nubi, the history 
of Kibera is in essence the history of these Nubis. Kibera remained a „rural 
area‟ dominated by Nubis, until in the 1970s and 1980s it rapidly filled up 
with „outsiders‟
158
 looking for cheap accommodation – today Kibera is a 
sprawling slum with hundreds of thousands of people packed in an area of 
550 acres. 
 
This chapter tells the story of how the Nubis settled in Kibera, and how they 
struggled to hold on to their land while their „Sudanese‟ villages turned, 
within a relatively short period, into a slum. The first part of this chapter 
deals with the period up to Independence (1963), a period in which the 
Nubis settled in Kibera, generally leading a good life, even if they started to 
become marginalised. This section shows how the Nubis have tried to use 
their being „foreign soldiers‟, and the special relationship they therefore had 
with the colonial government, to maintain access to special privileges and 
control over the land in Kibera. This strategy was relatively successful 
considering they managed to stay in Kibera, despite attempts by the British 
at relocating them. Independence was a major break-point for the Nubis as it 
was the start of a period in which they would lose much of what they had: 
most of their land, access to jobs, income from the alcohol production, 
supremacy in Kibera, and support from the Government. Therefore 1963 




The second part of this chapter covers the period from Independence to 
2000 and describes how Kibera became, within a short time, a congested 
slum area. As the British left Kenya without solving the problem of Nubi 
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settlement and Kibera land ownership, the Nubis now depended on Kenya‟s 
„African‟ government – their strategy of appealing to their past military 
services to the state no longer worked. To maintain their claim on Kibera the 
Nubis had to rethink and transform their ethnic identity, from „foreigners‟ to 
„Kenyans‟. This worked only to a limited extent; while the Nubis were more 
or less accepted as „Kenyans‟ and could stay in Kibera, they were unable to 
stop the influx of outsiders and the large-scale construction of rental rooms 
in Kibera. The outsiders were supported by local authorities of the same 
ethnic group, whereas the Nubis were on their own – they no longer had a 
political patron to help or protect them.  
Finally, the last part looks at Kibera and the Nubis as they are now, at the 
beginning of the third millennium: a marginalised community in a slum 




Kibera: the good years – from 1904 to 1963 
 
Nairobi and its first African inhabitants 
 
In 1896 Nairobi was only a staging depot for the oxen and mules of the 
Protectorate‟s Government, along the main road from Mombasa to 
Kampala. Some years later, in 1899, the railhead reached Nairobi and the 
Kenya-Uganda Railway headquarters was subsequently moved from 
Mombasa to Nairobi. In the same year the Ukambani provincial 
headquarters, situated too far from the railway, was transferred from 
Machakos to Nairobi; the East African Protectorate government followed 
some years later (1905). Within a few years Nairobi had become a town 
with streets, shops and hotels; by 1906 Nairobi had around 11,000 





Segregation of races was a key concept in early 20
th
 century Nairobi. The 
Nairobi Master Plans, mainly done by South African planners in 1905, 1927 
and 1948, systematically established racial zones in Nairobi, with extremely 
unequal residential densities, allegedly for reasons of “disease and 
sanitation”. Europeans, Indians and Africans all had their own locations, 
with extremely unequal residential densities.
161
 Africans were only tolerated 
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in Nairobi as a temporary workforce, not as permanent inhabitants, and 
certainly not with entire families. The low wages allowed only men to stay 
in Nairobi, and kept the families at home to work the family farms to take 
care of themselves and supplement the husbands‟ wages with extra food. As 




Already from 1901 Africans needed a special pass to be in Nairobi, but there 
was no provision to accommodate even those that were allowed to work and 
live in Nairobi. Most employers did not provide accommodation to their 
employees; it was left to the African labourers (men) to fend for themselves. 
They slept in sheds at work, in the store rooms, in the streets, or rented 
cheap rooms, sharing with many other men, often in illegal settlements.
163
  
Nor were Africans allowed to construct and own their own houses. 
Kileleshwa, Pangani and other African settlements were all demolished at 
some point, mostly in the 1920s, to make way for higher class Indian or 
European residential areas. The Africans had to move to Pumwani, a new 
settlement built in 1922 especially for that purpose. The land around Nairobi 
was simply too valuable to be used for African settlement.
164
 Kibera never 
suffered the same fate; the land was allocated to the army and therefore the 
Nubis were in a privileged position – they were allowed to stay there, at a 





Initially the army barracks for the East African Rifles were established just 
north of the Nairobi River. Around 1903-4 the barracks, then of the King‟s 
African Rifles, were moved to Ngong Road, just a few kilometres south-
west of the city centre (and effectively outside Nairobi‟s municipal 
boundaries), where now Kenyatta Hospital is. In 1904 the adjacent area of 
4197.9 acres was allocated to the army as military exercise grounds. The 
Kibera area was surveyed by the government only in 1917, and gazetted as 
“Nairobi Military Area” in 1918.
165
 It was in this area that the retired 
Sudanese soldiers would be allowed to settle, a place that they would call 
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“Kibra”: a bushy place, a forest; empty, save for the occasional Masai 




Even though at retirement from the army they did not receive a pension, the 
Nubis did not worry about the future, as they were exempted for life from 
paying Hut or Poll Tax, and there was plenty of land in Kibera to settle and 
cultivate; they assumed that this land was „their pension‟, like it had been 
for generations of soldiers before. That this was not only the Nubis‟ opinion, 
is clear from a letter from the District Commissioner: “Provision of free 
land out of which a living can be made by those long-service Nubians who 
should, I think, undoubtedly be so provided for as a form of pension, for 
which there is no other provision” (though he does not specifically refer to 
the Kibera land)
167
. Furthermore, the Acting Chief Secretary wrote to the 
Union of Sudanese that they “have already been granted holdings at Kibira, 
after discharge from the Military Forces in lieu of repatriation expenses”; 
this seems to indicate that (part of) the Kibera land was given to the 
Nubis.
168
 However, the official army permit to settle in Kibera, the so-called 
„shamba
169
 pass‟, stated that the bearer “has permission to make a shamba in 
the Military Reserve”, while later shamba passes gave permission to “live in 
the KAR Shamba and build one [or more] house”
170
 – this would indicate 
that the Kibera land was not given to the Nubis, but rather just for their 
temporary use. Yet, there are colonial documents that use the words „in 
perpetuity‟ when referring to a place for the Nubis to settle, words that the 
Nubis themselves have used a number of times when claiming that the 
Kibera land was given to them.
171
 There is, unfortunately, no surviving copy 
of a document „drawn up by the Commanding Officer early in the history of 
the settlement‟ with the rules and regulations for settlement in Kibera – it 
could have given some evidence on the agreement between KAR and Nubis 
concerning settlement in Kibera.
172
 Some old Nubis mentioned that each 
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soldier was given a certain amount of land, 1.3 hectares, or „so-many‟ acres, 
and that each family was obligated to keep 10 goats, but there is no written 
evidence to support this claim. 
 
The question whether the Kibera land belongs to the Nubis or not, whether 
it was given to them for ever, would crop up again and again, and would be 




The first years in Kibera, 1904-1918 
 
In principle, only demobilised or retired (“time-expired”) soldiers with at 
least 12 years of service in the KAR were allowed to settle in Kibera, and 
only with an official shamba pass. Although official settlement in Kibera 
was allowed from 1912, it is unlikely that Nubis would not have settled 
there from the beginning: probably some informal settlement of the area 
close to the barracks took place from 1904: “Sudanese families appear to 
have taken residence on it from that date”. There was much more space in 
Kibera than in the barracks, and ample opportunity for cultivation. 
Moreover, many soldiers had more than one wife, so needed additional 
space for their other families.
173
  Settlement may have been by demobilised 
and retired soldiers and their families, but it is actually more likely that 
families of active soldiers settled there first, since the new barracks were for 
active soldiers. Retired soldiers would have settled earlier, and not have 
moved immediately with the battalion to the new barracks.  
 
Over the years (between 1912-1934), only 291 shamba passes were to be 
issued, but some shamba passes were given to Nubis with as little as 3 years 
of military service and an increasing number of people would settle in 
Kibera without any permit at all: the sons of Sudanese permit holders would 
marry and build their own house in Kibera without actual permit, retired 
Nubis from other Nubi villages in Kenya would also move to Kibera and 
settle there without permit, and also some local people looking for land, 
work, or a place to stay.
174
 Most (ex-)soldiers settling in Kibera were Nubi; 
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about ten soldiers of other ethnic groups were given official permission to 
settle in Kibera: some „natives of Abyssinia, Congo, Tanganyika, Nyasaland 
and the coast‟
175
 – the ones that remained in Kibera, assimilated into the 
Nubi community. 
 
Photo 1: Young Nubi soldier with his equipment (early 20
th
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The first years people lived near the barracks in a small settlement called 
“Kambi KAR” or “KAR shamba” (near to where now the City Mortuary is). 
Over the years they probably spread out over Kibera, moving further away 
from the barracks. Most likely a major movement took place from 1912, 
when settlement was officially approved, and the Nubis were told to “make 
their own selection within specified areas”. Of the 291 shamba passes ever 
issued, 101 were given out in 1913.
176
 The Nubis settled in small villages, or 
rather clusters of compounds, in the higher parts of Kibera, often together 
with relatives and people of the same original Sudanese ethnic group.
177
  
The sloping land towards the rivers was used for agriculture, while livestock 
was grazed further away. Makina became the main village in Kibera, 
situated near the main road passing through Kibera, where the weekly 
market was held. Some areas were inhabited by only a few families, like 
Lain Shabaa (the shooting range
178
), Galalima and Gumberedu (see map 3 
below).  
 
Many of the Nubi men were in the army, and during World War I many 
veterans and younger Nubis joined the army. After the war, there was large-
scale demobilisation and the army gradually lost its appeal as an employer. 
The younger generation, instead of joining the KAR, increasingly looked for 
work in Nairobi town, as clerks or guards, like many of their retired and 
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Leadership and authority in the community was provided by the councils of 
elders (majlish shu’uba or majlish shauri)
180
. There were several of these 
councils in Kibera, each covering one or more villages, solving problems 
and guiding the people.
181
 The highest-ranking army officers (there were a 
number of Regimental Sergeant-Majors in the community) were the natural 
leaders in Kibera; they were often also wealthier than the others. Around 
1919 the first Liwali (chief or headman) was appointed, representing the 
Nubi community, and overseeing Kibera on behalf of the government.
182
 
There was also a majlish for the whole of Kibera, possible created by one of 




The Nubis are Sunni Muslims, and, as Islam in Africa often tolerates 
„continuation of traditional beliefs and practice, alongside its own‟, they 
also maintained a number of their traditional tribal customs and rituals.
184
 
Most Nubi children went to the Koranic school (madrasa) from an early age, 
but secular education was not considered to be very important: as one old 
man explained “education of this world serves you only for this world, 
whereas education of the other (after)world, serves you in the other world, 
and that is much more important”. Secular education was also avoided out 
of fear for Christian influence – „imagine the consternation when the 
children would come home singing Christian hymns!‟.
185
  
The boys spent much of their free time hunting and roaming around Kibera, 
and were expected to join the army. Several old Nubis recounted how the 
British, at the traditional dholuka dances, surrounded the dance area to catch 
the most promising boys for the army (and this usually with the silent 
approval of the boys‟ fathers). Nubi girls were mostly kept secluded inside 
the compound; they were trained to be good wives, learning to make the 
traditional handicrafts (mats, food covers), and cook the traditional food. 
Nubi women were expected to be quiet and obedient; they were largely 
confined to the homestead. Marriages were organised by the parents and 
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strictly within the Nubi community – from within Kibera or from another 
Nubi village in Kenya or Uganda. Once married, a man could look for a 
second wife of his own choice; she could be non-Nubi, and often was – 
many soldiers continued taking wives (by force or not) from ethnic groups 
in areas where they stayed for some years on a tour of duty, like Turkana or 
Somalia; a number of these would come to Kibera, and “become Nubi”.
186
 
According to numerous older informants, having two Nubi wives was 
„asking for trouble‟; they would fight for supremacy in the compound. 
However, a Nubi woman would not mind having a co-wife of lower status, 
preferably a non-Nubi, whom she could dominate and who could help her in 
the house and compound. One elderly Nubi described the chance meeting he 
had in Turkana with unknown relatives: he was in the market place when a 
woman stopped him and said he reminded her of someone – to his surprise, 
she then started speaking Kinubi with her mother. The mother had been 
married to his grandfather… They had learned Kinubi while living in the 





The agricultural work in Kibera was mainly done by landless Kikuyu or 
Meru shamba boys looking for a way to survive. Since they were working 
for the Nubis, these shamba boys were in principle the only „outsiders‟ 
(non-Nubi) allowed to stay in Kibera.  
 
 
Kibera under pressure, 1918-1945 
 
From the 1920s the Nubis were well established in Kibera. They lived 
scattered around the area, growing their own food in their shambas, keeping 
livestock, doing a bit of business. Additional income came from jobs in 
town: the Nubis were by many regarded as a “better class African”, “with a 
capacity above that of the ordinary African”
188
, and it was easy for them to 
get a job; many Nubis worked for the Kenya Bus Service (from the mid-
1930s), the Police or as clerk in the Ministry of Labour.
189
 At home the 
women distilled their “Nubian Gin”, for the (mainly) men to enjoy, and 
adding some income to the household. In general, life in Kibera was very 
good indeed.  
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The population of Nairobi continued to grow rapidly: from 20,000 in 1920, 
to less than 30,000 in 1926, to 33,000 inhabitants in 1930, to 49,600 in 1936 
to 108,900 in 1944.
190
 The population in Kibera increased gradually but 
remained low. After World War I more demobilised Nubi soldiers settled in 
Kibera, also some coming from other Nubi villages like Eldama Ravine. 
When in 1927 the African settlement of Kileleshwa (also in Nairobi) was 
demolished, some Nubi families living there moved to Kibera. There were 
also Nubis moving out of Kibera: a certain Juma Birinji for example went to 
Kisumu in the early 1930s, because he could get more land there – he sold 
his house and land to another Nubi. Or like Doka Fataalbab, who apparently 
did not get along with his brother and moved to Kitale to live with his 2
nd
 
wife. In 1934 the Nubi population in Kibera was estimated to be 1500-
1700.
191
 Other people, „outsiders‟, started moving into Kibera as well – 
some Kikuyus looking for land for survival, as well as shamba boys, house 
helps and other staff and servants working for the Nubis. Furthermore, there 
was some intermarriage with (mainly) women of local (mainly Kikuyu) 
ethnic groups. But this was all on a small scale and the Nubis were firmly 
„in charge‟ in Kibera – they were officially still the only ones allowed to live 
there.  
 
The influx of outsiders increased further when in 1928 Kibera was quietly 
handed over from military supervision to civil administration – it now fell 
under the Nairobi District Commissioner, not the Nairobi City Council, 
even though the municipal boundary was expanded again, now including a 
small part of Kibera (part of Sarang‟ombe and Toi
192
). Under civil 
administration, control of the area became even slacker than it had been 
under the KAR. As a result Kibera became more attractive to other Africans 
(non-Nubis) looking for work and accommodation (which remained in short 
supply) in Nairobi, and opportunities to survive; it is possible that many of 
them had to survive through illegal activities like prostitution and theft.
193
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Kibera became also known for its illicit liquor, the Nubian gin. Possibly 
already before the 1920s the Nubis had started to commercialise their 
Nubian gin; they produced increasing quantities of their traditional liquor, 
drawing many people (mainly „natives‟) to Kibera, especially in 
weekends.
194
 Despite „liquor raids‟ and increased fines and prison sentences, 
the production of Nubian Gin increased further during the 1930s. It 
provided a much-needed source of income for an increasing number of Nubi 
families: though the Nubis produced enough food in their shambas to 
survive, their standard of living was affected by the economic depression 
that hit Kenya in the 1930s.
195
 Some Nubis, businessmen or with jobs in the 
army or government, were doing well, but many others were unemployed. 
However, despite the economic depression, the Nubis never got much 
involved in supplying food stuffs to the Nairobi population.
196
 With the 
amount of land they had at their disposal, located so close to town, there 
would have been plenty of opportunities. The only product, apart from 
alcohol, that attracted their interest, was meat; more than half of the 
approximately 20 shops in Kibera were also used as butcheries, though the 
authorities suspected that at least part of these butcheries were owned by 
Kikuyus, and run in the names of Nubis (this was not the case, some older 
Nubis insisted). As Kibera fell outside the municipal boundaries, butchers 
were ‟not required to be licensed, as they supply only Africans‟. The meat 
did not need to be inspected by municipal authorities and therefore could be 
sold cheaply. Much of the meat went into town to supply butchers there, or 
was bought in Kibera by non-Kibera residents.
197
 This lack of interest in 
supplying town with other produce may (partly) be explained by the income 
generated by the Nubian gin – there was no need for extra income. 
 
Kibera‟s bad reputation and subsequent complaints by the European 
community urged the authorities to take steps to relocate the Nubis and 
demolish the settlement, like other African settlements before. The idea of 
using the sons of the ex-soldiers as the next army recruits had never 
materialised, so one of the reasons for Kibera‟s existence had disappeared. 
The value of the land, located so close to town, was of course another 
important factor in the proposed relocation of the Nubis – with Nairobi 
growing fast, it had soon become clear that the Kibera land, even if located 
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outside the official city boundaries, was too precious to be used for an 
African settlement, and that removing the Nubis would provide valuable 
building land for the growing city.
198
 From as early as 1919, when Nairobi‟s 
boundaries were changed for the first time, the colonial administration tried 
to relocate the Nubis to areas further away from Nairobi – as the Nairobi 
District Commissioner wrote: “I admire the Nubi, but would like to see him 




In the 1930s several areas around Nairobi, and as far as Thika (about 40 kms 
from Nairobi), were selected and investigated. However, all these options 
for resettlement of the Nubis away from Nairobi had to be discarded, for a 
multitude of reasons: wildlife conservation, resistance from local ethnic 
groups or European residents, unsuitability for farming, insufficient rainfall, 
the owners refused to sell, or because it was going to be too expensive to 
compensate the Masai.
200
 Furthermore, the Nubis did not make it easier for 
the British to find suitable land: they did not mind moving, but insisted on 
farmland and pasture, and a place near enough to Nairobi to continue their 
jobs in town.
201
 Moreover, they benefited from the lack of Government 
control in Kibera and the possibilities for the Nubian Gin trade; it is likely 
that they were unwilling to move just anywhere, unless possibilities for 
similar trade existed, to equal the profits made in Kibera – this basically 
meant staying near Nairobi.  
 
The Nubis were also active complaining and fighting for what they saw as 
their rights; many British administrators disliked them for it
202
, but they had 
powerful protectors in their previous army commanders, some now Lords 
back home in England.
203
 Many thought the Nubis deserved respect in view 
of their past military record and support to the British colonial 
administration: „it would be a grave mistake in policy not to recognise the 
loyal services rendered by the Sudanese ex-KAR soldiers, by some generous 
settlement in regard to land‟; the Nubis gratefully exploited these 
                                                          
198
 See letter DC Hosking to Commissioner of Local Government, Lands & Settlement, 
13/5/1931, KNA PC/CP.9/15/3. 
199
 Letter from Chief Secretary to KAR Assistant Commandant, 7/6/1919 (KNA 
PC/CP.9/15/3); DC Nairobi Hosking, to PC Nyeri, 27/4/31, KNA RCA (MAA) 2/1/3/i; see 
also Parsons 1997: 91. 
200
 See also Parsons 1997.  
201
 Letter Union of Sudanese to Major-General Giffard, 24/2/1938; letter Nubi leaders to 
Chief Native Commissioner, 15/8/44, both KNA RCA (MAA) 2/1/3/ii. 
202
 Parsons 1997: 101. 
203





 So the Nubis remained in their privileged position in Nairobi, 
living near the city centre, enjoying the advantages of both rural and urban 
life. 
 
At the same time, another process was taking place in Kibera: a reduction of 
the land. Being so close to Nairobi, the Kibera area was a logical choice for 
expansion of the town. Despite Nubi protests, large parts of Kibera were 
hived off over the years, starting in the late 1920s with the expansion of the 
(Royal) Nairobi Golf Club
205
 (from 216 to 429 acres) and in 1937/8 the 
construction of the new Aerodrome Road. In most cases the land that was 
used was sparsely inhabited and usually did not require the large scale 
movement of people; only the re-alignment of the railway cutting through 
Kibera (1948) entailed the demolishing of 16 Nubi houses and relocation of 
people; alternative housing built for the relocated Nubis by the Railway 
Administration was refused (they were “constructed to an exceptionally low 
standard” and walls already falling down a year after construction
206
), as 
was (initially) the monetary compensation.
207
 In other cases the land was 
used by the Nubis for livestock or as shamba, but monetary compensation 
was only given for houses: in the case of shamba or pasture, the Nubis just 
had to look for another place. In 1947, the Kibera area had shrunk from the 




But with the British looking for alternative space to move the Nubis to, and 
the hiving off of Kibera land, the Nubis realised that their claim on Kibera 
may not be as firm as they had thought
209
; the old arrangement of giving 
land to retired soldiers as their pension did not seem to work like before. 
The Nubis looked again for support from their former superiors, and sent 
letters and petitions to different levels of the administration.
210
 They also 
testified for the Kenya Land Commission, which was to review all land 
claims in Kenya (1932), but their claim to Kibera was repudiated: Kibera 
was considered Crown Land and the Nubis “tenants at will of the Crown, 
liable to termination at any time”. The Commission‟s conclusion was that 
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the Nubis were only given permission to live temporarily („their lifetime‟) in 
Kibera: to build temporary houses
211
 and use the land for agriculture and 
livestock. The Commission did not agree that the land was given as a form 
of pension (that practice did not exist anymore in the 1930s) since the Nubis 
had received a gratuity on retirement, nor that all the Kibera land was for the 
Nubis‟ use, since also the KAR‟s shooting range („Lain Shabaa‟) was 
within. The Nubis‟ only consolation was that the Commission did not agree 
with an outright eviction, and recognised their right to compensation with 
suitable land if they were to be moved from Kibera (the necessity of which 
did not convince the Commission). But they were also denied the right to 
build more houses in Kibera, and were expected to die out slowly, as only 
the ex-soldiers and their wives/widows would have rights in Kibera; their 
children would have to move elsewhere after both parents had died, but be 
compensated for the house that would be demolished.
212
 Kibera‟s illegal 
(non-Nubi) residents had no rights of course, and were not eligible for any 
compensation.
213
 Up to 1944, apparently 41 houses were demolished under 
that arrangement, but none of the older Nubis seem to remember this, nor do 
they remember Nubis (children of the original pass holder) having to leave 





During the following years no suitable land could be found to move the 
Nubis to. With World War II about to start, the “Kibera issue” was 
forgotten, and laid to rest for the time being. However, the government saw 
no reason to support the Nubis or make their life easier: the liquor raids in 
Kibera continued, and no permission was given to supply clean piped water 
to the area
215
 with the excuse that “it is undesirable that the settlement there 
should be permanent” – it was thought that neglecting the settlement would 
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Despite all this, life in Kibera had remained good for the Nubis: there was 
still enough space for livestock and plenty of food from the shambas; even 
with reduced employment, there were still men with jobs in town, and 
additional income from Nubian Gin to maintain a reasonable standard of 
living.  
 
Photo 2: Well-to-do Nubis, probably late 1930s–early 1940s.
217
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The influx of „outsiders‟, 1945 - 1963 
 
After the war the Nubis that had fought with the British army returned to 
Kibera and life continued as before. The Nubi population in Kibera 
increased slowly, from the estimated 1500-1700 in 1934 to probably slightly 
below 3000 at Independence (1963).
218
 In between, a number of surveys and 
censuses were done in Kibera, with varying degrees of accuracy. In 1945 a 
total of 2023 Nubis were counted
219
, but in other reports
220
 a total of 2175 
was used, while referring to the same census. In 1948, 1618 Nubis were 
counted but their total was estimated to be at least 400 more.
221
 In 1955 a 
total of 2084 Nubis were thought to live in Kibera.
222
   
 
The problem with all these censuses is that they were probably all rather 
inaccurate. Nubis would move in and out of Kibera and be absent for long 
times – sometimes they were counted, sometimes not. In his survey of 1948, 
Superintendant Kitching estimates that more than 400 Nubis were absent, 
many of them away to attend “a large wedding at Mombasa”. There were 
also Nubis living elsewhere for work in the army or as businessman, but 
keeping a house and family in Kibera; there were „adopted children‟ (often 
suspected to be simply employees or tenants), Nubi women in prison, and 
women from other ethnic groups living with Nubis as concubine. There 
were also many Nubis living in Kibera without official permission, mostly 
having moved in from other Nubi villages in Kenya; in 1945 this group of 
unauthorised Nubis was thought to be almost 75% of the total.
223
  For 
obvious reasons, these people would not necessarily be keen on 
participating in a census. All this made it difficult to do a reliable census of 
Kibera‟s population.  
 
What is clear though from these surveys and censuses is that the number of 
Nubis increased only slowly, while the number of „outsiders‟ grew much 
faster – from a few hundred in the 1930s to probably more than 6000 at 
Independence. In the mid-1940 the number of outsiders in Kibera was 
thought to be around 317-600, mainly Kikuyu and Meru shamba boys. 
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Kitching‟s 1948 census shows suddenly 1472 outsiders (which he still 
considers an underestimate) from many different ethnic groups, mainly 
Kenyan (mostly Kikuyu and Luo), but also many Ugandans and 
Tanzanians.
224
 This is a huge increase from the previous figures, which were 
undoubtedly underestimated as well – large numbers of Africans moved to 
Nairobi during the 1940s (the World War II economy), and they would all 
need cheap accommodation. Somewhere in the early 1950s, the Nubis 
became a minority in Kibera. 
 
However, the Nubis were hardly aware of the presence of so many 
outsiders, who mostly lived in the areas away from the Nubi homesteads, in 
the forest or in the shamba areas. Moreover, these outsiders were looked 
down upon and avoided as much as possible. The Nubis call “non-Nubi” 
derogatorily “labi” – the root of the word comes from the Arabic word for 
„slave‟; in Kinubi it means „mshenzi‟, „an uncultured person‟ (Swahili), 
someone of lower status, rather than „slave‟. In daily life, contacts with 
these outsiders were kept to a minimum, and intermarriage was discouraged 
(though existed and increasingly so). The outsiders living in Kibera were 
not involved in the social and cultural life of the Nubis: the communities co-
existed almost without any contact.  
 
Meanwhile, the hiving off of Kibera land continued like before: the Nairobi 
Dam was built right after the war; in 1948 the railway line to Uganda was 
removed from the city centre and realigned to go around Nairobi, cutting 
through Kibera, where a small railway station was built as well; Woodley 
estate was built in the early 1950s; in 1952 land along Ngong road was 
given to some sports clubs (now the Impala and Harlequin Sports Clubs), 
and in 1950-53 the Royal Agricultural Society of Kenya built their new 
Agricultural Showground in a part of Sarang‟ombe; in the early 1950s the 
Public Works Department had 150 African employees living in the PW 
housing at the end of what is now Karanja Road.
225
 And like before, the 
Nubis continued to protest, to no avail, against the government using “their” 
land for its own purposes. Around Independence less than 1200 acres 
remained of the original 4198 acres of Kibera land.
226
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The relocation of the Nubis came also back on the agenda after the war. It 
was a time when the colonial government had started to invest more in 
social welfare and African housing, in “response to an emerging 
consciousness in Government circles that more should be done to provide 
for the social welfare of Nairobi‟s African workers, and to produce a more 
stable and productive workforce”. New low-income housing estates were 
created, like Ziwani, Starehe and Kaloleni; Nairobi was growing, and 
became more and more urbanised. For Kibera this interest in social welfare 
resulted in a report on “destitution at Kibera” and an “economic and social 




With Kibera under civic administration, the policy had been that “no further 
grants should be made to discharged soldiers” in order to achieve the 
“gradual elimination of this settlement”.
229
 This „gradual elimination‟ 
however never happened: many older Nubi men married younger women, 
often non-Nubi, to take care of them, and these women had the same right to 
stay in Kibera till they died. It was evident that Kibera would not disappear 
easily: “it may be 60 years or more from now before free settlement rights 
die out”.
230
 In 1944 it was therefore agreed to recognise the permanency of 
Kibera, if the Nubi community could be concentrated into a planned and 
orderly settlement with modern facilities and services. The area could then 
be handed over to the Nairobi Municipal Council
231
 and supplied with water 
and other amenities. This set off a new round of efforts to relocate the 
Nubis, though this time the Nubis working in town could choose to remain 
within the Kibera area, though concentrated in one corner, on small plots; 
others could move further away, if they wanted, to an area outside Nairobi, 
large enough for agriculture and their livestock.  
 
To achieve this, it was imperative to control Kibera better. In 1945 a 
European Superintendent (directly under the District Commissioner), 
Captain Kitching, was recruited to oversee Kibera, clear out unauthorised 
residents, control unauthorised house construction, ensure that no permanent 
buildings were erected, and to organise the proposed resettlement of the 
                                                          
228
 D.M. Anderson: 145-9; the “Kibera survey report” of 1944, and the “Destitution at 
Kibera” report of 1947 done by the Social Welfare Adviser Charles Philip.  
229
 Letter Colonial Secretary to Commanding Officer of 3
rd
 battalion KAR, 19/3/1928 
(KNA PC/CP.9/15/3). 
230
 Parsons 1997: 93; “Kibera survey report” p 1; “Destitution at Kibera” p 1.  
231
 Kibera was still under the District Commissioner of Nairobi; Nairobi City Council 
refused to accept the area as part of the municipality unless the “Nubi problem” was solved, 




Nubis. Kitching must have had a frustrating job, trying to achieve all that. 
Demolishing houses and stopping illegal construction, he became very 
unpopular with the Nubis.
232
 And in the end, most of his work was for 
nothing, because the planned restructuring of Kibera and relocation of the 
Nubis did not happen: there were many delays due to financial constraints 
(Britain was economically in a very difficult situation after World War II
233
) 
and problems selecting a suitable area. Moreover, it appeared to be 
extremely difficult to control Kibera. First of all, Kibera was big and the 
villages and houses scattered; some unauthorised houses were demolished 
but at the same time many more were constructed unnoticed – possibly 
partly to replace the demolished ones.
234
 In 1945 the Nairobi District 
Commissioner was ordered to stop removal of unauthorised houses of 
Nubis, not to “cause grave hardship on these unfortunate people”.
235
   
 
Controlling illegal residents appeared equally difficult: they did not have a 
permit to live in Kibera, but could not be prosecuted for unlawful 
occupation of Crown Land if they were accepted by the permit holders (the 
Nubi ex-soldiers) as “lodgers”.
236
 Several cases taken to court ended in a 
defeat for the authorities: the Attorney General ruled that the charges were 
not legal. Unwilling to burn their fingers again, the authorities stopped 
prosecuting people: “It is high time that a thorough clean up of the village 
was undertaken, but without the legal means and backing very little can be 
done”. Furthermore, the fact that these illegal residents had lived there for so 
many years made it increasingly difficult to just evict them, without 
compensation or alternative place for settlement.
237
 An attempt by the 
government in 1949 to issue new permits to all Nubis, their staff and visitors 
(each group a permit with a different colour) also ended in failure; the Nubis 
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simply refused to accept the new permits, and threatened with a civil 
disobedience campaign.
238
   
 
Who then were all these illegal (and some legal) residents, these „outsiders‟? 
First of all they were the (mainly Kikuyu, Kamba and Meru) shamba boys 
and house helps that worked for the Nubis, many of whom had lived there 
for many years, and had meanwhile married and had families. They usually 
lived in a hut in the shamba, sometimes in a shed in the compound. There 
was also an increasing number of landless Kikuyus looking for a place to 
live, after having been pushed off settlers‟ land
239
; some were given 
permission to live there in return for part of the crops they harvested. They 
often lived in the more isolated parts of Kibera, on the slopes, away from 
the Nubi homesteads. Another group was the prostitutes and illicit alcohol 
brewers that often just lived somewhere, in the forest, in an empty house, or 
as concubine or caretaker of an old Nubi. Some rented rooms from Nubis: 
according to Kitching, Nubi women were “not averse to renting rooms to 
other tribes for that purpose [prostitution]”. There were also other 
„undesirables‟ in Kibera, but most were not really living there – these were 
people that would come during the day to “take advantage of the soldiers 
and houseboys visiting Kibera in search of amusement, licit and illicit”. 
There were also the traders: men selling clothes, utensils, and (mainly 
Kikuyu) women selling vegetables and other produce (and they may have 
also been involved in prostitution). The women would come walking from 
Kiambu, which provided most of Nairobi with vegetables and staples. 
Traders did not need permits to be in Kibera, since they only stayed for the 
day: non-residents had to be out by 6 pm (and this government-imposed 
curfew was actively supported by the Nubi community, and according to 
several informants, especially the Nubi boys liked to beat up „brother labi‟ 




The largest group of outsiders staying in Kibera were the African workers 
looking for accommodation near town, or near the industrial area where 
many of them worked; even if it was forbidden to live there without a 
special pass, Kibera gradually filled up with tenants. The first tenants may 
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have lived in Kibera already in the 1920s
241
; most probably some were there 
in the 1930s, and certainly in the 1940s. In the early days, accommodation 
in Kibera was not in large supply, but it was cheap, and initially sometimes 
even free of charge, a favour rather than business. With the growing interest 
of other Africans to live in Kibera, some Nubis added an extra room to their 
house, or added an outside door to one of the rooms in their house (while 
closing the inside door) as a private entrance for a tenant. The first tenants 
were mainly male staff of the white people living along Ngong Road, in 
Kilimani or Karen; some could not find accommodation in the servants‟ 
quarters (female staff got priority); others might have a room in the 
servants‟ quarters but no space for the whole family – they kept their wives 
and children in Kibera, while visiting them at night or in the weekends. 
Another group of tenants may well have been prostitutes, as claimed by 
Kitching.
242
 Apparently during World War II, soldiers from the Lang‟ata 
barracks kept their wives in Kibera
243
 (these may have been prostitutes as 
well). Part of Kitching‟s (underestimated) 1472 „non-Sudanese‟ must have 
been tenants. Social Welfare Officer (and former PC) La Fontaine writes in 




Nairobi continued to grow fast: in the 1940s its population increased by 
17% per year; the African population trebled between 1939 and 1952. The 
housing estates the Municipal Council had built were clearly insufficient, 
every year the deficit of housing increased, and all African settlements were 
overcrowded. By 1947 the housing shortage in Nairobi was desperate, and a 
growing number of people moved into Kibera: there was simply no 
alternative housing for Africans to be found in Nairobi.
245
 Moreover, Kibera 
was close to town and cheap compared to other African settlements in 
town.
246
 More Nubis started building extra rooms specifically for rental 
purposes; some may have needed the money to survive, certainly if they 
were not involved in the Nubian gin business. Like all other houses in 
Kibera, the newly built rooms had to be “temporary structures”, made of 
sticks and mud, with a corrugated iron roof – these would usually be 
constructed within the compound, but at a distance from the main (Nubi) 
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house, and with its own latrines, in order to maintain a social distance 
between landlord and tenants.
247
 The Nubis would ask the Superintendent 
for permission to repair a house and then secretly add a few rooms to rent 
out. In the late 1940s, according to Kitching, “... any available space such as 




World War II had been a prosperous time for many (rural) Africans due to 
high commodity prices (which they produced) and increased employment; 
the Nubis also benefited – the market for their Nubian gin had expanded 
enormously with so many soldiers in Nairobi. However, after the war 
African discontent grew rapidly: squatter cultivation was restricted, and 
forced labour increased, while population pressure in the native reserves 
rose. Wages in town fell behind price increases and inflation. 
Unemployment in town soared, and opportunities for educated Africans 
remained limited. Many of the urban migrants were landless Kikuyu 
(squatters squeezed off the European farms or from the native reserves)
249
, 
ending up in the informal sector and crime. African discontent increased 
until it erupted in the Mau Mau civil war; the State of Emergency was 




During April 1954, in a month-long operation dubbed “Operation Anvil”, 
some 16,500 people, practically all Kikuyu, Meru and Embu, were removed 
from Nairobi and detained or (usually the dependents) taken to their native 
reserves.
251
 During this operation, the Kikuyu-dominated low-income 
housing area of Mathare Valley was demolished. As a result, Kibera 
remained one of the few areas offering cheap accommodation for Africans. 
People from western Kenya and Kamba people came to replace the Kikuyu 
workers in Nairobi. Settlement in Kibera was henceforth apparently actively 
encouraged, it being considered a ‟loyalist‟ area.
252
 Moreover, Kibera was 
popular with the new migrants from mainly western Kenya, because it was 
relatively safe
253
 – the influx created an additional market for rental rooms 
in Kibera, and was capitalised upon: Nubis started constructing more rooms. 
                                                          
247
 The very first tenants actually often lived within the Nubi house; the tenant‟s room‟s 
would get its own separate entrance. 
248
 Memorandum by Kitching, 20/10/1949, KNA PC/CP.9/15/5. 
249
 Around 55% of the Nairobi workforce was Kikuyu (White: 158).  
250
 Bogonko: 58-80; Kanogo: 96-120; Maxon: 228-31; Throup 1978. 
251
 See Clayton 1976: 25. White (1990: 193) mentions a total number of 30,000 arrested 
people (in one day).  
252
 See Amis 1983: 152-3.  
253
 Clark 1975: 7. 
85 
 
These were mainly Nubi women that invested the money they had earned 
with Nubian gin. 
 
However, the special „emergency powers‟ were also used in 1955 to evict 
Kikuyus from Kibera.
254
 Did the authorities know that Kenyatta and other 
members of the Kenya African Union used to hold (before Mau Mau) secret 
meetings in Nubi houses
255
 in Kibera, and hide there for police when 
necessary? The Nubis sympathised with the fight for Independence, though 
did not support the Mau Mau openly or actively.
256
 Quite a number of 
Kikuyus hid in Kibera during Mau Mau, possibly a few hundred, but these 
were not necessarily militants; most of them were just ordinary people, 
employees of Nubis, tenants, or friends. They would put on an Islamic dress 
and change their name, to appear Nubi. Some were actually children of 
Nubis‟ friends and employees that were detained; they would grow up 
within the Nubi family, and pretend they were their (grand)children (quite a 
few of those children would stay with the Nubis after the Emergency and 
become part of the community). Others were Kikuyu girls that, looking for a 




In the late 1950s, most Nubi families would have had a few tenants only, 
maybe 2-4, a few families maybe some more, some families none; it was 
still an “emerging small-scale rental sector”. It was mainly the women, more 
enterprising than men and keen on ways of generating a steady income for 
the upkeep of the family, who built rental rooms. Having tenants was not 
considered „dignified‟ and most Nubi men did therefore not bother much 
with room construction; many did not even have the money for it. Other 
Nubis, who did have money (businessmen, senior officers), were not 
interested in having tenants, they did not need the money. As Islam allows 
women to have their own money and property, they invested part of their 
Nubian gin profits in the construction of rooms, ultimately resulting in a 
large number of female structure owners in Kibera: “landladies” rather than 
landlords. There were high returns on investments in rental rooms: building 
4-5 rooms would cost around 300 shillings, and this was earned back within 
a short time, even with rents as low as 15-20 Shillings/month.
258
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Nevertheless, the income it generated could not be compared to that of the 
Nubian gin. 
 
Towards the end of the 1950s restrictions on African movements were 
relaxed and the migration rate to Nairobi increased. People from western 
Kenya preferred to live in Kibera because it was relatively safe and not a 
Kikuyu-dominated area. With the lifting of the State of Emergency in early 
1960 the Kikuyu returned to Nairobi in great numbers; a number of them 





Though largely forgotten during the Emergency, the relocation of the Nubis 
cropped up again after Mau Mau. Due to the high cost of construction of the 
low-income estates and the heavy debt burden of the municipal council and 
the government, it had been proposed to focus on large-scale African-owned 
development.
260
 In 1959 the government came with a new scheme, with 5 
neighbourhoods to be constructed in Kibera‟s areas with a low population 
density, and given out on tenant-purchase or owner-builder basis. The idea 
of relocating the Nubis away from Nairobi was now completely discarded: 
they could stay in the new scheme planned within Kibera, the „Kibera 
African Settlement Area‟, measuring approximately 500 acres.
261
 However, 
in the new scheme there was no longer a provision for agriculture and the 
grazing of cattle. It was thought that if Government would be firm and 
reasonably generous over compensation and land grants, there would be no 




In 1962/3 the first phase of the new scheme, Karanja (or „Salama‟, as the 
Nubis called it), was completed; small but affordable houses, and built 
according to the construction standards of the day. However, not many 
Nubis were interested in moving there: they had to give up their big house 
and plots in Kibera in exchange for a small house in Karanja, with a low 
ceiling, on only ¼ acre plots, enough only for growing some vegetables and 
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keeping a goat and some chicken. Most Nubis did not think much of the 
houses: they were too small for Nubi families used to living in large 
compounds, and besides, the latrines were next to the kitchen or even inside 
the house, causing a kind of culture shock – in Nubi culture the latrines were 
as far as possible from the kitchen. Moreover, the new houses did not have 
any space for tenants, nor for the brewing of beer or distillation of alcohol 
(for hiding the equipment), which would make the Nubis lose much of their 
income, while at the same time they would, for the next twenty-odd years, 
be expected to repay the loans, something they were not at all used to. These 





Even though they generally showed little interest, the new houses were 
eventually all bought by Nubis. Many Nubis from Sarang‟ombe moved to 
Karanja Phase 2, which was built specifically for them.
264
 It was a time 
when agriculture had largely lost its importance in Kibera, and big plots 
were not really needed anymore. Many Nubis had become urbanised, and to 
some extent for some people the new houses in Karanja fitted well in that 
new life style. Moreover, there was the advantage of having a title deed to 
the plot in Karanja, and the provision of water and other services (proper 
infrastructure). Some Nubis bought a number of houses in Karanja, also for 
their sons, as every person above 16 years could get a house; some of them 
put tenants in their new Karanja house, if the children were still too small to 
live alone. Some of the Nubis that got a house in Karanja did not demolish 
their old house in Kibera, instead renting it out and getting money to pay for 
the new house, while polygamous men might have only one of their houses 
in Kibera demolished, while keeping the others. Even if a house was 
demolished, the rental rooms in the old Kibera compounds often remained 
standing as well, continuing to provide an income. Karanja provided only 
enough houses for a small part of the Nubi population. So, at Independence 
most Nubis were still in Kibera, living the way they had lived for the 
previous 60 years. At least, that was the way it seemed. A closer look would 
reveal that some things in the Nubis‟ lives had gradually changed, almost 
unnoticed.  
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The importance of livestock and agriculture had diminished over the years, 
though neither appear to have been very important to the Nubis for survival 
to begin with; they usually had other income, from Nubian Gin, salaries, 
business or tenants. A 1956 report claims that “some of this land is under 
cultivation, but most of it is lying dormant”. Agricultural produce was seen 
as a supplement, complementing that monetary income. A wide variety of 




The trend of growing unemployment that started during the economic 
depression (1930s) was temporarily interrupted by the employment 
opportunities of the World War II, but restarted and continued after the war. 
This was for several reasons. In the first place, the Nubis‟ interest in secular 
education had remained poor: the only government (primary) school in 
Kibera was closed in 1941 due to lack of interest.
266
 The few educated 
Nubis did very well, but the majority was lowly educated and had therefore 
very little chances on the labour market. Secondly, after the war there was 
much more competition for jobs from other Kenyan Africans, further 
reducing the Nubis‟ chances to secure work. While in 1947 more than 60% 
of Nubi men claimed to have a job, a survey in 1955 shows that only 17.5% 
of adult men had work.
267
 Their growing unemployment was also caused by 
the Nubis‟ attitude towards work: quite a number of Nubi informants, 
female and male, claimed that many Nubi men did not really want to work, 
unless it was something of „sufficient standard‟ – if a job was not „good 
enough‟, they would rather sit at home and do nothing. Many that found a 
job, left again after one week. This attitude may have been caused by their 
feeling of superiority, but it was also a rational choice: many Nubis (their 
wives) had income from the Nubian gin, and did not really need a job to 
survive. Throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, and into the 1960s, the 
Nubian Gin provided the Nubis with an income to maintain their relatively 
high standards of living in Kibera, without having to worry about jobs or 
education.
268
 For the men there was no need to work, or to get a proper 
                                                          
265
 See Deverell/Colchester‟s report 1944, pp 3-4; Kitching‟s report 1945, pp 3-; Major 
Small‟s report of 1955, pp 10; “Kibera village”, a 1956 report by Senior Health Inspector 
(copy from Kibera). Cattle rustling apparently became a problem in the 1960s and 1970s 
(several people told me this), resulting in many people losing or selling off their livestock. 
266
 The Kibera Survey Report by Deverell & Colchester, 1944, pp 6-7 (KNA RCA (MAA) 
– 2/1/3 ii). 
267
 Kibera survey report; „Report of an investigation...‟, La Fontaine 1947, pp 5-6; Major 
Small‟s 1955 census. 
268
 This does not apply to all Nubis of course; in the 1960s the first Nubis went to 
University and others went overseas for studies, and there was more interest in (secular) 
education in the younger generation. 
89 
 
education, no incentive to do anything at all; their wives earned much more 
than they would. As a result, the Nubis were no longer seen as a „better class 
African‟, possibly even the opposite. Already in 1931 the District 
Commissioner of Nairobi wrote that “the second generation (Nubis) and the 
hybrids arising from mixed unions are degenerate and generally a disgrace 
to their fathers”.
269
 That is of course an exaggeration, but it may serve as an 
indication of a decreasing respect for the Nubis.  
 
As Independence drew nearer, the Nubis, not knowing what to expect from 
the new government, and probably hoping that the British would come to 
their rescue in the last minute, tried again to get legal title to the land, 
sending letters, memos and petitions, amongst others to British PM Harold 
MacMillan (in 1963); they even sued the British government. But so close 
to Independence, the British lacked the will or influence to convince the 
Kenyan politicians to uphold colonial obligations towards the Nubis.
270
 The 
political changes after the Emergency, and the growing nationalism in 
Kenya forced the Nubis to rethink their strategies. So far they had 
successfully used their close relationship with the colonial authorities; it was 
one reason why they were still in Kibera – they had emphasised their 
military past, their services to the colonial power, as a negotiating tool in 
order to get support from the Government. The Nubis had always profiled 
themselves as “Sudanese”, „foreigners‟, and advocated for the status as 
„non-natives‟ in order to get special treatment. This would not work 
anymore; in a post-colonial, independent Kenya they would be strangers 
without special privileges or support from anyone. So already from the mid-
1950s, the Nubis, in particular the younger generation, born and raised in 
Kenya, started using a different language: instead of “Sudanese” they saw 
themselves as Kenyans, and started referring to themselves as “Nubi, a 
Kenyan tribe”, with the same rights as other indigenous groups. Moreover, 
as Kenyans they would possibly have better chances for a positive solution 
to the Kibera land problem, and the right to remain settled in Kibera in the 
face of competing demands by other Kenyans. Their position was delicate, 




Nevertheless, despite the problems of police liquor raids, unemployment, 
and increasing numbers of „labi‟ in Kibera, life for the Nubis had been good 
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throughout this period. They were comfortable, they had enough food and 
money to live, and were still officially the only people allowed to live in 
Kibera. The Independence of Kenya did not mean an immediate stop to 
these „good years‟ in Kibera, but it was a major break-point for the Nubis. It 
was the start of a period in which they would become even more 
marginalised and lose much of what they had: support from the 
Government, most of their land, access to jobs, supremacy in Kibera.  
 
 
The scramble for Kibera, 1963 – 1990 
 
At Independence, the British left Kenya without solving the problem of 
Nubi settlement and Kibera land ownership; the Nubis were henceforth 
without their previous employers‟ support. This does not mean that 
immediately after Independence things changed, and life for the Nubis 
deteriorated, but in the long run it did have consequences. On the other 
hand, it also created new opportunities for the Nubis: a boom in the rental 
business. This section describes how Kibera became, within a short time, a 
congested slum area.  
 
 
The calm before the storm, 1963-1974 
 
In the first decade after Uhuru (Independence) Kibera stayed relatively 
calm. While other Africa n squatter settlements like Mathare and 
Kawangware experienced an expansion during the late 1950s and 
„exploded‟ in the 1960s
272
, Kibera remained in principle forbidden territory 
for people without a shamba pass or special permission to stay there. 
Expansion in Kibera was therefore limited. 
 
Nevertheless, the increased migration towards Nairobi (the town‟s 
population nearly doubled between 1962 and 1969, from 267,000 to 
509,000
273
) unavoidably had its impact on Kibera. Kibera‟s population (both 
Nubi and outsider) continued to increase, from around 9,000 at 
Independence to 17,000 in 1972.
274
 In 1966 an unofficial census was done 
which shows that the Nubis were at that time heavily outnumbered: 3000 
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 Even with an increased interest in the 
Government to provide accommodation for Africans, low-income housing 
remained in short supply in Nairobi as the stream of Africans to town 
increased. In the 1960s it was relatively easy to build a hut somewhere on 
the periphery of Kibera or to get permission (from the chief) to expand 
one‟s house with a few rooms for tenants (or even without permission). 
Many Nubi families had started adding some rooms to their compound
276
, 
though some families, resenting this influx of „labi‟, refused to build rooms 
to accommodate these „intruders‟. In 1972 the rental business was still quite 
small: a survey showed that the average number of rooms per (Nubi) house 
owner was 4.3; in the sample, only two landlords had ten or more rooms: 




On 1 January, 1964 the boundaries of Nairobi were extended to cover an 
area of approximately 266 square miles, to accommodate future expansion. 
As a result, Kibera became part of Nairobi, but the Nairobi City Council 
(NCC) remained reluctant to take charge of Kibera. This was mainly for 
financial reasons: they regarded (as did the government itself) Kibera as a 
“Government estate”, in which the Government was the landlord, and 
therefore obliged to build houses and provide amenities. The NCC was only 
willing, and this was agreed with the Government, to assume responsibility 
for Kibera once the area was physically re-planned and the inhabitants 




The hiving off of Kibera land continued like before. Official policy was 
„demolition of unauthorised settlements‟; a number of settlement in Nairobi 
were demolished, to „keep the city clean‟.
279
 In Kibera several lower-income 
housing estates were built in Kibera area between 1963 and 1974: Karanja 
Phase 2 and 3; Ngei, Onyonka and other estates in the Lang‟ata area. The 
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Nubi villages of Sarang‟ombe, Galalima and Toi were demolished to make 
way for Jamhuri, Olympic (then called „the Hill‟) and Fort Jesus estates. 
Sometimes the bulldozers came with very little notice, and some older 
Nubis remember their fear, being woken up with torches shining in their 
face, and the cold when sleeping out in the bush after their house had been 
demolished in the middle of the night. Nubi families were often not even 
compensated; they had to live with relatives or friends while building new 
houses in other parts of Kibera. The (less than thirty) Kikuyu families that 
lived in Lang‟ata also had to leave their houses; they were given the choice 
to move to Lamu (Mpeketoni) or to stay in Kibera; those that stayed (most 
of them) were allocated an area in what is now Laini Saba to build their 




In the first estates to be built (Karanja), the Nubis got priority for the new 
houses, as well as compensation for their old houses (though not the rental 
rooms). But in the estates built in Kibera after Karanja, Nubis did not 
manage to get more than a few houses. It is possible that Nubis could not 
afford the deposit for the new houses
281
, but it is more likely that many were 
not really interested as these houses were considered too small or did not 
provide opportunities for renting out rooms, which had by then become an 
important source of income for the Nubis.
282
 Another factor was the 
corruption that had started playing a role: houses were no longer allocated to 
the most deserving but to relatives, clients and others in social networks for 
personal accumulation. Furthermore, despite official housing policy 
emphasising the poorer segment of the population, in reality, until the early 
1970s, construction and provision of mortgages focused predominantly on 




Bit by bit parts of Kibera were converted into residential estates, and the 
Nubis were more and more squeezed into an ever smaller area; in the mid-
70s only around 800 acres remained of the original 4200.
284
 Protesting 
against this did not help: in 1969 the Minister of Lands “made it clear that 
the government regarded Kibera area as State Land, belonging to the 
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Republic, as no one else could claim legal rights to the land”.
285
 And so, the 
Nubis‟ struggle for control of their land had to continue. The problem was 
how to convince the new Kenyan government to recognise their claims to 
Kibera, or at least give them some security of tenure. According to the new 
government, the Nubis had only rights to their houses, not the land itself. 
This would mean that, in case they would be moved elsewhere, the Nubis 
would get compensation for the old house, but this was certainly not always 
the case; they were often removed without compensation, and even without 




The Nubis considered themselves, after years of uninterrupted settlement, 
the „de facto‟ owners of Kibera, but they lacked the political leverage to 
support their claim on Kibera and secure a title deed. Unfortunately, the 
good relations with the new President Kenyatta on account of their support 
to KAU in the 1940/50s, were not used to the Nubis‟ benefit. Khamis Juma, 
one of the main Nubi leaders in whose Kibera house Kenyatta used to have 
meetings and hide from the Police, was apparently once invited to come and 
see Kenyatta at State House, but he refused to go: “He used to come to me, 
should I now go to him? Let him come here.” A golden opportunity may 
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Another potential success story did not deliver any results. In 1969 a Nubi, 
Yunis Ali, was elected to Parliament, representing the Lang‟ata 
Constituency (which included Kibera). He was supported by the Luos, who 
had moved into Kibera in large numbers after the murder of Tom Mboya, 
when they fled Kikuyu-dominated areas like Kawangware. Mboya had been 
quite active in Kibera in the late 50s, and it is claimed by some Nubi wazee 
that KANU‟s symbol, the cockerel, comes from the red blazers of the 
Nairobi Sudan Association (a football club?), which Mboya had seen when 
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Photo 4: The Nairobi Sudan (Football?) Association, late 1950s. Note the 





In November 1970 the Nubi MP Yunis Ali tabled a motion, which was 
subsequently passed in Parliament: 
  
“that pursuant to Government‟s declared policy on slum 
clearance in Kibera Village and the fact that Kibera inhabitants 
are entitled to full rights to plot ownership like any other citizens 
in the country, this house urges the Government to introduce a 
scheme at Kibera whereby demarcated plots with title deeds will 
be allocated to the residents for putting up decent houses either 
on their own or with Government assistance, as opposed to the 
present housing scheme by the Ministry of Housing”.
289
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However, this motion was never acted upon, the Lands Act was not 
changed, nothing was gazetted, and title deeds were never issued. There was 
no political will to do anything for the Nubis; without their former 




With the influx of the outsiders in Kibera, things started to change in the 
Nubis‟ daily lives as well. Their traditions were slowly changing, the 
upbringing for Nubi girls became less restrictive, and there was increased 
interest in education, while the influx of outsiders brought the Nubi 
community closer together, which showed in the gradually decreasing 
importance of the old Sudanese tribal languages, traditions, ceremonies and 
cults in favour of a more homogeneous Nubi culture and identity.
291
 People 
had become more urbanised, with less interest in farming, and much of the 
farmland was slowly filling up with houses. While the importance of 
Nubian Gin as the big money-maker decreased, the importance of getting 
income from the rental business increased. Renting out rooms carried no 
risk, and was less labour intensive. Besides, it was a one-off investment, 
with a high rate of return. Many Nubi women that had stopped Nubian Gin 
production, moved to the rental business, even if it never brought in the 
amounts of money that the alcohol had – it was their only option. Nubi men, 
the ones with an income, built rooms as well, but they generally had less 
money than women, and fewer men than women got involved in 
construction of rooms. 
 
The new Kenyan government was increasingly dominated by the Kikuyus, 
from President Kenyatta down to the district level. After Independence, the 
(European) Kibera Superintendent was replaced by a Kikuyu Chief, while 
the last Nubi Liwali (assistant-chief), Suleman Ahmed, was not replaced 
after his death in 1968. As argued by Amis, in the early 1970s “big 
personalities became interested in shanty housing as an investment outlet. 
Given the clientilistic structure of much of Kenyan politics, [….] it is likely 
that ethnicity would be exploited – in this case by the Kikuyu”.
292
 It is 
claimed that in the years before the 1974 elections, many Kikuyus were 
registered as voters in Kibera, though they did not actually live there. As a 
Nubi man explained: “many people were trucked into Kibera to vote; the 
locals were wondering who all these people were. Checking the voter cards, 
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it said indeed they were registered (and living) in Kibera, but they did not 
live there. They came the night before, voted and left”.
293
 As a result, Yunis 
Ali, the incumbent Nubi MP, lost the elections to Mwangi Maathai, a 
Kikuyu, who also benefited from a split in the Nubi vote, between the two 
Nubi contestants, Yunis Ali and Ratib Hussein. With Yunis Ali out of 
Parliament, Kibera lost its last source of protection; there were now Kikuyus 
at all levels of government. The (Kikuyu) chief considered the vast area of 
empty land as a place the Nubis should share with their fellow Kenyans, 
who also needed a place to live. According to him, it would amount to 
discrimination if only Nubis would be allowed to live there and build rental 
rooms; besides, the Nubis did not use all the land.
294
 The doors to Kibera 
were thrown wide open.  
 
 
The first wave, 1975 – 1979 
 
A huge influx of people started, and Kibera‟s population grew spectacularly 
fast: from 20,000 in 1975 to 60-65,000 in 1980, while in 1979 Nairobi‟s 
population had increased to 828,000.
295
 These new “Kiberians” were of all 
ethnic groups, moving to Kibera for its ideal location near jobs in the 
Industrial Area and in town, all within walking distance. The new landlords 
however, the ones that built the houses where all these new tenants lived, 
were no longer only the Nubis, but pre-dominantly Kikuyus, people with 
connections in the government, (senior) government officials themselves, 
fellow tribesmen, and friends. 
 
Word spread quickly that there was land available in Kibera for 
construction, and people came from all over Kenya to invest. Very soon it 
was money that determined who could construct, rather than ethnicity or 
connections. Construction became more expensive because of its scale. The 
prospective landlord needed to buy the building materials and hire people to 
do all the work, usually for blocks of at least 10 rooms at once.
296
 Prices for 
building materials and wages went up. The work had to be done fast, within 
one week, because the construction was in fact illegal, and not official 
government policy. Therefore nothing was put to paper; no license or 
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allotment letter existed. In some cases a letter was given stating that 
permission was given to “repair the house”, in case senior government 
officials would see the construction work going on; the „permit‟ had to be 
given back once the house was ready.
297
 Construction in Kibera was illegal, 
but continued simply because the local administration benefited from it: 
there was a “fee” involved. Therefore, in the end basically anyone who 
could pay the „fee‟ would get permission to build. Yet again it was mainly 
Kikuyus that built houses; they were often the people with money. The main 
beneficiaries of the Kibera construction opportunities were the (Kikuyu) 
middle class and rich people. Looking for plots to develop, businessmen 
would come, senior civil servants, but also the local administration (chiefs, 
District Officers, etcetera). Their interest was not to live in Kibera but only 
to build rooms and rent them out – possibly more than 64% of the landlords 
did not live in Kibera in those days. These so-called „absentee landlords‟ 




Ethnicity however continued to play a role in access to construction of 
rooms, and also the poorer segment of the Kikuyu community got a chance. 
Sometimes they pooled their money, like a group of cleaners of Kenyatta 
Hospital; members of a dance group that used to entertain the president were 
rewarded with a plot in Laini Saba; there were retired people that came to 
invest their pension, build a house for themselves and as well some rental 
rooms for income to live on; most of the first Kikuyu immigrants, who had 
lived in Kibera from the 1920s or 1930s, also put up rooms. 
 
Construction boomed. Tenants moved in as soon as a house was finished; 
newcomers had to wait for months to find a room. Construction started in 
the “empty” areas: areas that the Nubis (had) used for their livestock or 
shambas, areas further away from the Nubi villages, like Kianda, Shilanga 
and Laini Saba, which already had a small Kikuyu population.
299
 Sometimes 
shambas were destroyed to make room for construction, though more often 
the shambas were no longer used. Gradually the construction moved closer 
to the Nubi villages.  
 
Meanwhile the Nubis had also continued construction of rooms, in areas 
that were considered “Nubi territory”
300
, though usually not on a very large 
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scale. As mentioned earlier, construction had become expensive, and many 
Nubis simply did not have that kind of money. The income from Nubian gin 
had by now decreased so even women did not have as much money as 
before. Most women that did have money became involved in construction, 
also lending money to other women to build rooms. Some richer Nubis 
(men) built rooms on a larger scale, like 20-30 rooms, some even more. 
Other Nubi men with less money, realising that the rental business was there 
to stay and could provide them with a good income, started building rooms 
as well. This is not to claim that men did not build in the 1950s and 60s; 
they did but not on the same scale as women – most men did not have the 
money for it. 
 
The local administration, informants claimed, wanted to give the impression 
that they were working together with the Nubis, suggesting it was not (only) 
the administration, but (also) the Nubis themselves who wanted this 
construction. They therefore worked together with the Wazee wa Kijiji 
(village elders), some of whom were Nubis; they served as middlemen 
between the administration and the prospective landlords, and received part 
of the „fee‟, while some got loans (from the Chief) to build their own rooms. 
Their task was to find empty spaces that could be occupied without 
expecting problems with a possible Nubi owner, and to forestall Nubi 
resistance in certain areas. They took advantage of the situation by building 
many houses themselves.  
 
Conflict was unavoidable. There was increasing resistance within the Nubi 
community against the construction and resentment against the Nubis that 
got involved with it, the rich and the village elders (wazee wa kijiji); they 
were often seen as collaborators with the outsiders. Many Nubis thought it 
was getting out of hand, and feared that they were going to lose the little 
control over Kibera they still had. Resistance did not have much effect, 
though: Nubis were asked for their title deed, to show that they owned the 
land; they were told to go back to Sudan. While the Administration Police 
was used to intimidate protesting Nubis, the corrupt judiciary offered no 
help whatsoever. It was clear that the Nubis did not have any special 
position anymore in Kenya, no leverage with the Kenyan Government, and 
no one to stand up for them; large-scale construction of houses and influx of 
„outsiders‟ continued. 
 
The situation was aggravated by the fact that the reduction of Kibera land 
continued during these years. Nubi houses (including the rental rooms they 
had built over the years, some families lost up to 40-50 rooms, without 
100 
 
compensation) in Lang‟ata, Laini Saba and Lomle were demolished to make 
way for new residential areas, while in 1978 houses in Kambi Lendu were 
demolished for the construction of Moi Girls School; in other areas Nubi 
houses had to make way for some churches, that, through their apparent 
links with „important people‟, even managed to get title deeds. The 
demolitions forced Nubis to move from the relatively empty periphery into 
the central part of Kibera; many people from Lomle for example initially 
moved to Mashimoni to build new houses there
301
, before returning to a 
newly built Ayany. This sometimes even caused problems between the 
Nubis, who not always wanted to make space for their displaced fellow-
Nubis. By 1980, probably only about 700 acres remained of the original 
4198 acres. 
 
Towards the end of 1978 the pace of construction slowed down.
302
 President 
Kenyatta had died, and was replaced by Daniel Arap Moi, a Kalenjin – the 
Kikuyu hegemony seemed to be over. Lang‟ata Constituency‟s Kikuyu MP 
lost the 1979 elections, voted out by the large numbers of non-Kikuyu 
tenants that now lived in Kibera.
303
 Kibera‟s Kikuyu chief was suspended 
and replaced. It was a short period of uncertainty, people being replaced, 
others settling down in new jobs. As a consequence, everyone was waiting 
to see what would happen, and construction slowed down, though it never 
stopped. 
 
Though „demolition of unauthorised settlements‟ remained the official 
policy, the core of Kibera was never touched. It seems that demolition in 
those days focused more on visible settlements, often close to or within 
central Nairobi. Kibera was, like Mathare, much larger than most 
(demolition would make an enormous amount of people homeless), and 
more or less „out of sight‟. Moreover, in Kibera political and economical 
interests played a role; the investment in rental houses had to be protected. 
Furthermore, official policy became more pragmatic, realising that informal 
settlements play an important role in providing necessary housing and 
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Kibera becomes congested, 1980 – 1990 
 
With a new Kenyan government, where the Kikuyu no longer dominated, 
other ethnic groups got their chances to construct in Kibera. Nevertheless, 
the Kikuyu continued to figure prominently amongst the new landlords; 
they were the most enterprising people, they had the money to build. A 
survey undertaken in 1980 shows that 66% of large landlords (with >20 
rooms) were Kikuyu and 22% were Nubis, while the average number of 
rooms per landlord had gone up from 4.3 in 1972 to 12.2, a substantial 
increase. Being a landlord had become a profitable business: investment was 
recouped within a year, and with seven rental rooms one already had an 




The tenants moving into Kibera were of all Kenyan ethnic communities, but 
with a strong bias to the western part of Kenya: in 1980, 40% of the tenants 
were from Nyanza (Luos), and 30% from Western Province (mainly 
Luhyas), while only around 10% were Kikuyus. Most tenants (76%) were 
formally employed, while average income was approximately one and a half 
times the official minimum wage, making Kibera an „upmarket‟ slum 
compared to other slums. Nonetheless, people living in Kibera were poor: 
the official minimum wage in 1980 stood at 450 Kenyan Shillings (Ksh), 
while World Bank and the trade union estimated that a family would need 
625 Ksh for their basic nutritional requirements alone.
306
 Poverty and the 
lack of government built and managed low-income housing were the 
reasons for people to live in an illegal settlement. 
 
Around 1980 President Moi was heard on the radio, banning construction in 
Kibera; he only allowed renovation of houses. Construction almost came to 
a complete standstill. However, this was very short-lived: for the right fee, 
the chief would still allow construction – only now it had to be done even 
faster. Instead of one week, people were given one day to erect a structure! 
Construction would start early morning and continue till midnight to finish 
12 rooms. The next day they would put in the doors and windows and 
people would move in immediately. Houses were in high demand, and 
tenants would pay advances, even before a house was built. And so, 
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By then, the so-called empty areas, away from the Nubi areas, were 
becoming congested and encroachment on the Nubi villages had started. 
Makina was hardly touched: it already quite full with structures built by the 
Nubis themselves; they would build as much as possible to fill up empty 
spaces, in order to avoid having outsiders in Makina.
308
 This obviously led 
to more conflict between Nubis and administration. The administration 
continued to use force to claim land from protesting Nubis, beating or 
locking them up if they continued their resistance. The Administration 
Police was used to intimidate and beat up protesting Nubis, as shown by an 
angry letter sent to the DO: “why did your office decide to destroy crops on 
the plot without previously even informing the owners of the plot? Why did 
the chief‟s askaris [police, soldiers] decide to assault Mr. Suleiman 
Ramadhan, without an apparent reason?”.
309
 In some cases, rooms were 
simply built in an empty place, and when the Nubi came to complain, he 
was told to compensate the room-owner for his loss (if he would have to 
demolish his structures), after which the Nubi had no choice but to let it go. 
In other cases, according to a former mzee wa kijiji (village elder), “the 
Chief would show up with someone, and to the Nubi he would say: „this is 
an empty space, I give you three days to construct; if not done, then this 
man will construct‟. The chief had already received his money so had to 




However, as the construction was against official government policy and 
was in fact (supposed to be) done secretly, room for negotiation developed. 
To avoid problems, prospective landlords (still mainly Kikuyus) were sent 
to negotiate with the Nubi who claimed ownership of that particular piece of 
land, suggesting that he would allow structures to be put up, some of which 
would then be given to the Nubi in exchange for the land (a normal ratio 
seems to have been 2:1). This system, which came to be known as “jenga 
yangu, jenga yako” (“Build mine, build yours”, Swahili), was an attractive 
option for many Nubis. In the first place, many saw the irreversibility of the 
trend that had set in, they realised they would not be able to stop this 
invasion of outsiders anymore. More and more Nubis decided to put up 
structures as well, to preserve at least some of their land for themselves and 
benefit from the rental business. “If you did not build on your land, someone 
else would, and most likely an outsider; you would be left with nothing”. 
Secondly, most Nubis did not have the money to build houses, and this 
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system was an easy way of getting houses and providing the family with 
income.
311
 The Nubis had resisted as long as they could, but now started 
actively looking for people to do “jenga yangu, jenga yako”, putting their 
land up for grabs in exchange for rooms. The younger people would later 
blame them, “you old people have sold Kibera”, but looking back, were they 
right or wrong? In some cases Nubi youths forced their fathers to give in to 
the trend and build rooms, or, if they had a job, they simply built rooms 
themselves without their father‟s permission. Nubi women with money from 
Nubian gin or tenants joined in the race by offering other Nubis (often 
women) to build rooms according to the “jenga yangu, jenga yako” system; 
some big Nubian gin producers managed to construct hundreds of rooms for 
themselves. Nubis who had land but no money offered their relatives or 
Nubi friends with money space to build rooms, sometimes even without 
asking for rooms in exchange, but mainly to make sure that it was a Nubi 
who built on their land, and not an outsider.  
 
The construction business became almost like a race against time: 
everybody putting up as many structures as possible, and as fast as possible. 
Rooms were built on roads, and latrines were demolished to make space for 
more structures, creating the conditions for Kibera‟s infamous „flying 
toilets‟ (people defecate in plastic bags and hurl them away, over the roofs). 
People were at some point told (by the Chief) to remove fences around their 
compounds, so others could build rooms. Every available space in Kibera 
was used for construction. 
 
Meanwhile the hiving off of Kibera land had continued. Land had been 
given out (by the Government) to some churches along Kibera Drive, and 
more construction had taken place, for schools, and for residential areas like 
Highrise Estate, looking out over Kibera, now a crowded slum area on an 
estimated 550 acres of land. 
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Kibera consolidated, 1990 – 2000 
 
Had construction accelerated in the 1980s, it all but stopped in the early 
1990s: Kibera was more or less full. Construction of houses continued on a 
small scale, filling in empty pockets here and there, within the 550 acres that 
had remained of the original 4198 acres. The main construction works were 
repairs or demolition of derelict walls and roofs, rebuilding rooms, or even 
re-dividing rooms into smaller ones, to create more rooms and space for 
more people. 
 
In 1993, Kibera‟s population was estimated to be around 250,000, and 
377,000 in 1999
312
, the largest informal settlement of Nairobi (and of 
Kenya). People of all Kenyan ethnic groups were squeezed within the area 
that is now Kibera, with houses even on the steeper slopes and close to the 
rivers. Though people live mostly ethnically mixed (landlords don‟t like to 
rent out to people of the same ethnic group, in case they team up against 
her/him), certain patterns of ethnic clustering have been established. Kibera 
is now divided into a number of „villages‟ (see map 3, below), each with its 
own characteristics in ethnic makeup: while most villages have people of all 
ethnic groups, often one group is dominant. Some of the old Nubi village 
names have disappeared, replaced by names of Kikuyu or other origin, or 
referring to the dominant ethnic group of that village. 
 
The Nubis live concentrated in Makina, Kambi Muru and Lindi, and own 
most of the houses there; tenants are of all ethnic groups. Gatwikira and 
Kisumu Ndogo (together they are often simply referred to as “Gatwikira”) 
are dominated by the Luo (tenants), mainly young men fresh from Nyanza, 
though most houses are actually owned by Kikuyu. Laini Saba is dominated 
by Kikuyu owners/inhabitants, with Kamba, Luhya and (some) Luo tenants. 
Kianda is very mixed in terms of inhabitants, though more than 50% are 
Luo, while the house owners here are mainly Kikuyu and Kisii. Shilanga 
has mainly Kikuyu-owned houses, and mixed tenants, though many are Luo. 
In Mashimoni, most houses are owned by Nubi and Kikuyu, with mainly 
Luhya tenants. Nonetheless, in general, all villages have residents of all 
ethnic groups. 
 
The life of the Nubis changed fundamentally in many ways. They were now 
surrounded by outsiders, and contact with them was unavoidable; 
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intermarriage had increased, and the Kinubi language gradually 
incorporated more Swahili words and was, in the younger generation, often 
even replaced by Swahili. The Nubian Gin production had almost 
completely ceased; agriculture and keeping livestock was no longer 
possible, there was simply no space anymore. Jobs were harder to get, they 
were for fellow tribesmen rather than for „Sudanese‟; discrimination had 
started.
313
 The Nubis had lost control over Kibera; all they had left were 
their houses and the rental rooms they had managed to build, mainly in 
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Kibera in the third millennium – new challenges 
The world is urbanising fast: by 2030 an estimated 60% of the world's 
population will live in cities.
314
 At the beginning of the 3
rd
 millennium, 
Africa is the fastest urbanising continent in the world. While in 1980 only 
28% of the African population lived in cities, it now is estimated to be 
around 37%. Currently 71.9% of the urban population in sub-Saharan 
Africa, over 166 million people, lives in slums and squatter settlements 
without adequate shelter or basic services. Efforts of African governments 
to provide shelter for their urban population, and certainly housing that is 
affordable to the poor, have been insufficient. „In Kenya, it is estimated that 
234,000 new housing units are required every year yet only 20,000-30,000 
units per year are currently being produced and a mere 20% of these are 
affordable to low and moderate income families‟.
315
 In Nairobi, possibly 
around 1.5 million people, 60% of the city‟s population, live in slum areas 
comprising less than 5% of the total municipal residential land. To compare: 
in 1960 only 6% of Nairobi‟s population lived in squatter settlements, in 




Kibera is now claimed to be the largest slum in sub-Saharan Africa, but 
population figures for Kibera are ambiguous: estimates range from 220,000 
to more than one million.
317
 Though there seems to be some consensus on 
600-700,000 being a reasonable estimate,
318
 there is no evidence that this is 
actually the case. Rather, there is more evidence for a much lower 
population. In 1999 the international NGO Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) 
did a survey in Kianda and estimated the population at around 23,000 
people instead of the official figure of 75,000.
319
 The “Map Kibera Project” 
did a door-to-door census in the same area in 2008 and found only 15,200 
people. The Kenya Slum Upgrading programme (KENSUP), which is 
responsible for managing the slum upgrading in Kibera (with UN-Habitat) 
did a census in Soweto East, chosen to be the first Kibera village to be 
upgraded, and found around 20-23,000 people compared to the UN estimate 
of 70,000; the KENSUP figures have not been made public.
320
 A document 
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on Lang‟ata Constituency shows a population of 256,446 for Kibera, though 
it is unclear where the document comes from (the Kenyan government?) and 
on what data exactly the numbers are based (the official 1998 National 
Census?).
321
 A recent study in Nairobi‟s slums found that the average family 
size is around 3 persons, and that there are on average 2.6 persons per room, 
much lower than most people would expect. The low number of people per 
room was also informally confirmed by KENSUP.
322
 The “Map Kibera 
Project”, by extrapolating its Kianda findings to the whole of Kibera, 
concludes that there are between 220,000 and 250,000 people in Kibera.
323
 
The preliminary results of the most recent survey, done by MSF-Belgium in 
May 2009 in all Kibera villages, show again a low population: between 
201,000 and 244,000, with an average of 2.9 persons per room.
324
 On the 
other hand, there is a big difference between Kibera‟s daytime and night-
time population, and many of the „cousins and friends‟ that sleep all over 
Kibera without any regular or fixed home, may not have been included in 




What can we conclude from this about Kibera‟s population? It seems clear 
that most official estimates are much too high. Assuming moreover that the 
above-mentioned low-estimate surveys and censuses may have missed part 
of the people, it seems prudent to estimate Kibera‟s population between 
200,000 and 300,000 people (though it remains nothing more than an 
„educated guess‟). Is Kibera in that case still sub-Saharan Africa‟s largest 
slum?
326
 Maybe not, but it is not a title to be proud of anyway.  
 
Kibera is now densely populated, dirty, and dangerous; because it is 
considered an illegal settlement, Kibera is denied public services like 
infrastructure and health clinics, and like any slum, it is an unhealthy place 
to live. A „slum‟ can be defined as an (often unplanned) section of a city 
characterised by inferior living conditions (inadequate housing, lack of 
potable water and sanitation systems, electricity, infrastructure), poverty, 
high population density, and often without (individual) security of land 
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 The general neglect of slum areas and informal settlements by the 
government shows also in the lack of reliable figures or estimates of even 
the most basic indicators. Nevertheless, some data are available to help 
create a general picture of the living conditions in Kibera.  
 





Housing in Kibera is generally of appalling standards; most rooms have 
walls built of mud and wattle, roofs of corrugated iron sheets and earthen 
floors. Walls are cracked, and some have large holes through which one can 
peek into the neighbour‟s room; roofs are leaking, and the noise of people, 
radios and TVs is all-pervading. Water and electricity are available in 
Kibera, but connections are private (including many illegal connections 
from the mains) and mainly used for business, which makes water and 
electricity even more expensive to slum dwellers than they are for the more 
affluent part of the city‟s population. The toilet ratio seems to be one pit 
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latrine (usually in very poor state) per 50-150 people (optimum is 10-20 
persons per unit); one often has to pay to use a toilet, hence Kibera‟s 
notoriety for „flying toilets‟. The Nairobi City Council only collects garbage 
(and only at very long intervals) along Kibera Drive, the main road, so 
within Kibera waste is thrown outside and left to rot in the streets, 
occasionally washed away by the rain; burning piles of waste are a common 










Access to health care is limited and expensive – there are no governmental 
or municipal health facilities in Kibera, and people depend on private 
dispensaries that have mushroomed in recent years. HIV/Aids is a problem, 
due to poverty; live sex shows are performed in Kibera, without condom, 
despite the HIV/Aids threat: "better die ten years later of HIV/Aids than 
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 In general, slum residents have a high mortality burden 




Existing figures on employment are confusing; formal employment could be 
between 17 and 69%.
331
 While in the early morning many people can be 
seen along the roads walking from Kibera to the Industrial Area, strolling 
through Kibera during the day shows that unemployment rates must be high, 
with many young men sitting idle by the side of the roads or in bars. Many 
people depend on the informal sector, casual work and „business‟.
332
 
According to a recent study, almost 50% of Kibera residents earn less than 
7,000 and 24% between 7-10,000 Kenyan Shillings per month.
333
 Getting 
three meals a day is often unachievable: in the same study, 38% of the 
respondents claim to frequently miss one meal in a day.
334
 Alcohol and drug 
use is rampant, probably caused by poverty and unemployment: people are 
bored, „people want to forget‟, and, alcohol takes away the hunger.
335
 This 
situation creates conditions for crime: in the absence of formal income 
opportunities, many resort to theft. Every Kibera village has its gangs, and 
people fear going out at night. Nevertheless, Kibera has a "safe" image, 
particularly when compared with other informal settlements like Mathare, 
while there are also differences within Kibera: Makina is generally safer 
than for example Gatwikira.  
 
Kibera‟s continued population growth is due to continuing rural-urban 
migration, and, probably more importantly, due to a natural population 
increase: Kibera has many long-time residents (30% has lived here more 
than ten years), and a very young population: 52% is below 24 years, and 
many of those were born in Kibera.
336
 There are no official data on the 
ethnic composition of the population, but it is generally thought that the Luo 
are the largest group, then the Luhya, the Kisii, and others. The Nubi are 
now only a very small minority in Kibera.  
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The Nubis in the third millennium 
 
Today, there are probably not more than 6-7,000 Nubis living in Kibera; a 
socio-economic census of the Nubi community undertaken in October / 
November 2007 found around 5400 people, but may have missed a number 
of families. No other Nubi surveys or censuses have been undertaken 
(completed) since the „unofficial census‟ of 1966 that found 3000 Nubis, so 
it is difficult to compare and assess the veracity of the latest figures.
337
 What 
is clear though from the 2007 census is that the Nubi community in Kibera 
is small in numbers
338
, and insignificant in the political arena; their 
continued quest for Kibera land rights (or for recognition as Kenya‟s „43
rd
 
tribe‟) seems to stand little chance.  
 
In 1995 some title deeds appeared to have been given out to well-connected 
individuals, but Nubi youths protested against this and when they found out 
that the title deeds were not registered and never legalised, the matter was 
put to rest. In 1996 President Moi announced that the Nubis would get a title 
deed for the land they occupied in Kibera, but like with the previous motion 
of 1970, there was no follow up on this
339
, and no permanent solution to the 
“Nubian problem” was offered. In 1997, the Minister for Lands and 
Settlement announced his ministry‟s objective “to ensure security of tenure 
to the bonafide owners of the structures in these [informal] settlements 
[including Nubian villages] by issuing them with titles for the land on which 
the structures stand”.
340
 Indeed, people in Nubi villages around Kenya, in 
Mazeras and Kisumu for example, have received allotment letters or title 
deeds to their plots. Kibera was specifically mentioned in the minister‟s 
statement, however, no allotment letters or title deeds have been issued in 
Kibera, with the exception of a few churches and a few „connected‟ 
individuals. This is most likely because Kibera is politically too sensitive, 
with the large Luo/tenant population and the extremely high value of the 
land (being so close to the centre of town), to divide the land amongst the 
landlords. The Nubis might not have agreed with the Government giving out 
title deeds to all structure owners: they consider the non-Nubi landlords as 
illegal. Several Nubi organisations were established at different times to 
coordinate possible actions and negotiations with the government over the 
Kibera land, but none of them have been very successful in securing 
concessions from the government on the land issue.  
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Kibera has seen a number of violent conflicts over the years, always 
resulting in death, destruction and displacement. In 1992 and 1995 clashes 
erupted between Nubis and Luos, and may have been the result of 
frustration with the „outsiders‟, or underlying tension between tenants and 
landlords. The Luos had by then become (one of) the largest ethnic groups 
in Kibera
341
, not so much as house owners, but mainly as tenants. The next 
round of clashes, in 2001, was instigated by politicians who see Kibera 
more as a reservoir of votes than as a slum with people that need their 
support. In these clashes, again mainly between Nubis and Luos, houses 
went up in flames, and more than 30,000 people were displaced; 15 people 
were killed and scores were injured.
342
 Calm returned after two weeks of 
violence, but Kibera had changed: in the Luo-dominated areas tenants have 
refused to pay rent since then, or pay only a fraction of the pre-clashes level. 
Many landlords lost their houses and their income in those areas. After the 
2007 elections another round of violence broke out in Kibera (and in many 
other parts of Kenya), making headlines all over the world: thousands of 
people fled Kibera and many were killed or injured. This time, while the 
Nubis were not really involved in the clashes, the Luos seem to have used 
the (election) violence to chase away Kikuyu landlords and increase their 
control over Kibera. Chapter 5 will elaborate further on these violent 
episodes and the resulting changes in Kibera, by analysing the role of ethnic 
politics and the resulting diminished importance of the Nubis in Kibera. 
 
There are now thousands of landlords in Kibera (while possibly 94% of 
Kibera residents are tenants
343
), with property varying in size between just 
one to hundreds of rooms. Sometimes tenants can turn into owners when 
buying the room they live in, or even become „small landlords‟ if they can 
buy a few rooms from a „retiring landlord‟. Most of the landlords (73%) 
supposedly don‟t live in Kibera.
344
 About 50% of the landlords are 
Kikuyu
345
, but their numbers are going down, as rooms are sold off to 
people of other ethnic groups, after the 2001 and certainly the 2007/8 
clashes, when being a landlord in Kibera lost some of its attraction and even 
turned out to be a hazardous business, and less profitable with the reduced 
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or unpaid rent. People sell their rooms as well when they retire and want to 
go back “up-country”, or the children of the original owner sell the rooms 
when he dies and they do not live in Kibera. The Nubis possibly own about 
10-15% of the rooms in Kibera, but they can‟t sell and leave the area, since 
they have no home area to go to.  
 
The Nubis‟ financial position has deteriorated in the last decade. The rent 
clashes of 2001 reduced their income and increased poverty in the Nubi 
community: many Nubi families depend for their income on their rental 
rooms. Most Nubis are „small landlords‟: an average Nubi family owns 
probably between 10-20 rooms, though some (like absentee Kikuyu 
landlords) own 50, 100 or even more rooms, and some (including an 
increasing number of younger Nubis) none at all. Moreover, the generation 
that built these rooms are now grandparents, sustaining their (unemployed) 
children as well as their grandchildren, who also occupy more rooms than 
before, reducing the number of rooms available to rent out. It means that 
larger families live off fewer rooms than before, while at the same time 
(food) prices have gone up and rent levels have gone down.  
 
The Nubi community has also lost in many other aspects. Many Nubi youths 
drop out of school at an early age, resulting in continued low levels of 
education, and high unemployment. This, according to many people, has 
resulted in young Nubis getting involved in crime, and has increased drug 
use amongst them. Moreover, there is a certain degree of discrimination in 
Kenya against Nubis (and against Muslims in general): getting IDs, 
passports and jobs seems to be more difficult for them than for others – 
Nubi youths have to go through a special vetting process in order to get their 
ID.
346
 This discrimination is a result of the Nubis‟ minority status and the 
resulting lack of political leverage. Moreover, in Kenya these days it is 
impossible to get a job unless you “know someone”; jobs and other perks 
often go to people of the same ethnic group, further reducing the chances for 
minority groups like the Nubis. 
 
For the young Nubis there is hardly any incentive to do anything. Many stay 
at home idle and live off the rental income of their parents‟ houses. But 
what does the future hold in store for them? A family can survive on the 
income of 10 rooms, but at some point Nubi families will have to make do 
with the income from 4-5 rooms in order to survive, if rooms are split 
between inheriting children. One room brings in 500-1000 Kenyan Shillings 
                                                          
346
 Sing‟oei 2008. See also Chapter 3 and website 
http://www.minorityrights.org/3951/kenya/muslims.html (accessed 11/5/09). 
114 
 
per month, hardly enough to live unless other income becomes available. 
With generally high levels of unemployment, the future looks bleak for the 
Nubi youth. 
 
Many Nubis have moved out of Kibera in the last decades. In the 1970s 
some richer Nubis started buying land outside Kibera, in places like 
Kitengela, Ongata Rongai and Ngong, though many plots remained 
undeveloped; again, a majority of the buyers seem to be women. A few 
land-buying associations, like Akhwana Housing Cooperative Society 
(1988), were established (most members were women), but have not been 
very effective due to the low saving and purchasing power of the Nubis  and 
misuse and embezzlement of the raised funds. Other Nubis, with jobs or 
money, have moved „upwards‟, out of Kibera to estates within Nairobi or to 
the surrounding villages, or further away, to Mombasa, and some even 
abroad. Nevertheless, they all keep a strong link with Kibera and their 
relatives there, visiting regularly and coming for weddings and funerals. 
 
The main Nubi organisations are the Kibera Land Committee (KLC) and the 
Nubian Council of Elders. The KLC focuses on the land issue in Kibera and 
had (in 2002) completed negotiations with the government on getting a 
communal title deed for the so-called “Nubian Village” (250-300 acres, half 
of Kibera), but has since been waiting in vain for the document itself. The 
Nubian Council of Elders became active after the 2001 clashes, trying to 
negotiate a return to normalcy with the elders of the other ethnic groups. 
They work on all aspects of Nubi rights and have initiated some suits 
pending in court, to sort out the issue of Nubi citizenship, against 
discrimination and one on the land issue at the International Court in The 
Hague. A court case on citizenship against the Kenyan Government is 
pending to be heard at the African Commission on Human and People‟s 





Demolitions, and the upgrading of Kibera 
 
It is unclear what the Kenyan government‟s plans are with Kibera: 
demolition and forced evictions, plans for upgrading, and promises of a 
communal title deed for the Nubis have all been witnessed in the last 
decade. Since Independence the administration seems to have been reluctant 
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to offer a permanent solution to the “Nubian / Kibera” problem, while 
showing insensitivity in dealing with poor people.  
 
Evictions and demolitions have continued in Kenya despite the 
government‟s stated policy of non-demolition: slum housing should not be 
demolished unless there is some positive and overriding developmental 
reason, and if there are alternative areas for resettlement. Evidence from a 
number of demolitions shows that this policy has been ignored.
348
 Early in 
2004 forced evictions and demolitions of houses took place in Kibera, to 
make way for a proposed road by-pass. Raila Village (a relatively new 
village in Kibera) was bulldozed without notice; 400 structures were 
demolished, including schools, clinics and churches, leading to the internal 
displacement of over 2,000 people and causing property losses in the 
millions of Shillings. Four years later there was still no sign of any activity 
or work on the by-pass. Forced evictions of this nature are in breach of well-
established international norms and laws which obligate the Government 
(that ratified these international treaties) to provide the affected 
communities with adequate and reasonable notice, genuine consultation, 
information and adequate alternative housing or resettlement.
349
 In the same 
year people were given notice for demolition of structures too close to the 
road, structures located under or near to power lines, and too close to the 
railway line. Though some people voluntarily demolished and moved their 





Nonetheless, demolitions or threats continued: in August 2007, a seven-day 
notice was issued by the Ministry of Housing to residents in Soweto East. 
The Ministry planned to build a road from Mbagathi Road to Karanja Road 
and marked the affected houses with a red cross. No compensation and 
resettlement was offered to the residents. In fact, the Ministry has claimed 
that it will charge residents for the cost of the demolition!
351
 In mid-2008 
the houses with red crosses were still standing, though some work was in 
progress at the junction of the planned road and Mbagathi Road. 
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These demolition threats are bizarre since the Government had already in 
2000 decided to develop plans for the upgrading of Kibera slums, in 
collaboration with UN-Habitat (the so-called Kenya Slum Upgrading 
Programme, KENSUP).
352
 The plan was to build next to Kibera 
accommodation (6-700 apartments), the so-called „decanting site‟, where a 
few thousand people (inhabitants of Kibera: both landlords and tenants) 
from a small part of Kibera would be temporarily resettled; their vacated 
houses would then be demolished and in the newly created open space, flats 
were to be built for the same people that had moved temporarily to the 
decanting site. Soweto East was earmarked to be the first Kibera village 
benefitting from the upgrading. However, the implementation of the 
upgrading plans has left much to be desired. Kibera residents received 
hardly any information on the plans, and they were clearly expected to 
simply rubberstamp the plans. Moreover, the demolition of Raila Village 
had created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion between local 
population and the authorities. The earmarking of Soweto East started a rush 
for houses in that area, driving up the rent and cost of living. It was also 
very unclear how much the new houses would cost, and whether people 
living in Kibera would be able to afford it. The local newspapers showed 
nice drawings of the new flats, one to three bedrooms, toilet and bathroom, 
a living room and kitchen, and with water and electricity supply.
353
 Could 
such a house cost the same as what people were paying in Kibera, between 
400 and 1000 Kenyan Shillings (6-15 US dollars) per month? There did not 
seem to be any plans for financing, or mortgages. Moreover, neither the 
government nor UN-Habitat appeared to have much money available, nor 
long-term funding. There was also the fear for corruption – many thought 
(think) that connected people from outside will be put on the list of people 
entitled to a new house. Or that the poor will sell or sub-let to middle class 
people, and move to (or create) another slum – because it is clear that there 
is a market for very cheap housing.  
 
Another major, as yet unsolved problem is the question of who should be 
entitled to a house in an upgraded Kibera: the landlords, in proportion to the 
number of rooms they own now, or just one house „per person‟? Should the 
tenants have rights to a house as well?
354
 These questions are not easily 
answered, as there is a conflict of interest between the two groups. The 
landlords won‟t easily accept anything that reduces their rental income 
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opportunities in Kibera, they want the same number of rooms and continue 
with their rental business; tenants would obviously prefer to have their own 
houses. Moreover, ethnic politics will also be involved in this: the majority 
of tenants are Luos, while the majority of landlords are Kikuyu and Nubis. 
The Luo tenants will obviously want to have a share and own part of the 
new houses, and will be (are being) supported by their leader Raila 
Odinga.
355
 The Kikuyu landlords have largely kept out of the previous 
clashes between landlords and tenants
356
, but the Nubis have not: many of 





This chapter has shown how the Nubis settled in Kibera, and how they have 
successfully used, during the colonial period, their being „foreigners and 
soldiers‟ and their special relationship with the colonial authorities to 
maintain control over Kibera. After Independence the Nubis had to change 
their strategy and ethnic identity: they turned themselves from „Sudanese‟ 
into a „Kenyan tribe‟. However, without political (read: ethnic) support in 
independent Kenya the Nubis lost their supremacy in Kibera – they were 
unable to stop the influx of outsiders and construction of rental rooms, and 
Kibera became, within a short time, a congested slum area. At the beginning 
of the third millennium the Nubis have become a marginalised community 
in Kibera. The recent upgrading plans have taken a long time to materialise, 
and are fraught with problems; it is unlikely there will be any substantial 
change in Kibera in the near future. But, no matter what will happen in or to 
Kibera, it is clear that the land ownership issue must be dealt with at some 
point, and that any solution must take the Nubis and their rights into 
account. The fact that the Nubis have been allowed to stay in Kibera for 
such a long time has created a legal precedent: „claim to this land can be 
solidified on the grounds of longstanding and spiritual connection to Kibera, 
as their eviction would result in the destruction of the community‟s survival 
as a group‟.
357
  Even if they have never been given an official title deed, 
after more than 100 years of occupation the Nubis do have, according to 
Kenyan law, strong legal claims on (at least part of) Kibera. Besides, they 
have nowhere else to go; Kibera is their homeland, and, as many of them 
insist (and have shown during the various violent clashes), if they have to, 
they „will defend it to the last man‟. 
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The „making‟ of the Nubis – on ethnic identity 
 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen that before Independence the Nubis 
started identifying themselves as „a Kenyan tribe‟, instead of as „Sudanese‟. 
Since the Nubis „emerged‟ in the late nineteenth century, they have changed 
quite a few times of identity. Starting off individually as Dinka, Mundu or 
Nuba, they merged into a new military community linked to the Egyptian 
army; in those days they were possibly already known as „Nubi‟. After 
moving to Uganda, and in the colonial days in Kenya, they were identified 
as „Sudanese‟, foreigners, an identity they insisted on for various reasons. In 
Kenya, in the final colonial years before Independence, they started 
presenting themselves as „Nubi, a Kenyan tribe‟, reflecting the changing 
political context in Kenya. This chapter will have a closer look at Nubi 
ethnic identity and the many changes it has gone through during its 
relatively short existence. Analysing how and why the Nubis, after settling 
in Kibera, increasingly developed into a more homogeneous ethnic group, it 
will be clear that ethnic identity is not static, but open to change and 
manipulation, depending on the context and situation.  
 
It was generally expected that in African countries after the colonial era, 
under the influence of nationalism and modernity, the different ethnic 
groups, their ethnic identities and ethnic distinctions would disappear, 
especially (or first) in urban areas – Africans would simply become national 
citizens: Kenyan, or Ugandan.
358
 This has, however, not been the case: 
ethnic identities often became even more important, especially in urban 
settings, playing a role in competition for jobs, housing, and plain 
(economic) survival. In urban areas there is much more contact between 
members of different ethnic groups than in rural areas, and in such situations 
ethnic identity often becomes more important – people feel more secure and 
at ease with people of the same ethnic background, and they often support 
each other in the first steps in town after arriving from the rural areas, often 
settling in the same part (slum) of town, or even in the same area within a 
slum. Certainly in economically difficult times, or in case of danger or 
threats to the whole group, people pull together and identify more with their 
„fellow tribesmen‟. The influx of (mainly Christian) outsiders into Kibera 
had a similar effect on the Nubis – they pulled together, „united‟ against the 
outsiders, and became „more Nubi‟. The cultural differences that had existed 
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between the Sudanese „tribes‟ in terms of language, food and rituals, and 
that had continued to exist in Kibera, disappeared gradually. This chapter 
will describe this process of „nubianisation‟, while also reviewing some 
Nubi „ethnic markers‟, the special physical and ideological characteristics of 
Nubi culture – how do Nubis identify themselves? Special attention is 
reserved for some of these characteristics: „endogamy‟ (marrying within the 
group), and the way in which the Nubis incorporated new members (mainly 
women through marriage) to the community. The relationships with 
„tribesmen‟ in other Nubi villages in Kenya and in neighbouring countries 
(mainly Uganda) will be discussed, and finally, the legal struggle of the 
Nubis to be recognised as a Kenyan „tribe‟ will be highlighted.  
 
 
Creating a new community – from Sudanese to Nubi 
 
The Nubis were not a homogeneous ethnic group when they arrived in 
Kibera; they were internally divided, mostly along „Sudanese tribal lines‟. A 
closer look at the social history of the Nubis in Kibera shows that this 




Internal divisions  
 
From the beginning, the Nubis settling in Kibera tended to stay closer to 
people of the same original Sudanese ethnic group, nowadays called “clan”. 
In general the Fur and Nuba settled in the Sarang‟ombe/Lomle area and 
Lindi, the Bari in Makina and Lindi; the Shilluk and Dinka were mainly 
around Sarang‟ombe and Lomle; the Tagalaw in Galalima, the Mundu in 
Lang‟ata and Toi, the Lendu lived in “Kambi Lendu”, and likewise, the 
Kuku, Alur, and Muru all had their own “Kambi”.
359
 People were well 
aware of their tribal origins, they still had culturally more in common, and 
felt more at ease, with the people of their own clan / ethnic group, who 
would, for example, also prefer the same food: there is a big difference 
between what for example Dinka (cattle nomads) and Mundu 
(agriculturalists) would eat in Sudan, and this difference continued, to some 
extent, to play a role in Kibera. This shows for example in the food stuffs 
used in wedding or (female) circumcision rituals – the Dinka clan tend to 
use more milk, while the Mundu are more into sweet potatoes. 
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There was also a preference to marry within the same clan – some people 
travelled far to look for a suitable „same clan‟ marriage partner for their son 
in other Nubi villages in Kenya and even Uganda, and only if they could not 
find anyone suitable would they look at the girls of the other clans. 
Moreover, amongst themselves they continued speaking their own tribal 
languages instead of the “military” language, Kinubi, which was only used 
when people of different clans were together. Some of these tribal languages 
(f.e. Lendu) were spoken in Kibera by the older generation until the 1950s, 
when most of that first generation of soldiers had died. One old mzee still 
remembered some Lendu words, but never learned to speak the language.  
 
The group of soldiers that had been recruited in northern Sudan or Egypt to 
go to Somalia, initially spoke proper Arabic and not the simplified “Juba-
Arabic" or Kinubi. There was a tendency for those people to marry within 
the “northern group”. In due course they unlearned the proper Arabic and 
used the Kinubi spoken by the others.
360
 Apart from differences in language, 
there were differences in rituals and ceremonies (in weddings etc.) that in 
some cases remain up to today.  
 
The preference in „tribal‟ residence contributed initially to the development 
of a “sub-locality identity”, strengthening kinship ties and other 
relationships within the different Nubi villages. Internal problems were 
solved by the sub-locality‟s elders (majlish shu’uba/shaura) who provided 
leadership at the locational level. The Nubi chief in Kibera, the Liwali, was 
not accepted by all Nubis; since he was from one of the sub-locations, 
people from other sub-locations would not recognise or accept him as their 
leader. Each sub-location had its informal leaders (usually the senior 
officers), some of whom rose to Kibera-wide prominence, like Khamis 
Juma or Ramadhan Marjan; there was an almost continuous competition for 
supremacy in Kibera between these „big men‟. Each sub-locality also had its 
own cultural group and football team, further indicating the importance of 
the sub-locality in social life.
361
 This situation also led to a certain rivalry 
between the different sub-locations in which young and old were involved, 
sometimes (or, according to some people, often) ending in physical fights; 
after football matches, or during weddings or traditional dances organised 
by one of the cultural groups, a boy from Makina dancing with a girl from 
Lomle could be enough reason for trouble. The main rivalry was between 
Makina and the Lomle / Sarang‟ombe area, where allegedly more 
progressive, richer and more educated people lived. 
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The geographical separation of the different clans was not very strict, and 
became more blurred over time. First of all, there were clans with few 
people in Kibera: in settling they tended to mix with the other clans; 
secondly, the choice of location also depended on friendships established in 
the army, and friends from different clans settled together. Moreover, the 
Nubi community was quite small, and the number of potential marriage 
partners limited, even within the whole community; as a result there was 
increased intermarriage with the other Nubi clans. Over the years a 
substantial mix between the clans (and sub-locations) took place.  
 
Some of the Nubi clans occupied a different, lower status position within the 
community, especially the smaller clans – they were by some Nubis even 
referred to as „labi‟. Many Nubis were a bit scared of the Lendu and Alur, 
because of their alleged witchcraft powers; they were also looked down 
upon, because they kept much more to their old traditions and rituals than 
the others
362
 – the girls of these two clans were not popular marriage 
partners for boys of other clans: until the 1970/80s they mostly married 
within their clan. The relatively low social position of the Lendu may also 
have to do with the fact that the Lendu joined the Nubi community at a later 
stage – the majority joined a few years before marching to Uganda, and 
others of the Lendu ethnic group begged to be allowed to join them due to 
famine in their area: they apparently became servants/slaves to the 
soldiers.
363
 Later the Lendu also became soldiers, and „full‟ members of the 
group. 
 
The internal division in the Nubi community was also somehow reflected in 
the existence of two Nubi organisations in Kibera, both pretending to 
represent the community: the Union of Sudanese and the Sudanese 
Association. The history of both organisations is unclear and confusing, as 
community leaders moved from one to the other, depending on local 
alliances and on who was in charge of the Union or Association at the time. 
Part of the rivalry between the two organisations seems to have stemmed 
from the locational differences, and from jealousy between elders that could 
not accept each other as the leader. Possibly generational differences have 
played a role as well: at some point the Association was mainly made up of 
the older people, while the Union was more attractive to younger people. 
Again later the Association lost a lot of goodwill in the community by 
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supporting the Government‟s plan to move Nubis to the new housing 
scheme of Karanja.
364
 How deep the rift ran in the community is shown by 
the story of a student who in the late 1960s was doing research on Kibera‟s 
history; one day he interviewed a knowledgeable old man and was to return 
the next day to continue his questions. The next day, on arrival, the old man 
refused, he did not want to have anything to do with the student anymore, 
since he had found out that his father was in the Association! 
 
Despite the tribal differences and divisions within the community, the Nubis 
presented themselves to the outside world as one community: „we are a 
distinct homogeneous community in the middle of pagan Africa‟, the Union 
of Sudanese wrote in 1940 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 
London. According to Deverell and Colchester, “the Nubis are a well 
defined group with established and well respected custom” and “high 
standards of community behaviour and respect”.
365
 In public the Nubis 
would invariably refer to themselves as „Sudanese‟
366
, emphasising their 
status as „foreigners‟ and their special relationship with the colonial 
authorities. They did not want to be classified as „pagan African natives‟, 
but rather saw themselves in the same category as Arabs, Somalis and 
Comorians (all specifically classified as „non-natives‟ in 1934
367
), and 
certainly not lower than “the Indian who came in large numbers and finds 
himself in a better and superior position than ourselves who lost our lives 
fighting”; they requested the Government to consider their application „to be 




Being recognised as Sudanese, as non-natives, would give them some 
monetary advantages over „natives‟: during World War II the Asians had 
received higher food rations than natives.
369
 Probably more importantly, 
being recognised as Sudanese would give the Nubis recognition for their 
services to the British Crown; this special relationship with the colonial 
authorities should be reflected in special treatment – to be allowed to stay in 
Kibera, and to continue the distillation of Nubian gin. How important it was 
for the Nubis to be considered Sudanese is shown when they refused to pay 
a new Hut Tax that was introduced in 1940 under the Native Hut and Poll 
                                                          
364
 See Clark 1975 and Parsons 1997: 109. Informants M3, M16. 
365
 Letter Union of Sudanese, 14/10/40, KNA MAA/2/1/3; Kibera Survey report, 1944, p7, 
10. 
366
 Amongst themselves they would use „Nubi‟. 
367
 Salim: 76. 
368
 Letters Union of Sudanese, 14/10/40 and 15/8/44, KNA MAA/2/1/3. 
369
 Kibera Survey report, p 10. 
123 
 
tax Ordinance of 1934 (12 Shillings per hut). For the first time the Nubis 
would also have to pay Hut Tax (the first generation ex-soldiers had been 
exempted for life), but they refused: they would rather pay the 30 Shillings 
non-native tax, as long as it was not a native tax. A cablegram was sent to 
get support from Lord Lugard, but in vain; some Nubis ended up in jail for 
refusing to pay the tax.
370
 To the British, the Nubis were, after all, Africans 




On a number of occasions the Nubis suggested (or requested) “that 
immediate arrangements be made to repatriate all of us to Sudan where we 
will be able to live in peace”, at the expense of the British Government.
372
 
However, there was never any serious response or support from the colonial 
or British government to this, and attempts by Nubis to return to Sudan were 
not successful. The Sudanese (colonial) government did not want the Nubis 
to come back to Sudan – since there was no „Nubi tribe‟ in Sudan, the Nubis 
could not claim to be Sudanese.
373
 Moreover, the Nubis had left Sudan such 
a long time ago, would they still want, or be able, to live there? The 
Sudanese government thought they would not fit anymore in the Sudanese 
agricultural life, „under chiefs and headmen far less sophisticated than 
themselves‟.
374
 One Nubi, Haji Senussi, and his family left for Sudan in 
1946; the Kenya government paid him compensation for his house in Kibera 
(which they apparently demolished) and a contribution towards his travel 
expenses. However, he returned soon after, and sued the government to 
allow him to return to live in Kibera.
375
 The colonial government took all 
this talk of repatriation to Sudan as a bluff, a means of pressurising the 
government to leave them in peace in Kibera: “in fact it has been repeatedly 
emphasised that they are loyal citizens of Kenya and wish to remain here for 
good”.
376
 Yet, Sudan remained attractive to the Nubis. In 1956 (the year of 
Sudanese Independence) a delegation of Nubi leaders went to Sudan to 
check out the situation, and see if they would want to go back. Apparently 
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this trip was paid by the Sudanese government (probably the post-colonial 
independent Sudanese government). The conclusion of the delegation was 
that they did not like Sudan, they had become too urban, used to city life, 
and they did not like rural life, it was too hard for them.
377
 Nevertheless, 
quite a number of Nubi went to Sudan, in the 1950s or later, in order to find 
their relatives. Some, like Abdallah Congo (nickname), found their relatives 
and stayed; he left Kibera in the early 1960s, and wrote a letter saying he 
would not come back, and he never did. Several Nubis married in Sudan and 
stayed there; others married in Sudan but maintain, up to today, two 
households, one in (southern) Sudan, one in Kibera. 
 
 
From ‘Sudanese’ to ‘Nubi’ 
 
With Independence around the corner, the Nubis‟ attitude towards their 
„foreign‟ identity had to change; it was not a good idea to be foreigners, 
„strangers‟, in an independent Kenya, without any special relationship with 
the authorities. As foreigners they would also somehow have to convince 
the new independent government of their claims on the Kibera land. In the 
years before Independence, the Nubis therefore started to profile themselves 
as a “Kenyan tribe”. With the coming political changes and the growing 
nationalism in Kenya, they were forced to rethink their strategies. Whereas 
the older people found it hard to relinquish their special ties with Sudan, a 
connection they were proud of, the younger generation felt they had nothing 
to do with the Sudan; born and raised in Kenya, they felt Kenyan. While the 
older people suggested, at Independence, to move back to Sudan (they had 
no faith in an African government), the younger people were attached to 
(their tribal land) Kibera.
378
 When, shortly after Kenya‟s Independence the 
Sudanese ambassador commented, in a speech commemorating Sudan‟s 
Independence, that the Nubis were after all Sudanese, some young men 
stood up and protested that they were Kenyans, and not Sudanese.
379
 They 
started referring to themselves in public as „Nubi‟; the Sudanese Association 
became the Nubian Association of East Africa, and the name of the 
Sudanese Sports Club was changed to Kibera Sports Club (1963). Changing 
names was easy, but to be accepted as „real‟ Kenyans proved to be more 
difficult. Throughout the post-Independence period, Nubis have been 
                                                          
377
 Informant M12, whose father was member of that delegation; other informants. 
378
 Informant M4. 
379
 Clark 1975: 115. 
125 
 
confronted at times with references to their Sudanese origin, usually in 




Another process was taking place at the same time in the Nubi community: 
the clan differences were gradually disappearing. First of all, with time, the 
original soldiers and their children, the first generation, the people that had 
come walking from Sudan to Uganda and then Kenya, passed away; with 
them the tribal languages gradually disappeared. From the 1950s, no one 
could speak those tribal languages anymore; only Kinubi was used. 
Increased intermarriage between clans had watered down old tribal 
ceremonies and rituals, as well as the general division between the clans and 
locations – everyone was somehow related to everyone. 
 
This trend was enforced by the growing influx of outsiders into Kibera. The 
large numbers of outsiders (mostly as tenants of the Nubis) made the Nubis 
pull together and unite: social identity is most important the moment it 
seems threatened.
381
 The „threat‟ from outside made the Nubis forget their 
petty differences; the locational football teams merged, and a few social 
welfare organisations were established.
382
 As these new people were almost 
all Christians, the Nubis felt their own religion threatened – as a result, 
Islam became more important and the Nubis more religious (though this was 
possibly also influenced by higher levels of education and literacy). Also the 
fact that they were outsiders themselves, foreigners in Kenya, made the 
Nubis pull together. The Nubis increasingly became „one community‟.  
 
Nevertheless, even nowadays there are still some traces of Sudanese tribal 
differences present in Nubi culture and small divisions within the Nubi 
community. Until the 1980s (and maybe even later) girls in Lomle (Ayany) 
were warned not to marry people from Makina, as they were „uneducated‟. 
And according to some, up to today some people (the Lendu for example) 
still prefer to marry within their own clan. Some wedding ceremonies still 
have some rituals linked to food stuffs, which show the old differences: the 
Dinka using milk rather than cereals like the Mundu do. Apparently the 
Lendu still have their secret rituals around their Ngoza tree, linked to 
healing and other powers. Several clans have, since a few years, their own 
„welfare associations‟, where people of the clan get together to discuss how 
to advance the clan economically or help one another. Since the people in a 
clan are often closely related, this is sometimes presented as “the family 
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getting together to help family members”. While initially there was much 
interest from clan/family members to join the „clan association‟, this soon 
died down when people realised there was not much to gain from the 
association in terms of financial support.  
 
These last traces of old Sudanese tribal differences seem to suggest that the 
process of „becoming the Nubi ethnic group‟ is not over yet. However, it is 
more likely that some of these internal differences will take much longer or 
will never go away; no group is completely homogeneous, and probably all 
ethnic groups have this kind of locational differences and variations, or 
disagreements between factions within the group.  
 
 
Nubi ethnic markers 
 
If the Nubis are considered a more or less homogeneous ethnic group, then 
how do they identify themselves as a group? Every (ethnic) group has social 
and cultural characteristics, called „ethnic markers‟ – they distinguish one 
group from another, and people use them to identify themselves as member 
of that particular group. Ethnic markers can be physical or ideological; they 
can be related to dress, food, physical characteristics, music and art, tools, 
language, or to common ancestry, legends, traditions, etcetera. Ethnic 
markers can be anything that makes people say „this is typically Nubi‟ 
(though some markers could also be found in other groups, of course, but 
combined with other markers specific for those groups). At a more abstract 
level, ethnic markers allow individuals to interact with others who share 
their social norms (that is, usually, people of the same group) – people 
prefer to interact, and cooperate, with people with whom they share easily 
observable traits.
383
 People are therefore often attached to their ethnic 
markers that can also be seen as symbols of group unity. The Nubi 
community has a number of common ethnic markers, some of which 
however have all but disappeared in recent years. This shows again that 
ethnic identity is open to change, and not static: ethnic markers can change 
or disappear, but the Nubi ethnic identity has continued to exist, albeit in 
slightly different form. 
 
Easily visible ethnic markers are the public events like the dholuka dances 
with accompanying music, or the Nubi wedding ceremonies involving 
specific dress and jewellery for the bride. Though still undertaken, both the 
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dholuka and the wedding ceremonies have experienced changes. In the past, 
the dholuka would be danced almost every weekend, nowadays only at 
special occasions; the musical instruments used for dholuka (mainly drums) 
were traditionally played by women, who also sang most of the songs; 
nowadays it is mainly men. The weddings (with ceremonies and parties), in 
the past lasting 4-7 days, are now often squeezed into one single day, or 
maybe two days if the family has the financial resources. Physical markers 
like skin colour or facial features were not used as ethnic markers – the 
Nubis were a mix of many different peoples, one could find all shades of 
skin colour, from the darkest black to the lightest brown, in the community, 
including some typical southern Sudanese features can be seen in some 
people in Kibera. A few old people have facial scars, which were originally, 
apparently, “the marks distinguishing the slaves of the invading Nubi 
troops”, but became later “inseparably connected with being 
Mohammedanized”. In Uganda in the 1920s these facial scars – three linear 
marks, also nicknamed „one-eleven‟ – became a sign of high status (due to 
the Nubis‟ higher status as civil servants of the colonial government), and 
other ethnic groups like the Lugbara also started using it.
384
 Nevertheless, in 
Nubis that came to Kibera through Somalia or straight from Sudan, these 
facial scars may be remnants of a northern Sudanese tribal tradition; in 
Kibera it is certainly not considered a Nubi tradition.  
 
The Nubi language, Kinubi, is another specific Nubi ethnic marker, though 
nowadays also quite a few non-Nubi, born and raised in Kibera and living in 
close interaction with Nubis, speak the language fluently. A Creole 
language, Kinubi is largely a simplified version of the Sudanese Arabic, and 
has undergone considerable changes over the last century; there is a 
difference between the Kinubi the old people speak (which is still mostly 
Arabic) and the Kinubi of the younger people – nowadays much influenced 
by Bantu languages (Swahili) or other local Kenyan languages. The Kinubi 
that is spoken in Uganda is somewhat different from the Kinubi spoken in 




The Nubis also have a special way of respectfully greeting an older person 
(or a person of higher status): they take the hand of that person in their hand 
(or in both hands) and bowing slightly, they push the fingers (of the other 
                                                          
384
 Leopold 2006: 181-90. 
385
 A Creole (language) is a stable language that has developed from a pidgin language 
(which is a simplified combination of two or more languages). See Heine (1982: 11, 17) 
and Wellens 2001. 
128 
 
person) against their forehead and then against the chin. Even nowadays, 
Nubi children learn to greet older people in that respectful way. 
 
A number of ethnic markers were reserved specifically for the Nubi girls 
and women. The gurbaba, a large colourful cloth, worn as a skirt under the 
dress, used to be the every-day dress; nowadays it is only used at special 
occasions, like weddings and dholukas, when all Nubi women turn out in 
their best (and usually new) gurbaba. Nubi men usually wear European type 
dress or the Muslim kanzu, especially when going to the mosque or other 
religious functions. Nubi girls used to have a special way of plaiting the 
hair, which was done every Saturday by someone in the family; nowadays it 
is no longer done that way – all sorts of hairstyles can be found, including 
Chinese wigs. All Nubi girls would get a „kipini‟, a nose pin, when they 
were around seven years old. The kipini later became a fashion with the 
other ethnic groups, and was no longer something „typically Nubi‟. 
Nowadays, only few Nubi girls can be seen with a kipini. Apparently Nubi 
girls also had their lips tattooed to make them black; this, however, seems to 
have been a common practice in the region – and a very painful procedure, 
it was claimed.
386
 Preparing the excellent Nubi food was obviously a 
women‟s task; the recipes are based on (northern) Sudanese tradition, and a 
far cry from the simple East African ugali (maize porridge): rich dishes of 
meat and vegetables, accompanied by rice or thin pancakes (gurusa or 
kisra).
387
 These days few people can afford to eat the traditional Nubi 
dishes; they are reserved for special occasions. 
 
All Nubi girls were subjected to female circumcision, which had its origin in 
the Sudanese traditions, and was probably introduced in the community in 
the early days in Sudan. It was one of the prerequisites for marriage for the 
Nubi girls that they should be circumcised; this was usually done at an early 
age, when girls were between six and ten years old, and was accompanied 
by public celebrations. According to old sources, the girls were subjected to 
the „pharaonic circumcision‟
388
, the most severe form of female 
circumcision.
389
 The practice was maintained throughout the years in 
Uganda and Kenya. However, around the 1950s (and possibly even earlier) 
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the tradition somehow lost its appeal in Kibera. The severity of the 
procedure was gradually reduced, until finally in the 1990s people had 
simply stopped doing it, possibly influenced by higher levels of education 




What becomes clear from this is that, like ethnic identity, ethnic markers are 
not static; they (can) change, transform or even completely disappear. 
Nevertheless, the ethnic identity continues to exist. The Nubi language, their 
dress code, dances and wedding ceremonies, have all changed over the 
years, influenced by other cultures; the nose pin has been taken over by 
other, non-Nubi groups, while the Nubi way of plaiting hair and female 
circumcision have disappeared. Nevertheless, the Nubi identity is still alive, 
albeit in a different form.  
 
Apart from the physical ethnic markers, there are also a number of 
ideological markers, or principles, norms, which form part of the Nubi 
identity. Groups need norms to make social structure and organised 
community life possible, but these norms are not always completely 
complied with, rather they are used flexibly. Groups have to be flexible with 
(some) norms, otherwise community life would be near impossible. It will 
become clear that these ideological ethnic markers have the same 
characteristic as the other ethnic markers – they evolve, change; they are not 
static. 
 
The most obvious ideological marker is religion; as many Nubis keep 
repeating: “all Nubis are Muslim, but not all Muslims are Nubi”.
391
 
Originally, the Nubis belonged to the Maliki School of jurisprudence / 
religious law (which is currently followed by 15-25% of the Muslims, 
mainly in North and West Africa, including Egypt, and possibly also 
Sudan). Maliki is one of the four schools of religious law within Sunni 
Islam that basically deal with the observance of rituals, morals and social 
legislation. Due to a lack of preachers from the north (Egypt, Sudan), the 
Nubis had to follow preachers from the east, the Swahili coast, who were 
mainly „Shafi‟. As a result, most Nubis nowadays follow the Shafi school, 
but there are some that follow other schools and even some Nubi are Shia 
Muslims; it often depended on who they were interacting with, the „school‟ 
of the community they mainly associated with. The differences between all 
these groups are in practice not substantial. This may partly be because 
interpretations were often adopted to African custom; Islam was flexible, 
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and could tolerate the continuation of traditional beliefs and practice 
alongside its own. In the Nubi community, “like among the majority of 
African Muslims, African traditional culture remained vigorous”
392
 – a 
number of their traditional tribal customs and rituals were maintained, also 
in Kibera. All Nubi clans had their own, different, cults and rituals. For 
example, the Lendu and Alur had their sacred Goza trees (there were 
apparently three of them in Kibera) with small shrines, where they made 
offerings to get their ancestors‟ blessings; the rituals were done until the 
1980s, while in the last years they were already simpler, and shorter than 
before. One of the trees is still standing, but no longer used as „Goza tree‟; 
the other two were cut down (by Lendus!) to make space for a house. No 
one protested when it happened, indicating the diminished (or lack of) 
importance of the Goza rituals. People also believed (and many still do) in 
charms, ghosts and „night-runners‟ (beings that go out at night, flying 
around naked, not harming, but only scaring people). „Ancestor worship‟ 
rituals (sibr) were quite common in all clans, and possibly still exist; Islam 
and these traditional rituals exist(ed) side by side.
393
 The first mosque in 
Kibera was built at Makina, in the 1920s. In the late 1940s Lomle added a 
mosque to their madrasa (Koran school); to some extent this was a result of 
the rivalry between the sub-locations, and contributed as well to further 
separation.
394
 There are currently ten mosques in Kibera, and all imams are 
Nubis, though the mosques are used by all Muslims. 
 
Another one of the ideological markers (principles/norms) is that the Nubis 
are patrilineal: kinship and descent are traced through the male line (which 
is according to the Islamic rules). Also in settlement after marriage: a girl 
would in principle move to the new husband‟s area of origin (patrilocal). 
However, Nubis (soldiers) travelled around a lot, and many Nubis moved 
away to or from Kibera, and settled where they married or married where 
they settled. After divorce, a woman could stay in her husband‟s area or 
move back home, and thus her children could grow up amongst their 
mother‟s kin, and, with increasing importance of the matrilineal group in 
their lives, even inherit there.
395
 The Nubis were fairly relaxed about 
„lending out‟ or „swapping‟ their children (and adopting), and many Nubi 
children grew up in the house of an auntie or uncle, even if these lived in 
other Nubi settlements or as far as Kampala. This would have had an 
influence on inheritance practices. 
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Another ideological marker is the „myth of origin‟: notions of shared origins 
or ancestry are usually crucial for the (ethnic) identity of the members of an 
ethnic group
396
, and the Nubis are no exception. They take pride in their 
military history, claiming to be descendants of the Sudanese soldiers that 
came to Kenya with the British colonial army – this is the story that is 
communicated to the general public. However, in private conversations 
most Nubis would have little problem acknowledging their own Kikuyu (or 
any other ethnic group) ancestry, or naming all the Nubis they know that are 
(partly) Kikuyu. There is an overlap here with another ideological marker, 
endogamy. In principle, Nubis should marry someone from their own 
community. In the early days this meant marrying within the clan, or, for 
want of a suitable same-clan candidate, within the wider Nubi community, 
which became the rule in later years. However, also here reality is different - 
from the beginning, Nubis have married outsiders (mainly women, people 
without any direct link to the „Sudanese soldiers‟) and incorporated them 
into the community. In public, though, they would all maintain the myth of 
single origin.
397
 The next section will look a bit closer at the incorporation 
of new members into the Nubi community.  
 
 
The myths of origin and endogamy: outsiders ‘becoming Nubi’ 
 
In practice, ethnic groups have to be (and usually are) flexible with ancestry, 
the „myth of origin‟, otherwise they would not be able to incorporate new 
members into the group, something every (ethnic) group has to deal with at 
some point: strangers joining the group, or men or women marrying into the 
community, outsiders that would not (usually) share the same origin with 
the other members of the group. There must be ways of incorporating these 
newcomers into the group; in some cases they may be forced to play an 
inferior role as „second class members‟, in other cases they will become full 
members of the group. 
 
The Nubi community in Kibera wouldn‟t exist if it weren‟t for its „flexible 
ethnic boundaries‟, and people of other origin joining the group. Once the 
Nubis were „established‟ as a separate group, they continued incorporating 
new members. This was mainly through marriage and adoption, but also 
included a few Borana and Ethiopian KAR soldiers who also settled in 
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Kibera and married Nubi girls; over time these new group members 
assimilated completely into the Nubi community.  
 
In the early years, in Equatoria, and later in Uganda, Kenya and Somalia, 
the Nubi soldiers often „married‟ women they took by force. Once in 
Kibera, this practice gradually died out, simply because a decreasing 
number of Nubi men were in the army. Nevertheless, one old lady claims to 
remember that after the “Italian war”
398
 young Nubis came home with 
„captured‟ girls – most of these boys were considered too young to marry, 
and the girls were placed in the care of the boys‟ mothers until they got 
married. Marriage with non-Nubi women (forced or not) followed the same 
rituals and ceremonies as with the Nubi women; they were „real‟ weddings, 
and included the traditional dholuka dancing. 
 
The non-Nubi women marrying into the Nubi community were expected to 
„become Nubi‟ – they would have to become Muslim, change their name, 
and learn Kinubi. They would also have to dress like a Nubi, using the 
gurbaba (a colourful skirt-like garment), and learn to cook the typical Nubi 
food. Girls were circumcised if that had not yet been done. Most of these 
women completely adapted to Nubi ways; later generations would not even 
know that these women were not born as a Nubi. It was something people 
did not talk about, and children were not supposed to ask anything: the 





Though it was mainly women marrying into the Nubi community, there 
have also been some men that „became Nubi‟. Some of them were men 
working for the Nubis (shamba boys), that became Muslim and later 
married a Nubi girl. Others were adopted children that grew up with the 
Nubi family – they may have been orphans, or simply a child of a shamba 
boy that lived close to the family and gradually became Nubi. During the 
Emergency quite a number of Kikuyu children of shamba boys, friends or 
other Kikuyus living in Kibera, were taken care of by the Nubis – some of 
them remained with the Nubi family after the Emergency was over, and 
„became Nubi‟, later marrying into the community. Like the women, some 
of these men adapted so well that younger people would not know his 
original non-Nubi ancestry; when such a man died, the question would arise 
where to bury him, in Kibera or „home‟ – surprising half the community. 
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Usually though, men seem to have had more problems „becoming Nubi‟ 
than women, and (therefore) also more problems being accepted as a Nubi, 
certainly if they „became Nubi‟ at a later age. 
 
Nubi girls apparently never married much out of the community; this may 
have been because there was already a shortage of Nubi girls for marriage 
(many Nubi men were polygamous), but according to some people, also 
because they were too expensive (dowry and bride price), and too difficult 
to maintain: they were somehow spoilt, used to a high standard of living 




In general, after World War I, intermarriage with outsiders seems to have 
decreased. The norm was to find a Nubi girl of the same clan; if that was not 
possible, a Nubi girl of another clan; in the worst case, a Muslim girl from 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, intermarriage with non-Nubis never stopped 
completely; many Nubi men were polygamous, and second wives were 
often non-Nubi. Nubi businessmen may bring home a Turkana or Luo wife 
from areas where they would go regularly.  
 
Despite the fact that no one spoke about it, it was obviously well known in 
the community who was an outsider, who had originally come from another 
ethnic group. It was generally not considered a problem, though, being from 
outside the community: many Nubi women had originally come from 
elsewhere, and many people had non-Nubi (grand)mothers or aunties. But 
somehow it was not something people would talk about, it was almost 
something degrading. This must have something to do with the fact that the 
Nubis generally did not like „labi‟, the „outsider‟, whom they considered of 
lower class. No one wanted to be reminded that many of them actually were 
(full or partly) „labi‟. Therefore, as soon as a woman had „become Nubi‟, 
and made an effort to be part of the community (and many women became 
„more Nubi than the Nubis‟), she was accepted as a Nubi, and no more was 
said about it. Certainly, the Nubis could not afford to marginalise those in-
marrying women – they were a small community and could not risk women 
leaving the group. They therefore had to be completely integrated, and the 
secret, of who is a „real Nubi‟ and who isn‟t, well-kept. In this way, all 
women (and their off-spring) could hold their heads high and be publicly 
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During the Mau Mau Emergency a number of marriages took place with 
mainly Kikuyu girls hiding in Kibera (see also Chapter 2). From the 1960s, 
with more outsiders coming into Kibera and younger Nubis schooling 
outside Kibera, there was more interaction with “others” – intermarriage 
increased again. Part of those inter-tribal relationships were the so-called 
“come we stay” relationships: simply living together. With a Nubi girl this 
was out of the question, but with girls of other ethnic groups it was possible. 
Such a relationship did not require a great deal of money, whereas a 
wedding to a Nubi girl would be hugely expensive. Some Nubi families 
would actually prefer their son to live with a Kikuyu girl rather than spend 
money (they did not have) on a real Nubi wedding – that could always be 
done at a later stage. Very often though these informal „come we stay‟ 
relationships were at some point formalised, often during Ramadhan, under 
pressure from the family and community – it was considered „not done‟, it is 
against Islam, just live together like that without being married. It depended 
mainly on the family, how much they would really accept a non-Nubi girl 
(married to their son) to become a Nubi; it was the mother and sisters of the 
husband who were expected to teach the newcomer the Nubi ways, of 
female behaviour, of cooking, dressing, family life. In some cases they 
refused, or did not try very hard; in other cases the girl herself did not try 
hard, or kept part of her Kikuyu customs – even this was not always a 
problem, some families accepted this, but such a woman would never be 
seen as a full member of the community. Some women that became Nubi 
mentioned that they were never really accepted by the community: “they 
will always let you know that you are not one of them. The Nubis are proud 
people, they will never accept you completely”.
402
 Up to today, when people 
are arguing, they can still bring up the origin of others, “ah, but you are not 
really a Nubi....” or “yes, but his father was a Kakwa, they are like that....”. 
In a way, this is strange, because it seems unlikely to find any Nubi in 
Kibera that has no „labi‟ blood in his or her veins... they probably don‟t 
know it themselves! Nevertheless, it is mainly the older people that know 
the „outsider‟ origin of other Nubis; the younger generations do not know 
and do not seem to care about it. 
 
In the last two decades intermarriage with non-Nubi seems to have 
increased dramatically – according to some more than 50% of marriages 
nowadays is with non-Nubi. An attempt was made to collect statistics on 
marriages of Nubis within and outside the Nubi community, but it appeared 
that Nubi marriages were either not registered, or registered in many 
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different places, making it impossible to get comprehensive statistics. What 
seems clear though is that intermarriage with other ethnic groups has 
become generally accepted.  
 
Nowadays Nubis are more flexible with in-marrying people about their 
„becoming Nubi‟. Depending on the family, they may accept the woman (or 
man) in the family even if she does not make any effort to „become Nubi‟; 
other families may appreciate or insist on at least some concessions. The 
only condition is usually that s/he must be (or become) a Muslim. When 
asked who they would accept as a member of their community, most Nubis 
said they would accept anyone with one Nubi parent (father or mother) 
provided that person is raised as a Nubi (which is sometimes not the case if 
the mother is Nubi and they don‟t live in Kibera but grow up in the father‟s 
home area). In-marrying people, obviously without any Nubi parent, will 
also be accepted as Nubi, provided they are Muslim, and „behave‟ as a Nubi, 
feeling themselves (and wanting) to be part of the community; this would 
involve speaking Kinubi, and to some extent participating in Nubi 
ceremonies, funerals, weddings, etcetera.
403
 Many of the non-Nubi girls 
marrying a Nubi are actually from Kibera – born there, they often know the 
Nubi culture and sometimes even the language, and there is little problem in 
integrating. Nubi youths seem to attach little importance to marrying within 
the community. Some have joined a Nubi cultural club (mostly remnants of 
the old locational social groups) and want to promote Nubi culture and 
values, and the endogamous Nubi-Nubi marriage, but most seem less 
concerned about these issues. One reason is that many young Nubis are 
losing their own culture; they hardly speak Kinubi anymore, the gurbaba is 
only used for Nubi weddings and other ceremonies, the dholuka dance and 
music at weddings is being replaced by coastal Taarab music and disco. If 
people have the chance, they move out of Kibera. This raises questions and 
doubts about the future of Nubi culture and identity, though some people 
claim to have noticed a recent revival: an increase in Nubi-Nubi weddings, a 
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Other Nubi groups in East Africa 
 
There is another aspect of Nubi identity that has continued to play a role in 
the lives of many Nubis of Kibera: the link with other „East African 
Nubians‟. The Nubis are spread out over a number of countries, and, 
possibly because they are few in numbers, they keep in close contact – 
together they form the close-knit Nubi community.  
 
Within Kenya, there are a number of other Nubian villages (apart from 
Kibera) and quite a few places with sizeable Nubi communities, like 
Mombasa. The Nubi communities in these places have always been in close 
contact with each other, because of intermarriage in the past, or because 
people moved from one place to the other (usually to Kibera) for studies or 
work. Most Kibera Nubis visit the other places from time to time, to see 
relatives, or for celebrations like weddings or funerals.   
 
There are also Nubi communities in Tanzania and Uganda, as well as a few 
Nubi families in Somalia. The links with these communities have remained 
strong, certainly in Uganda where the Nubis are a recognised ethnic group. 
In Somalia, only a few Nubi families remained after the British handed over 
British Somalia to Italy in 1925. They have mostly assimilated into Somali 
society, but have also kept in contact with their relatives that moved to 
Kenya, mainly by telephone. In Tanzania, the Nubis have almost completely 
assimilated into the Tanzanian Muslim communities; Kinubi is not spoken 
anymore. They are, with a few exceptions, no longer involved in the Nubi 
cultural exchange activities within East Africa. They know they are Nubi, 
but otherwise they are just like other Tanzanian Muslims. Nevertheless, 
there is still contact between a few people in Kibera and some relatives in 
(mainly) Dar es Salaam.  
 
The links between the Nubis in Kibera and Uganda have remained strong 
for different reasons. First of all, Uganda has always had a sizeable Nubi 
community, and has been a major source of marriage partners; almost every 
Nubi family in Kibera has relatives in Uganda. In the old days, people 
looked for Nubi girls of the same clan (Sudanese „tribe‟), but it seems there 
have also been arrangements between friends from the same KAR company 
to marry each other‟s daughter, or as marriage partner for their son. 
Weddings still take place between Nubis from Kibera and Uganda, partly 
because young Nubis from Kibera study in Kampala and get to know 
Ugandan Nubis, as they often stay with relatives, or at least visit frequently. 
The Nubis have, since the late 1940s, organised football matches and 
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cultural events with their „tribesmen‟ in Kenya and Uganda
405
; the Nubian 
cultural festivals still take place, usually around Easter and in December, 
during the holidays; one year in Kibera, the next year in Uganda (usually in 
Bombo, the main Nubi village in Uganda, near Kampala). Due to the 
economic situation of many Nubis the scale of the festivals has reduced 
substantially, but still many people travel between Uganda and Kibera to 
participate in the festivals and visit relatives and old friends, or for funerals 
and weddings. 
 
In Uganda the Nubis had long been recognised as a distinct community, but 
their „special status‟ had been a topic for discussion since the 1920s - here 
too the Nubis claimed status as foreigners, non-natives. They never got this 
recognition, but were placed, in 1938, under the authority of the King of the 
Baganda, while their land ownership in Bombo, the military headquarters 
near Kampala where many Nubis had settled, was confirmed. Their special 
privileges disappeared with the death of the ex-servicemen.
406
 The events in 
Uganda were closely followed by the Nubis in Kibera, and gave some hope 
about ownership of the Kibera land, but had no further impact on the course 
of events in Kenya. 
 
In the 1970s, the time of Idi Amin, the ties with Uganda were strengthened 
further. Though Idi Amin was not a Nubi himself, he was Muslim and a 
soldier, and had therefore strong links with the Nubis. Being in the King‟s 
African Rifles, he spent some time at the Lang‟ata barracks in Nairobi, and 
must have spent time in Kibera as well.
407
 Like the British in the past, Idi 
Amin relied on foreigners for his army; he recruited many southern 
Sudanese, available after the civil war there had ended, a few hundred 
Palestinians, and he incorporated a growing number of Nubis.
408
 Many 
young Kibera Nubis saw opportunities in Uganda, and left Kibera to join 
Amin‟s army.
409
 According to one former soldier, “it was like the Nubians 
had taken power in Uganda, so it was a good opportunity for Nubians, and 
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many got rich by associating themselves with Idi Amin, they got shops 
etcetera after the Asians were expelled (in 1972)”.
410
 It‟s not clear how 
many Nubi boys and men (and some women as well) went to Uganda, but 
their absence was noticeable in Kibera – possibly 1-200, maybe more; 
according to some people there was hardly any young (Nubi) man left in 
Kibera. Most joined the army, others, older and more experienced, were 




After Amin was defeated and went into exile (1979), Nubis in Uganda had 
to go in hiding; they were very unpopular, partly held responsible for the 
excessive violence during Amin‟s reign.
412
 Many Nubis fled the country, 
and the gurbaba disappeared for a while from the streets of Kampala. 
Within 48 hours after Amin had fled, Kibera‟s Nubi population increased; 
several Kibera Nubis had died in Uganda, but most came back to Kibera, 
some through Zaire or Sudan. Moreover, many Ugandan Nubis came to 
look for shelter in Kibera, or a hiding place. Almost every Nubi household 
in Kibera had Ugandan relatives staying with them; some as many as ten. 
This influx of Ugandan Nubis created quite a bit of tension in many Nubi 
households, especially since many of them stayed for extended periods of 
time (some more than ten years!), often not working but depending on their 
Kibera relatives, who could do nothing but accommodate them. The richer 
Ugandan Nubis stayed in hotels in town, not in Kibera, before moving into 
rented houses; some later also invested in Nairobi, mainly in the public 
transport business (matatus). Most Ugandan Nubis eventually went back to 
Uganda, but often only after Museveni had come to power (1986) and had 
started returning property to the original owners – including Ugandan Nubis 
that had already been wealthy before Idi Amin‟s stint in power. Some built 
their own house and settled for good in Kibera.
413
 As a result of this 
increased contact between Ugandan and Kibera Nubis, intermarriage 
increased and old relationships were renewed. 
 
In Uganda, people that follow the Islamic way of life are generally known as 
„Nubians‟, while „Nubi‟ and „Muslim‟ are often used synonymously.
414
 This 
brings us back to the question whether the Nubis can be considered a „tribe‟: 
Kokole claims that the Nubis “do not constitute a tribe in the usual African 
sense”, because they don‟t have an indigenous language, no indigenous 
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names, no tribal land, and no myth of origin. He argues that the Nubis are 
rather a “Muslim Club” that any Muslim can join simply by speaking 
Kinubi and dressing like a Nubi, and also leave when it is more convenient 
to do so. However, Kokole is referring to the situation in Uganda, where in 
the recent past many people have „become Nubi‟, or rather, have 
„masqueraded as Nubi‟ – to benefit from the sudden prominent position of 
this group (mainly during the reign of Idi Amin). As Leopold argues, for 
local ethnic groups in (mainly northern) Uganda, the “Nubi identity 
provided an elective, strategic, alternative 'ethnicity'”, and, he adds, 
“undoubtedly many people were Nubi when trading in town (or serving in 
the forces), and Lugbara or Kakwa when they returned to the villages of 
West Nile.”
 415
 However, one can question the veracity of Kokole‟s 
conclusion – those „new Nubis joining the Muslim Club‟ may be perceived 
by the average Ugandan as Nubis (and this would be correct in situations 
where Nubi means Muslim), but the real or original Nubis know exactly 
who is a Nubi (meaning, member of the Nubi ethnic group) and who is 
“masquerading as a Nubi” (meaning, a Muslim).
416
 The real Nubis are 
“those persons who can prove that they are the descendants of the Armed 
Forces of Emin Pasha and his predecessors or that from association with the 
Nubi Community extending over a period of many years they have lost all 
connection with the tribes from which they originally sprang”.
417
 People 
may „become Nubi‟ (instead of simply „masquerade‟ as one), but it is linked 
to a process of adaptation and assimilation into the community; it is not as 
easy as „joining a club‟.
418
 The Nubi community in Kibera is certainly not a 
„Muslim club‟; they would accept „new Nubis‟, but only if they assimilate, 
become part of the Nubi ethnic community, with all its ceremonies and 
ethnic markers, and with the social obligations that are part of „being a 
Nubi‟. In Kenya, Nubi is of course not synonymous with Muslim.  
 
This discussion on the Nubis being a „tribe‟ or not, and on „who is a real 
Nubi‟ may seem trivial or irrelevant, but for the Nubis these questions are 
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: being considered an ethnic group will help in the claim on the 
land in Kibera, while being recognised as a real Nubi will become an issue 
when the Kibera land is eventually (if ever) allocated to the community – 
only real Nubis can be expected to share in the benefits.  
 
 
The Nubis today – legal problems in becoming Kenyan 
 
As mentioned earlier, after Independence the Nubis started to refer to 
themselves as a Kenyan ethnic group instead of as Sudanese, but to be 
accepted as real Kenyans was a different matter. Kenya has 42 recognised 
ethnic communities that have a national quota when it comes to recruitment 
for government jobs or places in national colleges. In censuses and other 
official statistics, all other people, including the Nubis, are put together in a 
rest group “others”. The Nubi have been campaigning to be recognised as 
“the 43
rd
 tribe” - apart from being entitled to a small job and college quota 
and part of the national cake, it would also mean a psychological boost to 
many Nubis. Moreover, it would have the advantage of easier access to 
national IDs and possibly give them a stronger claim on their Kibera tribal 
land. In late 2007, just before the elections, the incumbent president Kibaki 
promised the Nubis to recognise them as „the 43
rd
 tribe‟, but this was 
obviously merely an election gimmick to get votes.  
 
The Nubis have had some problems in becoming recognised as Kenyans (or, 
a Kenyan ethnic group). The Kenyan Constitution basically states that 
everyone born in Kenya before Independence, and with one of his/her 
parents also born there, qualified to be Kenyan. This would mean the Nubis 
automatically qualify to be recognised as Kenyan citizens. Foreigners, like 
the Asians, were told to declare their intent to the government to become 
Kenyan citizen. The Nubis however were apparently told “you are not 
Sudanese, you are Kenyan”, and so they did not bother to „declare their 
intent‟. This was later used against them – the last decade the Nubis have 
had serious problems in getting birth certificates, IDs and passports. 
Initially, Nubis were asked to produce their grandfather‟s birth certificate to 
prove that he was indeed born in Kenya. While the registration of births in 
Kenya remains inadequate at the present, it‟s impossible to imagine that the 
pre-1963 period would yield better records, if any at all.
420
 This was clearly 
an excuse not to give IDs to Nubis. A court case against the State clarified 
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the issue: the Government‟s position was that the Nubis had not renounced 
their Sudanese citizenship, and they had been negligent in not pursuing 
Kenyan citizenship by registration (like the Asians did). The High Court 
supported the Kenyan government, and demanded proof that the community 
was not a „phantom‟: every member of the Nubi community was to sign a 
document saying they are Nubi and „aggrieved‟; a clear attempt to stall the 
case.
421
 The matter was subsequently (in 2006, without further hearings in 
Kenya) brought before the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights (of the African Union) in the Gambia, where a ruling for its 
admissibility is yet to be announced.
422
 Nowadays, young Nubis applying 
for their ID have to pass through a „vetting committee‟, two or three older 
Nubis that verify whether the person requesting the ID is indeed known to 
them as a Nubi. With the vetting committee‟s note of approval they can then 
go to the Police department dealing with IDs. The Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights (an autonomous institution, created by the 
government) concluded in 2007 that “the process of vetting Kenyan-
Somalis, Nubians and Kenyan Arabs […] is discriminatory and violates the 
principle of equal treatment”. It is a violation of human rights to ask some 
Kenyan citizens supporting documents that go beyond those required of 
other applicants.
423
 Some people mention that this discrimination stems 
from the global „war on terror‟, in which Kenya supports the USA 
administration, and reason why Muslims in particular seem to have this 
problem in getting IDs. However, the problems were already there before 







This chapter has looked in more detail at Nubi identity and the changes over 
the years, from their creation as a community, up to the new millennium. 
There aren‟t many examples of the creation of ethnic groups from a mix of 
„strangers‟, like in the case of the Nubis
425
, and there is therefore no real 
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measuring stick available to indicate whether the time the Nubis needed to 
become a relatively homogeneous ethnic community is long or short. Their 
creation could be considered to have taken place in the 1890s, when moving 
into Uganda with Captain Lugard; had they stayed in Uganda, the group 
might have disintegrated, or disappeared in another, maybe violent, way. 
Going to Uganda meant becoming a group of foreigners in a strange land, 
leading almost automatically to „closing the ranks‟, and pulling together, a 
situation conducive to the creation of a group culture. The first decades in 
Kibera (and probably in other Nubi villages as well) the old Sudanese tribal 
differences continued to play a role, though, with the passing of time, of 
diminishing importance. The process of becoming a more homogeneous 
community was helped by the influx of outsiders into Kibera and the 
Independence of Kenya. It is clear from all the changes that Nubi ethnic 
identity has gone through during its relatively short existence that ethnic 
identity is not static, but open to change and manipulation, depending on the 
context and situation.  
 
Despite the remaining differences and divisions within the community, and 
the incorporation of many „foreign‟ women into the group, the Nubis can be 
considered an ethnic group – they regard themselves as such, and are 
regarded by others as such. The Nubi find a common origin in the area 
around southern Sudan, and they have their own language, distinctive 
cultural characteristics and ethnic markers, and a myth of origin or creation 
in the King‟s African Rifles, the British colonial army. They also have what 
could be considered their „tribal land‟, Kibera in Kenya (and maybe Bombo 
in Uganda), an essential part of Nubi identity.  
 
After Independence, contrary to expectations, ethnicity did not disappear 
under the influence of modernity; indeed, ethnic identities often became 
even more important, especially in urban settings, playing a role in 
competition for jobs, housing, and plain (economic) survival. The Nubis, 
being a small minority group, experienced more problems in securing 
employment – finding work often depends on „knowing someone‟, usually a 
member of the same ethnic community; the larger and more powerful ethnic 
groups are therefore at an advantage here, simply because they will always 
have „tribesmen‟ in any Government Ministry or department, or corporate 
offices. Ethnicity remains important in Independent Kenya, and the Nubis 
are at a disadvantage here; being recognised as Kenya‟s 43
rd
 tribe would 
certainly help. Another effect of the growing importance of ethnicity has 
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been a growing group consciousness after Independence, and an increasing 
homogenization of the community. On the other hand, due to the increased 
interaction and intermarriage with non-Nubis in Kibera, the young Nubi 
culture is already under pressure, and losing ground, increasingly being 
mixed with or replaced by elements from other cultures, including the 
mixed „urban culture‟. Nevertheless, despite the problems many Nubis have 
in getting IDs, they are, in general, being recognised and accepted as a 
Kenyan community.  
 
It is highly improbable that there are Nubis in Kibera with 100% 
Sudanese/northern Ugandan (or: “original Nubi”) blood, but this is in a way 
irrelevant because all these outsiders marrying into the community became 
Nubi by adapting themselves and conforming to the norms and values of the 
(developing) Nubi culture. Their off-spring grew up in the Nubi culture and 
was automatically Nubi. In-marrying „blood‟ disappeared, was not talked 
about and became invisible. However, the bloodline is of little relevance: it 
is the culture and behaviour that counts. Despite the fact that the Nubis are 
made up of people from an enormous variety of ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds, they have managed to create a Nubi community that has, so 





“Kill me quick” – a history of Nubian gin in Kibera 
 
 
"Here," said I, uncorking a vial of medicinal 
brandy, "is the Kisungu pombe (white man's 
beer); take a spoonful and try it," at the 
same time handing it. 
"Hacht, hacht, oh, hacht,! what! eh! what 
strong beer the white men have! Oh, how my 
throat burns!" 
"Ah, but it is good," said I, "a little of it 
makes men feel strong, and good; but too 
much of it makes men bad, and they die." 
"Let me have some," said one of the chiefs; 





Until they were introduced by the explorers Speke and Baker
427
 in the 
1860s, distilled liquors were largely unknown in East Africa.
428
 These 
explorers distilled on several occasions alcohol based on banana and sweet 
potato for the local kings, who were very impressed with the strong drink; 
one of the kings, Kamurasi of Bunyoro, even wanted a Sudanese soldier, 
passing through with Baker and a trading caravan, to stay behind to distil for 
him.
429
 The spread of distilled liquors in East Africa was closely associated 
with colonial rule, and particularly with the Sudanese soldiers of the 
colonial powers, the Nubis. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
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century, their waragi, or “Nubian gin”, spread across East Africa at the pace 
of the colonial conquest. 
 
Kibera‟s proximity to army barracks and a major town created a huge 
market for the Nubian gin, which was exploited to a considerable extent: 
many Nubi women became involved in producing and selling Nubian gin 
and the amounts of money they made allowed the Nubi community to live a 
very good life indeed.
430
 For a few decades they managed to monopolise the 
liquor trade as an ethnic business, an ethnic economic niche, until they were 
overtaken by events: the influx of other ethnic groups into Kibera and 
competitors (from other ethnic groups) entering the alcohol market. The 
Nubi women then moved to another ethnic economic niche, the rental room 
business, which was initially also almost completely controlled by the 
Nubis. Ethnic economic niches exist, or have existed, in a number of 
sectors; they can be linked to the ethnic stereotyping of the colonial days. 
The Nubi men for example had earlier also occupied such a niche: as a 
„martial race‟ they dominated the African soldiery in the regional colonial 
armies. Other examples include the Luhya as houseboys, or the street 
sweepers of Nairobi that had been (until Mau Mau) almost exclusively 




There is extensive literature on how African women try to escape male 
control and gain economic independence, and the options they have and 
strategies they use to achieve that – it would often involve migrating to town 
and cutting ties with the family back home. Nairobi in its early days was a 
male-dominated town with hardly any formal employment for women – 
they were supposed to stay at home. Apart from prostitution and trade, the 
production of alcohol was a commonly used survival strategy, because it did 
not require much capital or skills.
432
 In Nairobi‟s Mathare slums in the 
1970s, women involved in alcohol production also did very well financially. 
However, over the years they lost control over the business: in the „90s men 
had taken over the manufacturing of alcohol and women were only 
marginally involved in retailing distilled alcohol, earning much less than 
before.
433
 The Nubi women were at a clear advantage, as they already lived 
in (near) town, and had easy access to a market for their product. Moreover, 
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their fathers and husbands did not interfere too much with the alcohol 
production, nor did they try to take over the business. As a result of their 
income, the Nubi women became the economic power in Kibera.  
 
In Kibera in the 1970s, with the huge influx of people of other ethnic groups 
into the settlement, the production of Nubian gin (by Nubis) had to be 
reduced and was finally stopped. But many Nubi women maintained their 
relatively strong economic position by switching to another source of 
income, the rental business. In other parts of Nairobi this process had 
already started earlier, with women investing their own money, often earned 
with prostitution or alcohol, in houses and land. Nelson and others have 
identified „housing and property‟ as „one of the most important financial 
goals of single women migrants‟ strategies for survival in Nairobi‟. Luise 
White describes this process for women moving to Pumwani, the first legal 
African settlement in Nairobi, in the 1920s. House ownership was a good 
investment of their savings, and allowed women to earn a regular income 
and be completely independent in terms of receiving clients for sex or 




This chapter tells the story of “the rise and fall of the Nubian gin” in Kibera. 
The Nubian gin has played an important role in the history of both the Nubis 
and Kibera; with the income it generated the Nubis could maintain, during 
the 1930s through to the 1960s, a relatively high standard of living. As such, 
it supported the Nubis‟ view of the world, in which they were different from 
and better than the other Africans. Moreover, it made the Nubis even more 
attached to Kibera, and reluctant to move from there to an area further away 
from Nairobi, with less (alcohol) business opportunities. Without the 
Nubian gin, the Nubis might have eventually relocated when the British 
wanted them to; the Kibera land would then have been used for Nairobi‟s 
expansion, to build middle-class residential estates, and Kibera slums would 
never have existed. Without the Nubian gin, the Nubis might have become 
impoverished, leading to a breaking up of the Nubi community. 
Furthermore, without the Nubian gin money the Nubis (women) might not 
have been able to build (as many) rental rooms as they did, and this would 
also have changed the course of events in Kibera, with fundamentally 
different results. In this sense, the Nubian gin may have contributed in an 
important way to a continued existence of the Nubi community and the 
Nubi ethnic identity, and essentially also to the creation of Kibera as a slum. 
More generally, the „Nubian gin story‟ shows how alcohol production could 
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lead to shifting gender relations and to women empowerment in a male-
dominated society, resulting in women dominating the economy.  
 
The chapter will begin with an overview of the issues concerning alcohol 
during the early colonial days, before returning to Kibera for the actual 
„Nubian gin story‟.  
 
 
Alcohol in the early colonial days  
 
Alcohol played an important role during the colonisation of Africa; it was 
often used as barter in the exchange of slaves, gold, ivory and other African 
commodities, or even as payment for territorial concessions extracted from 
African chiefs. Many Africans, especially in West Africa‟s coastal regions, 




Africans had known alcohol for a long time, but these were simple 
fermented brews, with low alcohol content, and its use was often restricted, 
usually to the older men, or to be used in ceremonies and rituals. Production 
of alcohol was a family affair confined to the domestic setting, controlled by 
the older people.
436
 Distilled liquors were hardly known prior to the colonial 
era; they posed an extra danger because they could be kept for long periods 
and were therefore always available – not only during rituals. Moreover, 
they became available to anyone with money, not just the older people, but 




The Europeans (colonial authorities) were not in favour of Africans 
drinking: it was generally believed that alcohol was the principal cause of 
crime and violence, and “rendered all Africans stupid and quarrelsome”. 
Africans were „children and needed special protection from the dangers and 
evils of alcohol‟.
438
 However, despite a lot of pressure from temperance 
movements, churches and missionaries to protect the African natives from 
alcohol, it was hard to stop it: a lot of money was made through the alcohol 
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After the Brussels Conference in 1889-90, import duties on alcohol were 
introduced to control the alcohol trade and consumption by natives. 
Subsequent conferences, the most important of which resulted in the „Treaty 
of St. Germain-en-Laye‟ (1919), further elaborated on “limitations on 
existing trade, progressively increased rates of import duties, banned spirits 
production on African territories (outside South Africa and North Africa), 
and forbade the introduction of spirits into areas where trade was not yet 
established (East and Central and Muslim West Africa)”. The impact of all 
these measures was relatively limited; there were many loopholes in the 
legislation and many colonies, especially in West Africa, became dependent 
on the income of these duties on alcohol to cover the running cost of the 
colony – in some West-African cases more than 70% of the colony‟s budget 
was generated by import duties on alcohol. Many colonies could not afford 
to make a real effort to control the alcohol trade, and, despite the high 




In Kenya the first liquor regulation was passed in 1897, prohibiting the 
consumption of distilled alcohol by the African population. Subsequent 
amendments and regulations aimed at prohibiting also the manufacture, sale 
and consumption of “native intoxicating liquors”, the traditional fermented 
brews. This was not only to avoid problems of “disruptive drunken 
behaviour”, but there was also fear that drinking would discourage the men 
from engaging in wage labour, which would be a problem in Kenya, where 
a „rapid expansion of public works and white settler agriculture had created 




However, the Native Liquor Ordinances of 1907 and 1915 were only partly 
applied, and mainly in urban areas. The British rather depended on the local 
headmen and chiefs to control production, trade and consumption, but 
enforcement was almost non-existent, as the headmen were often corrupt, 
and liked to drink themselves.
442
 In 1921 a new Native Liquor Ordinance 
was passed, but again only applicable to specified areas, and initially only 
applied to urban areas and some areas of white settlement.
443
 In the same 
year the Nairobi Municipal Council forbade brewing of beer by Africans
444
, 
and a Municipal “native brewery” was set up, producing beer of low alcohol 
content. It was an attempt to regulate alcohol consumption, deterring natives 
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from brewing their own beer and possibly also to provide an alternative to 
the consumption of Nubian gin, which was apparently already becoming 





Despite all these international and national control efforts, illegal production 
of distilled liquors spread, especially in urban areas where there was a ready 
market for it. Kibera was perfectly situated, next to the military barracks and 
a fast-growing town.  
 
 
Alcohol in Kibera: Nubian gin 
 
According to Captain Lugard, “the Sudanese [Nubis] are much addicted to 
strong liquor”.
446
 Their Nubian gin was the pre-eminent drink of the 
military: production and consumption was initially largely restricted to the 
environs of military encampments.
447
 However, even if production was 
mainly for their own consumption, it is likely that from the beginning the 
Nubis also produced distilled alcohol for sale to other Africans. Already in 
the 1890s there existed a market in East Africa for fermented brews; in 1906 
porters in western Kenya went on a wild drinking spree, buying alcohol 
from women living in the police lines; in 1915 a Sudanese woman (that 
means, a Nubi) had been convicted of selling liquor without a licence.
448
 We 
can be quite certain that also in Kibera the sale –though most likely on a 
limited scale– of Nubian gin occurred from the early days of Nubi 
settlement: the nearby fast-growing town, and the military barracks 
provided a ready market for it. There is also little doubt that World War I 
further stimulated the market for liquor. 
 
Almost every Nubi family in Kibera, except the most religious ones, would 
make Nubian gin from time to time. It was quite a long process, taking 
about 2 weeks, but at any given moment there would be Nubian gin 
somewhere; if not in your own house, then at your neighbour‟s. Families in 
the same village or neighbourhood would often take turns in distilling it, or 
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The process of distilling Nubian gin was entirely controlled by the Nubi 
women, mothers helped by their daughters, and maybe a shamba boy for 
carrying the water. Production starts with the preparation of an amount of 
fermented brew, called “muna” (Kinubi). In a big clay pot water was mixed 
with molasses or sugar, and with either busaa (maize beer) or germinated 
millet grains as catalyser to start the fermentation. The pot was then closed 
and covered, and two weeks later the “muna” was ready for distillation. The 
distillation process itself was quite simple: a clay pot (with the fermented 
brew) was placed on a low fire; on top of it was another pot placed upside 
down, and this was tightly closed with wet cloth so vapours could not 
escape. The upper pot had a bamboo stick as exit, for cooling the alcohol 
vapours (once outside the pot) and leading the drops of gin into another 
closed container, often a tea kettle, for collection (see drawing A). 
 







The first drops of the distillate were the thickest, the strongest, and the best. 
The longer the distillation process took, the more water evaporated with the 
alcohol, and the weaker the liquor became. In the early days production was 
quite low; the Nubi women produced mainly for home consumption, and 




However, distillation was rather labour-intensive, as the process had to be 
strictly controlled: the pots had to be tightly closed so the vapours could not 
escape (except through the bamboo stick); the temperature within should not 
be too high, to avoid large-scale evaporation of water, reducing the alcohol 
content of the gin; and after distilling for a while, the residue of the 
fermented mix had to be replaced with fresh muna.  
 
Production of Nubian gin was initially done at home, in the compound. 
Even though the production of alcohol was forbidden, the military 
authorities did not seem interested in making an effort or spend time on 
exercising much control over Kibera – the Nairobi District Commissioner 
referred to it as the “farcical so-called control of the military”.
451
 They were 
inclined to let the Nubis distil and drink their alcohol and make no fuss 
about it, because “the tribe has always been given to having sundowners”.
452
 
And as long as Kibera was a military area, the police did not have complete 
and unhindered access; they needed permission from the military to enter 
the area.
453
 Moreover, the Native Liquor Ordinance did not “permit African 
police to conduct searches for illicit stills or native liquor”
454
, making it 
even more difficult for police to go into Kibera. 
 
For the Nubis, drinking Nubian gin was very normal; it was a man‟s social 
pass-time: friends and relatives would drink it together, and it was drunk at 
social and cultural occasions, like weddings and the traditional dholuka 
dances. It did however not play any role in rituals or ceremonies. Social 
drinking sessions would usually take place during weekends. Being drunk 
was seen as a sign of weakness: “A strong man could take his Nubian gin 
and would not get drunk”.
455
  Most men would reduce their alcohol intake 
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as they got older, though most would never stop drinking; some old men 
would have their cup of gin in the morning, as a “chest-medicine”.
456
 While 
men would drink gin, women would drink a light alcoholic (fermented) 
drink, Kangara, made of sugar and maize flour. This does not mean that 
women did not drink Nubian gin; they certainly did, when they were 
distilling or when men were not around, but never in public. The boys and 
young men were not supposed to drink Nubian gin; it was only for adults. 
From thirty years of age and onward, a man could drink but only with his 
own age-mates, never with the elders.   
 
Islam forbids the use of alcohol and the most religious Nubis were therefore 
on the side of the British colonial government and opposed the distillation 
and consumption of Nubian gin. Most Nubi however did not see any 
problem with the Nubian gin: religion was often seen as different and 
separate from „culture and tradition‟. Besides, the average Nubi did not have 
much knowledge on Islam and its rules; it was practiced with a lot of 
flexibility. Drinking Nubian gin was clearly a matter of tradition, and 
therefore allowed. “The men could be drinking heavily in the afternoon, and 





The men would at some point start bringing friends (of other ethnic groups) 
from work over to Kibera to drink Nubian gin in the family house. In those 
days it was not possible to just come to Kibera and look for a place to drink 
Nubian gin – one had to organise this through a Nubi friend.
458
 However, 
some market mechanism must have existed for selling gin to the soldiers 
and clients in town, because towards the end of the 1920s “Nubian gin” was 
already a source of complaints from the white community and the colonial 
authorities. And apparently already in the 1920s, Jomo Kenyatta bought 
Nubian Gin from the „Sudanese‟ at Dagoretti
459
, and then probably sold it in 
his „Kinyata stores‟. 
 
It is hard to be specific about the quantities of Nubian gin produced in 
Kibera, the number of women involved, or amounts of money earned with 
the trade in the 1920s, but based on the few written and oral sources 
available, it is clear that most Nubi families produced gin, and that the 
quantities produced for sale gradually increased from the beginning of Nubi 
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settlement in 1904 till the late 1920s, early 1930s, when an increase in 
commercialisation of the trade seems to have occurred. 
 
 
Increased commercialisation, 1930-1940 
 
The population of Nairobi continued to grow rapidly: from 33,000 
inhabitants in 1930, to 49,600 in 1936 to 108,900 in 1944
460
. More than 
50% of these were African men
461
, who were not allowed to drink imported 
liquors
462
, and could drink traditional beers only in the unpopular Municipal 
beer halls. This resulted in a fast growing market for Nubian gin and other 
locally made (illicit) liquors.  
 
Already in the early 1930s there obviously existed a big market for liquor in 
Nairobi: the police regularly carried out weekend “liquor raids” in Kibera 
(now that it was no longer military area, this was easier than before), and 
there was increased prosecution of Nubis found “in possession”. The police 
“on numerous occasions disclosed the presence of hundreds of gallons of 
spirituous liquor”. Nevertheless, the police admitted that the raids were 




Total prohibition of (fermented) „native intoxicating liquor‟ turned out to be 
unrealistic, and was in the 1920s replaced by a system of licensing; the 
Nubis could get a license to brew kangara for certain ceremonies or 
occasions like weddings
464
, and in another African village, Kileleshwa, only 
one „approved‟ person in the village would get a license for one year.
465
 
Production of distilled liquors however remained prohibited to the African 
population throughout colonial rule, while consumption of distillates was 
allowed only from 1955. 
 
The authorities believed that it was mainly destitute Nubi women (widows, 
divorcees, old women) that distilled and sold Nubian gin in order to 
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, an argument that the Nubi leaders also used to press for 
permission to continue the distillation. The ex-soldiers, and their widows for 
that matter, never received a pension from the KAR. In old age they often 
were no longer able to work, and claimed that for many of them the only 
way of generating an income was the distillation of Nubian gin. However, 
the government would not allow it, and the raids and patrols continued. 
Only much later, around 1945-7, would they give destitute Nubis a monthly 
“compassionate allowance”
467
, possibly to prevent them from distilling 
Nubian gin, but it would not have had any impact anyway, not even in the 
1930s. This was because it was not really only the destitute women distilling 
Nubian gin… With the economic crisis and deteriorating conditions of the 
1930s, many Nubi families had a hard time and were forced to try 
everything to generate income, in order to maintain (or regain) their 
standard of living, which had always been relatively high compared to other 
Africans.
468
 Nubi women were not supposed to work outside the house, 
outside Kibera, certainly not for „outsiders‟; those women were looked 
down upon. Making handicraft (mats and food covers) was an option, but 
that brought in little money. The only real option for Nubi women to earn a 
reasonable amount of money was to make and sell Nubian gin.  
 
But there was another very important reason to go into the liquor business: 
the money that could be made with the Nubian gin was much more than was 
needed for mere survival or maintaining the standard of living, it allowed 
women to buy whatever they wanted and lead a very good life in general. 
Who would say „no‟ to such a business? Women wanted money for buying 
clothes, food and other things to make their life more pleasant; and so more 
and more women became involved in the illegal distillation, making more 
and more gin, and making more and more money.  
 
Even young girls would start their own distilling business. One habooba 
(grandmother) confessed:  
 
I started distilling gin when I was 14 years old; I got money 
from my father and materials (and ingredients) from his 
shop, and I sold gin and returned the loan. All the profit was 
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Many more women started at an early age, usually with start-up support 
from their mother or sister.
470
 As Islam allows women to have their own 
property and earn their own money, the Nubian gin business was attractive 
to women: they started to control their own labour, income and expenditure.  
 
With the increasing commercialisation of Nubian gin, the old-fashioned clay 
pots were gradually replaced by larger oil drums (“pipa” in Swahili
471
) for 
fermentation. According to the oldest Nubi informant
472
, this process started 
already in the early 1930s. The old clay pots used for distillation had already 
earlier been replaced by sufurias, metal cooking pots imported from India. 
The process became more labour-intensive due to the large quantities 
produced and large amounts of water needed. This required additional help; 
most women had a shamba boy or another hired assistant (non-Nubis) to do 
the heavy work. 
 
With the use of sufurias, the method of distillation also changed. Three 
sufurias were required: one was placed on the fire; on top of it was another 
one with holes in the bottom, to allow the vapour to pass through; on top of 
that one was another sufuria full of cold water, to cool the vapours below so 
they would condensate against its cold underside. The drops of gin would 
then fall into a small container that was placed in the middle sufuria to 
collect the gin (see drawing B).  
 
This was an easier and faster way of producing gin, and allowed a higher 
production, though apparently of a lower quality (less flavour). The big 
producers had many „distillation plants‟ (the three sufurias) working at the 
same time, and often a complicated system with pipes for cooling the 
vapour and collecting the gin in one central container. 
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With the increased commercialisation, quality became second to quantity. 
Instead of using only the first drops of the gin, distillation went on longer to 
produce more (and weaker) gin from the same pipa. The fermentation 
process was reduced to one week, accelerating the speed of production. 
Chemicals came into common use only from the early 1960s (though certain 
additives, like baking powder, were used earlier), further shortening the 
process.  
 
Nevertheless some women preferred to produce high quality gin
473
; it was 
less work and also fetched a better price from the wholesalers, who would 
mix it with water before selling it. Many Nubi women would actually do the 
same, mixing gin with water, claiming it would be too strong for most 
                                                          
473
 Informant W10. 
157 
 





The available evidence suggests there was something of a panic in 
Government from the mid-1930, roughly the same time as in Uganda.
475
 
This was also at the time when local distillation of alcohol seems to have 
become more common in East Africa.
476
 When, in the 1930s, police “liquor 
raids” became more frequent and regular police patrols were introduced, the 
gin production (fermentation and distillation), especially of the bigger 
producers, was moved to the shamba (farm) or forest to avoid detection by 
the police. The pipas were dug in the ground, deep enough to have space for 
iron sheets to cover them, then sacks, then other cloth, and then sand to 
cover and level the ground - impossible to find, and strong enough to keep 
the weight of someone passing over it.
477
 Small producers would usually 
continue to distil at home, inside the house, but most of the distilling, 
instead of in the homestead, was now done “in the heart of the cultivated 




The larger production sites also had to be closer to the river, because the 
distillation process needed large quantities of water: for the production of 
the muna, and for cooling the distillation equipment. This was another 
reason for the Nairobi Municipal Council to refuse to provide piped water to 
Kibera: “The process of manufacture of Nubian gin requires large quantities 
of water both for the making of [fermented brew] and for cooling the 
distillation plant. No doubt the Municipal supply would be ideal for this and 
probably would produce a purer quality and better flavoured beverage than 
is produced at present, while of course it would guarantee a steady output 
regardless of weather conditions“.
479
 The official reasons had been that 
Kibera was outside the Municipal boundaries, and that the Nubis should 
move elsewhere to make way for town expansion – providing piped water 
would encourage them to stay in Kibera.
480
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The Nubis began to complain about the liquor raids and the alleged violence 
with which they were carried out.
481
 They had always been used to distilling 
and drinking Nubian gin, and their leaders repeatedly pleaded for 
permission to continue distilling Nubian gin for their own consumption, and 
for survival of “those destitute women”. Like in their attempt to stay at 
Kibera and hold on to their land, the Nubis tried to use their relationship 
with the colonial power (and former officials) to get privileged treatment. 
There was still considerable sympathy for the Nubis within the colonial 
government: 
 
While these old people cause a certain amount of trouble, one 
cannot help being touched or prevent one‟s sense of humour 
being tickled when one sees the same old faces and the rows 
of medals on the breasts of the really fine old type of Nubian, 
who in his younger and less alcoholic days did such 




The Nubis also looked for support from their former KAR officers. Their 
(former) military superiors never had had any problem with them producing 
and consuming of alcohol. Major Edwards, who had during World War I 
served with the Nubis in the KAR and highly respected them, wrote a 
memorandum to the colonial government in defence of the Nubis, stating 
that “a Police Officer would not view the possession of a small quantity of 





However, hundreds of gallons of Nubian gin cannot be said to be a small 
quantity for “the ordinary household needs of a family”.
484
 It is clear that 
there was a huge production of liquor in Kibera: during a police raid in the 
early 1930s, a Nubian gin distillery was discovered, with, allegedly, more 
than 30 oil drums used for fermentation.
485
 Used to full capacity, this site 
should have been able to produce more than 2000 litres of Nubian gin per 
week! Most producers however were much smaller, though many women 
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seem to have had 3-4 oil drums for fermentation, still a respectable number 
and enough for two hundred litres of gin per week. 
 
Photo 7: (Retired) Nubi officers of the King’s African Rifles, probably late 
1940s.
486





There was general agreement that the Nubis themselves did not cause any 
problems of drunkenness: “It is not the resident native of Kibera that is seen 
drunk, but it is the Kikuyu, a Kavirondo cook, houseboy labourer type”.
487
 
But there were two other problems: one was that natives from all over 
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Nairobi would go to Kibera to drink (“Drunkenness is rife every weekend 
all over Kibera”), and once drunk, would cause a nuisance in town, with 
“drunken natives staggering about the main roads of Nairobi every weekend 




The second problem was that Nubian gin was “exported” and sold all over 
Nairobi and even further away. The “very obvious increase of gin 
consumption in Pumwani” was traced back to Kibera, where a subsequent 
raid found gin in very large quantities.
489
 It was alleged that Nubi bus 
drivers of the Kenya Bus Company “are largely concerned with the 
distribution of the Nubian gin and are constantly intoxicated with it at night 
themselves, while I have received information that even when driving buses 
some of these Nubians have been suspected by passengers of being under 




In the Nubis‟ defence, it was said that it was not only them distilling Nubian 
gin: the Kikuyu shamba boys had learned how to distil while assisting the 
Nubi women, and they had taken over part of the business. Major Edwards 
claims that the Nubis “with some little feeling of jealousy, have now 
become the customers of their erstwhile clients”.
491
 This can hardly be true 
in 1936, the time Major Edwards wrote this. It is known that some Kikuyu 
shamba boys took their knowledge and experience home to Thika and 
Kiambu in the „native reserves‟. This was probably in the late 1930s, when 
“the trade in liquor was spreading to the Kikuyu reserves”; there is also 
some oral evidence from Kibera that confirms this.
492
 It is well possible that 
some Kikuyus living in Kibera were involved in selling gin and local beer to 
the soldiers of Lang‟ata barracks – according to some, they would buy 
Nubian gin, mix it with water and sell it.
493
 It is also known that some other 
non-Nubis living in Kibera (shamba boys, Nubi concubines) were involved 
in distillation and sale of liquor within Kibera, but on a small scale, and 
possibly only from the late 1940s.
494
 However, it is unlikely that the Nubis 
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would have become customers of the Kikuyu at that time; many Nubis said 
the Kikuyu liquor “did not taste as good as the real thing”
495
 – they would 
never drink it if „the real thing‟ was available. Serious production of 
distilled liquor by non-Nubis in Kibera started only around the late 1950s. 
 
The liquor raids continued as a matter of routine throughout the first half of 
the 1930s. Nubi women were arrested and taken to court. Fines varied from 
12 Kenyan Shillings (Ksh) to a few hundred and in exceptional cases more 
than 1000 Ksh
496
 – but many women had money, and fines were often paid 
swiftly in cash, after which most of them would immediately go back to 
distilling Nubian gin… There was simply too much money to be made in 
the liquor business: “The trade is so profitable […] that even the heaviest 




In 1933, those fines, bearing “little or no relation to the profits [...] derived 
from the illicit trade”
498
 were increased. Later still, prison sentences were 
introduced, as they were expected to have more impact. According to the 
police, they did: “the substitution of terms of imprisonment for the former 
inadequate fines has doubtless had a decided deterrent effect”.
499
 However, 
statistics seem to indicate otherwise: a survey in 1944 shows that all of the 
100 older Nubi women interviewed had spent time in jail, mainly for liquor-
related offences.
500
 Prison sentences were usually a few months, but were 
gradually increased to up to 2 years
501
, depending on the severity of the 
crime; if you were caught while distilling, the sentence would be higher than 
if you were found in possession of fermenting „muna‟. It was confirmed by 
older Kibera informants that many of the Nubi women spent time in jail, 
though only for the shorter sentences, up to a few months; for the longer 
sentences they would pay the fine instead (which was later no longer 
possible). This would however also depend on the financial capacity of the 
women involved; the poorer ones (small producers) sometimes did not have 
the money to pay the fine and would go to jail. Sometimes the fine was paid 
by relatives or friends, „business partners‟; it was usually not the husband 
who bailed out his wife. The District Commissioner of Nairobi complained 
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about the fact that “no effort is made [by Nubi men] to produce the fine, and 
the woman languishes in jail”
502
; he was clearly not aware that the women 
themselves were responsible for production and paying the fine, not their 
husbands. It may have been their own choice to go to jail instead of paying 
the fine; in other cases the husband may not have agreed with the production 
of alcohol and therefore refused to bail her out, or he simply may have had 
no money. 
 
From 1935 eviction became the policy - people convicted of a liquor offence 
would be given 2 months notice and evicted from Kibera.
503
 This seems to 
have happened only a few times
504
, though none of the oldest Nubis in 
Kibera can remember any case; probably most (or all) of them simply 
moved to another part of Kibera. In 1938, when Nubis said they would 
challenge the Government‟s position in court, this arrangement was 
cancelled by Mr Logan, the Commissioner for Local Government, Lands 





The Nubis often got advance warning of a pending raid, from the Liwali 
(Nubi headman), who was usually informed by the Police Commissioner
506
, 
or directly from police constables: some of them were Nubis, and many 
other policemen patrolling in Kibera were happy drinkers as well. Police 
were also said “frequently to be seen in a state of drunkenness in the streets 
of Nairobi”, but this was denied by the Police Commissioner.
507
 „Friendly‟ 
policemen were later rewarded for their information on pending raids. With 
the advance warning, the women had time to hide the gin in the shamba or 
in the house: in the sofa, the ceiling, or in a hole under the bed. If caught 
unawares, they would pretend to be naked in bed, so that the askaris would 
remain outside, to give them time to dress. One woman said she would eat 
hot peppers, causing her face to swell, and her body to sweat and shake, 
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giving the impression she was very sick – the police would leave her alone. 
The raids were a game of hide and seek, cat and mouse.  
 
From early 1936, regular police patrols during weekends in Kibera replaced 
the night raids that were stopped after complaints (by the Nubis). In the 
second half of 1938, however, it was agreed to carry out raids again, but 
only when there was sufficient evidence for the issue of a search warrant. 
Raids continued like before, but, according to informants, without 




In late 1938 a police post was established in Kibera to specifically focus on 
suppressing drunkenness and crime, and detecting infringement of the 
law.
509
 All these measures may have had some impact on liquor production 
and consumption, but certainly not enough to suppress the business, and the 
gin clearly continued to be transported to other parts of the Municipality.
510
 
The sale of Nubian gin was too lucrative and the heavy fines and prison 
sentences imposed hardly a deterrent. 
 
And so, despite the increasing measures to suppress the production of liquor 




Big business, 1940 - 1965 
 
The market for Nubian gin continued to grow in step with Nairobi‟s ever-
increasing population, which reached almost 270,000 around Independence, 
up from 109,000 in 1944 and 65,000 in 1938.
511
 These were the official 
figures, but it is likely that the real figures were higher, with many illegal or 
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The war economy occasioned by World War II created opportunities for 
employment and business; salaries increased as well. Moreover, during the 
war and the Mau Mau Emergency there was a large military presence in 
Nairobi
513
, with Buller Camp and the new barracks in Lang‟ata very close to 
Kibera. All these factors contributed to an increasing market for distilled 
liquor. Furthermore, in the early 1950s, at the time of the Mau Mau 
Emergency, “Africans boycotted the products of municipal breweries, 




During the 1940-50s (especially after World War II), the Nubis gradually 
lost their advantage as “a better class African”; their general lack of interest 
in secular education and the growing number of other Africans with good 
education, caused increasing unemployment in the Nubi community and a 
marked deterioration in their income. Especially during the 1950s, the need 
for additional income became apparently higher.
515
 In response, more and 
more Nubi women turned to Nubian gin production, or increased their 
production.  
 
Moreover, there was a growing number of female-headed households in 
Kibera, and these would almost certainly depend on Nubian gin for survival. 
In 1930, 41 out of 217 families (19%) were female-headed; in 1944 this 
percentage had gone up to 32%, and in 1955 it was about 42%.
516
 This 
increase in female-headed households appears to come mainly from women 
(possibly second or third wives) that outlived their much older husbands. If 
the widow was old enough and had grown-up children, she could remain in 
charge of the compound, and be completely independent – these were often 
the main producers of Nubian gin. There may also have been an increase in 
divorces, but this is harder to estimate, and statistics are not available. 
Divorced women often moved with their children back to the family 
compound, and lived there to some extent independently – often living off 
Nubian gin income.
517
 In the 1950s and 60s quite a number of women were 
simply abandoned by their husband, without official divorce – it is likely 
that these women would depend on Nubian gin as well.  
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A few Nubi men got involved in the Nubian gin business as well – not in 
production, but in selling: they would buy it from Nubi women, transport 
and sell it. This was done in secret: “the imams in the mosques were 
fulminating against alcohol, and some of these men were in the front row 




Nubi informants estimate that, in its heyday, 70-90% of the Nubi families
519
 
were involved in gin production, in a small or big way; some claim that in 
every family, even the most religious ones, at least one woman was 
distilling gin: 
 
Everybody, every house had Nubian gin… also religious 
ones, the mzee would say „you do what you want, I don‟t 
want to know‟. Many people did not have a job, so they had 





The gin producers came in different sizes. Small producers were often older 
women, with one pipa, that did not distil non-stop or even the whole pipa at 
once; they usually had a small group of regular customers, Nubi and 
outsiders, that would come into the house to drink. For them the gin income 
was often a supplement to any other income; sometimes maybe even the 
only income. These women would usually distil at home. The second group, 
the medium producers, was the largest group: most producers appear to 
have belonged to this group. These were the more energetic, often younger 
women, with 2-4 pipas, many producing non-stop, or at least very regularly, 
enough to have a decent income. The last group was the one of big 
producers, who could be found in every village in Kibera. There were 
around 10-15 families (in the whole of Kibera) that had more than 10 pipas, 
producing non-stop; huge distillation plants, with many fires and an 
elaborate piping system to connect all the sufurias and collect the alcohol; 
pick-up trucks and taxis would come to collect large amounts of Nubian gin; 




As a result, poverty did not really exist amongst the Nubis, though there was 
quite a big difference in wealth between the big gin producers and the 
smaller or non-producers, especially if not being involved in the business 
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was because of religious reasons. In 1947 a Government investigation into 
poverty amongst the „destitute‟ Nubis of Kibera was stopped because “the 
answers were given in parrot fashion, which suggested a previous rehearsal” 




There were different reasons for not being involved in gin production. Often 
it was forbidden by the father or the husband for religious reasons; in others 
it was because the husband had sufficient income, from a decent job like a 
Kenya Bus inspector, or if he was a big businessman: “If you have money, 
why would your wife have to be cooking that stuff?”.
523
 If the husband was 
with the police (and quite a few were), he could not be seen having an 
illegal “gin distillery” in his house.  
 
In many cases though, women apparently did it anyway, distilling and 
selling gin in secret, and the shayba, the „head of the compound‟ (the father 
or husband) either did not know, or (more likely) conveniently looked the 
other way, because they all benefited from the income it provided.
524
 The 
number of families where no one distilled gin was probably very small. 
Some women distilled only for a short time and then stopped because they 
were scared of the police, or had spent time in jail, or had been caught by 
the husband or father… One woman explained: 
 
My husband was a very strict man, and when one day he 
came home and found that I was arrested for distilling, he got 
so angry, he said I could rot in jail. I had been arrested at 
night, and in the morning my friends came to bail me out, 




Other sources of income were available to women, like making the 
traditional mats and  food covers, or selling food (mandazi, sambusa) in the 
market, or even renting out one or two rooms, but this brought in much less 
income. Working outside Kibera, for the white people for example, was not 
acceptable work for Nubi women.  
 
Prostitution was another alternative that provided a good income, more than 
unskilled labour.
526
 According to Bujra, there was “mention of „native 
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prostitution‟ in official records as early as 1911. Probably the first 
prostitutes in Nairobi were camp followers of the soldiers of the British East 
African Rifles”.
527
  In general however, Nubi women were not involved in 
this, at least, not in the early days.
528
 Later on, in the 1950s, with many 
people drinking, the loosening morals and closer relations with regular 
customers (Nubi or outsiders), quite a number of illegitimate children were 
born in Kibera, and gossip was rife. Though most prostitutes were from 
outside Kibera (quite a number were Tanzanian Waziba
529
), there was also a 
number of Nubi women that got involved in prostitution; they lived alone, 
with female friends (often also prostitutes), or at the far end of the family 
compound; often they were also involved in the Nubian gin business. Even 
some married women were involved, and some Nubi girls worked in 
brothels in town. No one talked openly about it.
530
 Prostitution was clearly 
not the most likely choice for Nubi women: making Nubian gin was more 
respectable and generated much more income. 
 
Small huts in the shamba (often the ones where the shamba boys lived) were 
used to hide the equipment and to do the actual distillation. Women would 
usually work alone (but almost always assisted by one or more casuals or 
their shamba boys), and sometimes in groups with relatives (mothers, 
daughters, sisters) or friends. Each would then bring their own shamba 
boy(s) and they would assist one another, and use each other‟s equipment.  
 
Distilling was usually done at night or in the early morning hours, when the 
police were not around (except in case of a „liquor raid‟). The „outsiders‟ 
were not a problem at night: since the old days there was a Nubi-imposed 
curfew – non-Nubi „outsiders‟ had to be out of Kibera by 6 pm.
531
 The time 
of distillation often depended on the number of distillation “plants
532
” a 
woman had, and the number of fires she could keep going and control; the 
more assistants a woman had, the more she could distil, throughout the 
night.  
 
On average, one woman with one or two assistants could distil one pipa, 
containing around 200 litres of muna, per night. An average producer, with 
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3 pipas, had to make sure that her pipas “matured” on different days, and 
then she would work 3 nights a week. Large producers (or women working 
in groups) could distil a few pipas per night, working from early evening till 
dawn. Most producers distilled only a few nights per week. One pipa would 
give between 40 and 80 litres of gin – 40 litres of a stronger/better quality, 
or 80 litres of a weaker gin. It appears that most women preferred to 
produce larger quantities of a weaker gin – possibly because it required less 
attention and control of the temperature. Production was often non-stop: as 
soon as one pipa was emptied for distillation, it was filled again with 
molasses and water, while a small quantity of muna was left to start the 
fermentation process again. One week later the pipa was ready again for 
distillation. After distillation, the gin would be put in bottles
533
 or in a debe 




Selling Nubian gin was easy: often the wholesalers or the taxis they sent 
would be waiting at the house, early in the morning when the women and 
shamba boys came back from the shamba after a night of distilling. The 
debes would be loaded straight into the car, and money exchanged hands as 
soon as the quality of the gin was established. This was done by dipping a 
finger in the gin and then lighting it: good quality (strong) gin would light 
up with a blue flame. Selling to wholesalers was probably the safest and 
quickest way to make money, though the prices, and therefore the profits, 
were a bit lower (for the same quality gin). Most middlemen were Asians or 
Kikuyu, but there were even some „whites‟ and police officers‟ wives. They 
would resell the gin in smaller quantities (often mixed with water) and make 
their own profit. 
 
Another common way of selling Nubian gin was taking it into town to 
deliver it, sometimes twice a day, at the houses, offices, bars or shops of 
regular customers.
535
 Usually the gin was put in bottles and tied around the 
waist under the gurbaba (a colourful piece of cloth traditionally used by 
Nubi women as a sort of long skirt), or in a shopping basket covered with 
vegetables, sometimes even carried by small children. It was more risky and 
time consuming, but brought in good money as well, and after selling, 
women would do shopping in town and take a taxi home to Kibera.  
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The third way of selling gin was to receive customers at home, in the 
compound. This way carried the most risk, not only because of the threat of 
police raids and patrols, but also the husband or father… Initially Nubi men 
would invite friends from work to come to the house and drink. Later on a 
special hut or room could be prepared for customers, but with the steady 
increase in commercialisation, and more and more outsiders coming into the 
compound and house, this became a problem. In compounds where women 
were in charge (mainly widows) there was usually no problem with non-
Nubi outsiders coming into the house or compound, but the elders and 
husbands often did not like to see „labi‟ (outsiders) in their compound. Quite 
a number of elders did not really approve of the alcohol either, so both the 
production and the customers had to be kept out of sight, even if they knew 
what was happening. 
 
In many compounds, new drinking space was created, where the customers 
would not have to come into the house, or even into the compound. The 
Nubi women were very inventive: they served quick drinks through the 
compound fence or through the window of the kitchen; space was created 
within and underneath the bushes of the compound fence, where people 
could quietly sit unnoticed; some had a special hut at the end of the 
compound, out of sight of the shayba (elder), where they distilled and sold. 
In one compound they even built a toilet with a secret passage into another 
room where gin was served! Customers would casually walk up to the 
house, to the kitchen and make a gesture of slaughtering, with the finger 
across the throat, as if to say “kill me quick”, because “that was what the 
Nubian gin did, it was that strong”. That gesture was enough; a glass
536
 
would be prepared and put at a place the regular customer knew; he would 
drink it in two gulps and leave the money on the tray. In fact, “kill me quick” 





Customers were of all colours and ethnic groups. Many of them were 
Africans: policemen, soldiers from the army barracks, or workers (nannies, 
cooks, cleaners, house boys and shamba boys) of the white people living 
along Ngong road in Woodley estate. The weekends were the busiest, with 
workers coming from all over Nairobi. Even Asians and white people would 
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venture into Kibera for a drink, or place an order and have it collected or 
delivered. Nubi men were also regular customers, in times when there was 
nothing to drink at home, or simply because some women produced better 
gin than others.  
 
The government meanwhile continued to try and discourage people from 
distilling and consuming Nubian gin: through police raids and patrols, 
prosecution, fines and prison sentences for offenders (producers and 
consumers). They prosecuted some non-Nubi ”bad characters” that were 
found in Kibera, for “unlawful residence on Crown Land”
538
, as they 
believed it was these people causing most of the problems. But controlling 
these illegal residents of Kibera was difficult, because they were accepted 
by the Nubis as “lodgers” - several cases taken to court ended in a defeat for 
the authorities, when the Attorney General ruled that the charges were not 





In 1940 there was a plan by the authorities to have a municipal beer shop 
and recreation centre near the Kibera police post, to “diminish recourse by 
ordinary Africans to more noxious pursuits”
540
; in the end however, it never 
happened. From around 1946-7, destitute Nubis were given a 
“compassionate allowance”
541
; this may have been to stop them from 
distilling gin, though this was also at a time when the colonial government 
had started to invest more in social welfare and housing for Nairobi‟s 
African workers, and to produce a more stable and productive 
workforce”.
542
 This resulted in a number of surveys to investigate poverty in 
Kibera.
543
 However, as noted earlier, Nubi women did not necessarily distil 
Nubian gin out of poverty. 
 
Another way in which the government tried to reduce consumption of 
Nubian gin was through the licensing of kangara (fermented maize beer), 
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first only for ceremonies, but later also for „weekend drinking‟, attracting 
large crowds to Kibera for the “comparatively harmless […] consumption of 
native beer”.
544
 However, none of these efforts had the desired effect of 
putting an end to the distillation and consumption of Nubian gin. 
 
Police raids therefore continued. The distillation sites were relatively safe: 
they were hidden, often far away from the compounds, in shamba or forest, 
with wild animals around, and the distillation was done at night. Police 
would hardly ever venture there, also because they did not know when 
exactly women would distil. The raids at home were more of a problem, 
because the women used to hide gin inside the house or compound. They 
were very inventive: bottles of gin were hidden inside the sofa seat and back 
rest, the ceiling, in the full water tank, or in a space in the floor. But even if 
they would get advance warning from a friendly policeman, there was 
always a risk of arrest and conviction, and of losing all the distillation 
equipment. Police raids and arrests increased during this period: between 
1931 and 1936 there were 146 convictions, but in 1943 alone there were 123 





Some people had good connections, and could be spared the hassle of 
repeated raids. For example the family, where all the women were involved 
in the Nubian gin business, and most of the men were heavy drinkers. One 
day, there was a raid, but by chance, the police did not find anything. The 
„shayba‟, who was an important man (councillor), went to the police station, 
and complained, and the Commissioner of Police gave instructions that no 
one should raid his house anymore, since he was an honest man. So the 





Not everyone was that lucky, and with all those liquor raids and patrols 
going on, most women opted for bribing the police to let them distil and sell 
the liquor in peace, or inform them of a pending raid. This was done with 
liquor or cash, and possibly even sex
547
. Many policemen were also regular 
customers, so some sort of a relationship existed that made it easier to be 
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“friends”. They would get a glass or a bottle for free now and then, or even 
–the senior police officers– larger quantities for wholesale, instead of 
money. The senior officers often preferred the larger quantities to resell; 
they would make more money that way. Women from the police barracks in 
Lang‟ata would come to Kibera to buy wholesale and resell. Some women 
claimed they had a police “pay-roll”; every month they would give fixed 
amounts to the inspectors, the juniors, and the constables, though most 
women would just give their informants „as required‟, and free drinks from 
time to time. Another woman explained: “if you have three pipas, the profit 
of one goes to the police, one is for the house and personal requirements, 
and one for food”.
548
 However, not all policemen were inclined to close 
their eyes for a fee – there is this story about a Nubi woman: 
 
She was a big gin producer, and was once arrested by her 
brother, who was in the police. Imagine the loyalty (of the 
brother/policeman)! The woman was taken to court and spent 





This was not very common, though. In this case, there may have been some 
previous problems between the brother and sister.  
 
With the very high fines and prison sentences, it was worth the investment 
to keep the police on your side. Bribing judges was also possible, but 
became increasingly expensive when judges realised how much money the 
Nubi women made; they charged ever-larger amounts of money to let 
women off the hook, even up to 6000 Ksh.
550
 Nevertheless, despite all the 
bribes paid, most women did spend some time in jail; some “notorious 
offenders” even up to two years – they would not get the option of a fine 
instead. Sometimes the police had to „satisfy their superiors‟ and produce 
some offenders and arrest people; sometimes someone had argued with the 
police, or there were new policemen who had not yet become „friends‟.  
 
During the first years of the Emergency the number of raids increased 
drastically, but these were mainly to flush out Kikuyu „militants‟ thought to 
be hiding in Kibera during Mau Mau. Most Kikuyus hiding in Kibera were 
just ordinary people, friends or employees of Nubis, or their children. After 
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Mau Mau was under control, the raids were reduced and became less of a 
problem. There were regular patrols, but the policemen were known and 
could be seen from far, as Kibera was still open country in those days. 
Playing children were rewarded with a shilling if they warned their mothers 
if they saw the police coming. Only after Independence did the police start 
causing problems again. 
 
 
Income from Nubian gin 
 
It is interesting to look at the financial side of the Nubian gin production - 
how much gin was produced, and how much money was actually made?  
 
Estimating the total production of Nubian gin in Kibera is difficult, simply 
because it was done secretly, and people often had no more than vague ideas 
of how many pipas other women had, or how often they distilled. However, 
for the purpose of getting a general idea of income, I will take an average 
producer with three pipas.  
 
If one pipa could produce up to 80 litres of gin per week, then three pipas 
could produce 960 litres per month. This is the weaker quality (with higher 
production), which is what most women apparently produced. Assuming 
also that the production was not completely non-stop, but with some delays 
here and there, an average producer would manage to get 750 litres per 
month. Some of this would be drunk by the husband and his friends, or used 
in weddings and social events – let‟s assume 600 litres could be sold.  
 
Prices for Nubian gin varied over time; in the early days it was 2 Kenyan 
Shillings (Ksh) per bottle of 750 millilitres
551
; for the early 1930s a price of 
7 Ksh is mentioned
552
 and in the 1940s the price stood at 6 Ksh.
553
 
However, most of the “notorious offenders and drinkers” in Kibera 
remember a price of 8/= Ksh per bottle, a price that remained stable for 
many years, possibly from the late 1940s, throughout the 1950s and well 
into the 1960s. That means that an average producer in the 1950s could earn 
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552
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553
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6400 Ksh per month.
554
 It compares with information from some 
informants: an average of 3000 Ksh per pipa was normal; some people 
made 15-20,000 Ksh in one month.
555
 Of this amount, 1/3 would have to be 
spent on bribing the police and judges. It may be that women exaggerated 
about their income, or mixed up figures and years, or had simply forgotten 
details – the amounts of money are so high, that it is in fact hard to 
believe.
556
 However, these quantities of liquor and profits have been 
confirmed by many informants, and the level of the fines (in some cases 
more than 1000 Ksh, already in the 1940s
557
) also shows that the amounts of 
money earned were very high. Nevertheless, even after allowing a liberal 
discount, enough remains to show that the Nubi women made a lot of 
money, substantially more than their husbands. 
 
Average salaries for Africans in Nairobi at the time were substantially 
lower: a soldier would get 40-50 Ksh per month; a normal average wage for 
an African was 50-150 Ksh, and their highest income was around 500 
Ksh.
558
 For the “better class African” Nubi, a salary of 600 Ksh was a top 
salary. The comparison makes clear that the Nubian gin business was 
generating a colossal amount of money – and the Nubis basically had the 
monopoly on liquor production in and around Nairobi, everybody had to 
come to them to buy it, and they kept this position at least until the mid-50s. 
Many women earned much more than what a husband with a good job 
would bring home. As one old „notorious offender‟ claimed: “a man would 
not earn more in one month than 25% of what I would spend on sugar (for 
distilling) in a week”.
559
 This may be exaggerated, but it is an indication of 
the difference in income between men and women, and the enormous 
amounts of money (some) women made. It is no wonder then that 
legislation, police raids and patrols, fines and prison sentences had so little 
impact on the liquor business.  
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Spending the Nubian gin money – the impact on Nubi society and 
Kibera 
The next logical question is what the Nubis (women) did with all that 
money. Such huge amounts, properly invested, would have made the Nubis 
very rich indeed in the Kenya of today. 
 
However, very little of it was invested. Most of it was simply spent on the 
best food, nice clothes, gold and jewellery (including gold teeth), school 
fees, expensive hardwood Lamu furniture, just anything they felt like. What 
initially may have started as a way to meet the family expenses, provide 
food and school fees and generally maintain the standard of living (in 
absence of the often unemployed husbands‟ income and support), had for 
many become a way to earn money to do and buy whatever they wanted. 
This stands in sharp contrast with for example the Kikuyus, who invested 
what they earned; there are many stories of shamba boys that worked hard 
(distilling Nubian gin, making and selling charcoal), saved and invested 
their money and became rich; “Kikuyus would save the money and then buy 





The Nubis had in general quite an expensive lifestyle, certainly compared to 
other Africans: there was always a lot and good food in the house, every day 
meat, and whatever they wanted.
561
 Cars and trucks, motorbikes, and the 
first gramophones could be found in Kibera. Many Nubis liked to gamble on 
horses, and would go to the Ngong Racecourse on Sundays. Being dressed 
smartly in good clothes was very important, for both men and women; one 
woman said that on a good day she would just buy a new suit for her 
husband, or 3-4 gurbabas if the trader happened to pass by: “you would just 
buy one, or a few, even if you did not need them, it was just for having 
them”.
562
 With every wedding, Idd or other celebration people would wear 
new clothes. Nubi children went to school wearing shoes, “when most 
teachers could not even afford them – they would take them from the 
children and give them back at the end of the year… probably used them 
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themselves during the weekend!”
563
 Money may have been spent on better 
housing as well: Kibera‟s Superintendent Kitching noticed that between 
1935 (when a housing census was done in Kibera) and 1945 (when he did 
his own survey) “a building boom seems to have taken place: huts which 
were mud, wattle and grass -one room- have now blossomed into six or 
more roomed houses with corrugated iron roofs and in some cases concrete 
floors”.
564
 Money was also spent on social events, like weddings, traditional 
dances, Idd and other celebrations, as well as support to relatives and poorer 
community members, the ones that did not distil gin. Hospitality to visitors 
was important as well. The Nubis also travelled quite a lot, all over Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania, to visit relatives in other Nubi villages, for weddings, 
funerals, or just for pleasure. There is a story of Nubis hiring a whole train 
to take them to Kampala and back, for a wedding; when returning, there 
were no taxis available in Nairobi: they were all waiting at the railway 




Certainly, differences in wealth existed among the Nubis, and many families 
could afford this expensive lifestyle only to a limited extent – certainly the 
smaller producers and the ones that were not involved in the Nubian gin 
business.
566
 In general, though, there was money for everything they needed 
or wanted. As one informant said: “There was always money, women 
always had money somewhere”.
567
 It is not surprising that many of the other 





One woman offered an explanation for this spendthrift behaviour of the 
Nubis:  
 
Islam says that money from this kind of sources is in a way 
„haraam‟, forbidden, „bad money‟, and it should be used, 
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People were in a way uncomfortable with the money they made, “they had 
the inner feeling that what they were doing was wrong, not right”.
570
 Thus, 
the money had to be spent.  
 
However, even if it is correct that this kind of money would be considered 
„haraam‟ in Islam, most informants doubt that that would have been a 
reason not to invest it, certainly in the 1940s and 1950s. Religion played a 
minor role in most people‟s lives and in determining people‟s options, and 
in general women didn‟t know much about Islamic rules and what was in 
the Koran. Besides, they were distilling and drinking gin, which would be 
considered even worse than investing haraam money. Furthermore, from 
the 1960s they would actually invest some of that haraam money, and that 
was exactly at a time when religion started to play a more important role. 
According to these informants, the main reason for not investing the money 
seems to be that most Nubis did not have any other idea of what to do with 
it: due to lack of education and maybe exposure to the outside world, they 
did not see the opportunities, for example in business, or “real estate”. Or in 
land, which was very cheap in the days after Independence; only few Nubis 
thought of buying. Most people did not think they would ever want or need 
any other land than the Kibera land. They did not look far into the future, 
their life in Kibera was very good, and they did not think things would ever 
change. For the same reason they continued to disregard secular education; 
“there was enough money to give the children anything they wanted, so why 




Even though Nubis were still employed in town in „positions involving 
responsibility‟
572
 many Nubi men had no work, or only casual jobs, they 
would work for a few weeks and then quit. Their general poor education 
reduced their chances on the labour market, certainly after World War II 
when an increasing number of Africans were receiving better education. 
Moreover, with their women earning so much money with the Nubian gin, 
there was no need for them to work. Many took to drinking heavily, 
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The men would always eat well before drinking gin, to avoid 
being drunk quickly. Drinking sessions were often a kind of 
competition between the men, who could drink more and still 
walk straight. And then sometimes they would fight to see 





And even playing golf was a favourite pastime: many Nubi men had been 
caddy on the golf course next to Kibera. A former Nubi barman at the golf 
club claimed that the Europeans at the golf club would ask him: “How come 
all these Nubi men are always playing golf? Don‟t they work”? In 1924 the 
first 48 “totos” (children) had been released from the KAR school to be 
caddies at a golf tournament; over the years they learned to play golf really 
well, using the old clubs of the European golfers. Some Nubis (former 
caddies), like Burhan (Bob) Marjan and Osman Amber, excelled in golf, 
winning major East African trophies in the late 1960s after the golf courses 
were opened to Africans. One story is told about a big golf tournament 
taking place in Kampala where some European golfers would represent 
Kenya. Some weeks before there were championships in Nairobi in which 
the Europeans were decidedly defeated by Nubi players. It was then decided 





Alcohol consumption became a normal part of life, not only for men, also 
for the younger people: boys started drinking at an ever earlier age, stealing 
bottles from their mothers and drinking them with friends, getting 
completely drunk – drinking alcohol became part of “growing up”. Some 
girls were sent back to the parents‟ home after a few weeks of marriage, 
because of alcohol addiction. Women drank more as well: they now had 
their own „social groups‟, and drank gin mixed with Tusker beer, a 
reflection of their new social status. Or they drank alone: some were 
drunkards like their husbands. The increased production of Nubian gin 
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In many families women were now taking complete responsibility for the 
household, paying all expenses, and taking care of the children, and of the 
husband. As one woman said:  
 
When a girl got married, she was forced to make Nubian gin: 
the new family would force her to, because the husband was 
not used to looking after others, so why should he provide for 
her? Most husbands did not provide for their wives and 
children. So, married women would make even more gin 
than before, because they now had to look after themselves, 




Apparently, even in cases where the husband did work (and the wife 
distilled), he often did not contribute to the household, since the wife 
already had more than enough money of herself – he would spend his salary 
the way he wanted: “the husband‟s income was spent by himself on himself: 
clothes, dholukas, fun…”. The wife would usually not mind; if she had 
enough income from gin, she would prefer the husband out of the way, with 
his own salary or with some pocket money (from her).
578
  Some women 
probably had to give (part of) their income to the husband, though this was 
apparently not common – the Nubian gin producer could generally use her 
income as she saw fit.  
 
There was also an increasing number of female-headed households, now no 
longer the young widows whose old husband had died, but increasingly 
women abandoned (for longer periods or for good) by husbands that had 
more than one family – not necessarily married, but concubines or 
girlfriends outside Kibera.
579
 These women were usually not supported 
anymore and had no choice but to take care of the family. 
 
The women would now also make the household decisions, but for good 
form allow their husband to participate in making some decisions, and let 
them play their leading role in public – despite the increasing economic 
power of the women, the men, regardless of their own income, were still 
considered the head of the household. Few women would stand up against 
the husband, certainly in public. Sometimes they used manipulation, 
soothing the husband with presents, or they would simply not ask or tell 
him. Because they had money, women could also make their husbands act 
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on their behalf in the public domain, like going to the chief to get 




The women‟s power was not shown openly. In public, the 
man would be the boss; women would accept that, and not go 
against Nubi values; they would respect that tradition. But, 





Women that would go against these Nubi values and tradition would end up 
divorced, and lose the respect of the community. Social status demanded 
that women were married; even if their husbands were of little use around 
the house, most women preferred not to divorce, not even if the husband had 
effectively abandoned them. Most women did not need the men 
economically, but only for social status. Some women would even give the 
husband money so they could „provide‟ for the family, as was expected of 
them in traditional Nubi society. For a man it was easier to divorce, he could 
more easily marry another woman, but there was also an economic aspect: if 
his wife distilled gin and had money, he had an easy life. Therefore, even 
men would not push for divorce. As a result, (official) divorce was not very 
common.
582
 There were also a number of rich, powerful women that took 
their own decisions and ended up divorced, but,  
 
they did not mind: their husbands were largely irrelevant to 
them. They went into business, became rich, and kept their 
independence; men were scared of them. There was Mama 
Ajoba, a rich Nubi businesswoman (widowed and divorced) 
who, in the late 1940s, got her driver‟s licence and bought 
and drove her own car, the first woman in Nairobi; at a time 




Divorcees and widows were usually among the bigger producers; they 
needed the income, and there was no one to stop them from producing on a 
large scale. Divorced women usually went back to the father‟s compound, 
often staying there relatively independent and often involved in the Nubian 
gin production, it being the only way a (divorced) woman could earn a 
living. If her father did not agree with it, her mother would intervene and 
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solve the problem for her. Widows, especially those with grown-up 
children, would take over the late husband‟s compound, and were then fully 
in charge; in many cases these compounds became big gin producers.  
 
Married women were somewhat more restricted, but did not need the 
husband‟s express permission to make Nubian gin or hide pipas in his 
shamba. Most men drank, and expected their wives to make Nubian gin for 
them, like they also expected the wives to prepare dinner – it was up to them 
how. Even married women would usually do what they wanted, but provide 
their husbands with his daily gin to keep him happy. Of course, husbands 
could get difficult, and cause problems for the wives, forbidding them to 
make Nubian gin, but this was not common, unless they had sufficient 
income themselves and provided for the family, or were very religious. 
Many (unemployed) husbands were pampered: they received some pocket 
money, a new suit from time to time, and were left to spend the day as they 
liked. Since the husbands also benefited from their wives‟ income, it was 
unlikely that they would interfere with the business. Furthermore, for 
religious reasons, most men did not want to be seen to be involved with it 
(let alone take over from the wife); drinking Nubian gin may be a 
„tradition‟, but trading Nubian gin was not, that was a religious matter, 
forbidden by Islam. 
 
Throughout the 1930s to 1960s then, the Nubian Gin provided the Nubis 
with an income to maintain their “good life” in Kibera, without having to 
worry much about jobs or education. Within the same period, the Nubi 
woman had become the most powerful person in many Nubi households, 
earning most of the money, and deciding on how to spend it. This was quite 
a change from the docile and obedient womenfolk of only a few decades 
earlier, when they were powerless and completely secondary to men. The 
income from Nubian gin had given the women economic independence, and 
given them the opportunity to liberate themselves from male dominance, 
despite the fact that the men were still important in the public domain. The 
women had become the dominant economic force in Kibera, and with their 
money they could essentially do whatever they wanted. Most of what the 
Nubi women earned was spent: on food, clothes, on the good life in general; 
some of it was saved in a box under the kitchen floor for leaner times or to 
bribe a judge. Some was indeed invested: a few richer women bought land 
outside Kibera. Another very good opportunity presented itself to the Nubis 






The decline of the Nubian gin 
 
During the 1950s and certainly the 1960s, Kibera itself had started to change 
quite dramatically – transforming from a Nubi-dominated rural area into a 
more densely populated settlement with a Nubi minority. More and more 
„outsiders‟ moved to Kibera, finding accommodation in the rooms that were 
being constructed by (mainly) Kikuyus and Nubi women using their Nubian 
gin profits. Apart from initially stimulating the production of liquor –they 
turned out to be good customers as well– these „newcomers‟ to Kibera 
began to spoil the liquor business for the Nubis in a number of ways.  
 
So far the Nubi women had been the main producers around Nairobi (with 
the occasional Kikuyu shamba boy or concubine, or tenant, producing and 
selling gin in Kibera).
584
 From the late 1950s, with the increasing numbers 
of outsiders in Kibera
585
, an increasing number of distillers appeared on the 
scene, copying the Nubi distillation techniques and taking over part of the 
clientele and profits. Moreover, increasing quantities of home-made alcohol, 
now called chang’aa
586
, were being brought to Nairobi (and Kibera) from 
Dagoretti, Kariobangi and even Kisumu. Apparently even some Nubis 
started importing chang’aa from Kisumu, it was faster than waiting for a 




According to many informants, the new chang’aa producers used all sorts 
of chemicals to speed up (or even replace) the fermentation process, like 
industrial alcohol unfit for human consumption. They would prepare 
chang’aa in only one day, which would kill or blind their customers with 
the chemicals that were used. Some informants, children of Nubian gin 
distillers, remembered seeing their mothers also add something to the muna, 
a white bar, a bit like a bar of soap.
588
 Though only few (former) distillers 
admitted it, it is evident that in the early 1960s Nubi women also started 
using chemicals to speed up the fermentation process; probably they used 
„sal ammoniac
589
‟, which apparently is not as dangerous for human 
consumption as „jet fuel‟ (which came into use much later). They also 
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started using pineapple and bananas in the muna, or cinnamon and cloves 
during distillation, for a better flavour and smell of the gin; Angostura, 
added to the gin, came into fashion in the 1950s. Nevertheless, with the 
increased competition, income for the Nubis was decreasing.  
 
By the late 1960s, early 70s, it was becoming difficult to find a quiet and 
secret place for distillation, with so many new people (tenants) living 
around and looking on, curious what was going on there at night. The 
Nubis‟ first response had been to move the pipas back from the shamba and 
forest closer to the house; they were now hidden in the ground within the 
compound, next to the house, or even inside the house, in a special room. 
The number of pipas had to be severely reduced due to lack of space within 
the compound, and because of the long distance to a water source – many 
compounds were too far from the river to carry the large amounts of water 
needed for more than one pipa. Furthermore, in the compounds there was a 
higher risk for police raids compared to production in the shamba, so many 
men did not want distillation to take place within their compound. 
Moreover, the presence of tenants within the compounds reduced the 
possibility of secret distillation. Women stopped working in groups, now it 
was each woman individually in her own compound, with often only one 
pipa remaining; that is, if her husband or father did not completely forbid it.  
 
The alcohol business was also becoming more risky: after Independence, the 
police raids intensified and took place almost every other day. The amount 
of money spent on bribing police and judges was such, that it became 
almost unprofitable to continue the trade. Whilst in Uganda the distillation 
of alcohol was legalised after Independence (1963), in Kenya police 
repression continued – Kenya derived considerable and much-needed 
revenue from the legal alcohol industry and imported spirits, which was 
being undermined by the illegal business.
590
   
 
Production and profits shrank, though the financial loss was partly off-set by 
increasing the price of gin from 8 to 16 Ksh per bottle; this was possible 
because demand for gin remained high, and apparently there was a lot of 
money going around, partly due to a boom in world coffee prices.
591
 Many 
women started also producing more kangara, the traditional “fermented 
beer”. Kangara had already existed in the early days of Kibera, and had 
been earning Nubi women a modest income as well, especially during the 
weekends. It was easy to make and already in the 1930s it was possible to 
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get a licence to brew a certain amount for weddings and other social events 
(the occasion was then used to brew large quantities for sale as well). In the 
40s and 50s, there were a few open spaces in Kibera where people would 
come during the weekends to drink kangara, in a sort of legalised manner. 
However, the kangara business was never very popular with the Nubis: it 
gave little profit compared to Nubian gin, and attracted a “lower class of 
noisy drinkers”.
592
 As kangara could be kept only for 1-2 days, it could 
never compete with distilled liquor, which could be stored for long periods 
and transported easily. 
 
In the 1960s it had become easier to obtain a licence for brewing beer; in 
principle this was meant for customary purposes, but in practice this was 
understood to include also the sale of alcohol. The (unpopular) municipal 
beer halls were gradually closed, but at the same time this opened up 
economic opportunities for individuals. In the early 1970s the sale of 
traditional liquor was actively encouraged to increase revenue through 
licence fees.
593
  The first licensed kangara bar in Kibera, “Tazamo Lako”, a 
communal (Nubi women) bar, opened in the late 1960s. However, after a 
few years there were so many (licensed as well as illegal) bars in Kibera that 
also here the profits dwindled; “Tazamo Lako” later (early/mid 70s) 
collapsed due to embezzlement. 
 
Even though they were instrumental in ruining the Nubian gin business, the 
increasing number of outsiders in Kibera offered at the same time a 
reasonable economic alternative: the rental business. It was less time 
consuming and only required a one-time investment with, in theory, 
perpetual profit. Moreover, the rental business was not forbidden by Islam, 
the money earned with it was not „haraam‟, and that may have put some 
people‟s conscience to rest; they were more at ease with this type of income. 
The earnings were not the same as with the Nubian gin, but it helped the 
family to survive; in those days, with 15 rental rooms one had a very 
reasonable existence.
594
 At the same time, there was a lot of work in 
Nairobi, and the younger generation Nubis, with generally more education 
than their fathers, had more chances on the labour market; school leavers 
could choose between several jobs. Some of these new „income earners‟ 
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made their mother stop distilling gin, now that they did not need „that kind 
of money‟ anymore.
595
 Nubi women started looking for work in town as 
well, in hair and beauty salons, or as receptionist.  
 
A number of other factors played a role in the decline of Nubian gin 
production. There was increased competition from other kinds of beverages 
and drugs: from 1947 Africans were allowed to drink bottled beer
596
 and 
soon the first Tuskers and Pale Ales were available in Kibera at “Dafala‟s 
bar”, one of the first places in Nairobi to sell it. The African (and Nubi) elite 
would now drink Lager, which was associated with „progress and 
development‟, and no longer Nubian gin (or other traditional liquors and 
brews).
597
 This did not mean that bottled beer took the place of traditional 
brews: it was too expensive for the common man, and traditional alcohol 
continued to dominate the local market. In 1955 a new “Intoxicating Liquor 
Act” was passed; racial drinking restrictions were lifted and spirits were no 
longer forbidden for Africans, increasing the competition from other 
liquors.
598
 Also miraa (khat), already available in Kibera since the 1920s, 
bhang and other „modern‟ drugs, won in popularity.  
 
In 1979 President Moi suddenly announced publicly that he was opposed to 
this business, and „called for a ban on informal production and sale of beer 
and distilled alcohol‟. One Nubi woman mentioned hearing him on the radio 
and deciding then and there to stop producing gin, worried about the rumour 




Religion was another contributing factor: in the 1970s the Nubis became 
more religious, possibly influenced by higher levels of education and 
literacy (and the availability of translations of the Koran), and as a reaction 
to the influx of the mainly Christian outsiders into Kibera. Many Nubis had 
not been really comfortable with the haraam money they were making; their 
conscience could now be put to rest with the start of the rental rooms, this 
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Moreover, with the increasing number of bars in Kibera in the 1970s and the 
growing numbers of young people drinking alcohol, intoxication and 
alcoholism became serious problems. Nubi women and young people were 
openly drunk; adultery and infidelity increased. It seemed to some that the 
Nubi community was on the verge of collapse
601
 – another reason for 
increased importance of religion?  
 
All these factors contributed to the decline of Nubian gin – more and more 
Nubi women stopped distillation. This process started slowly in the 1960s, 
but increased significantly in the late 1970s. In the 1990s there was still a 
small, and continuously decreasing, number of Nubi women distilling small 
quantities of liquor, but the „good old days‟ of the Nubian gin were over. 
However, many Nubi women managed to construct a number of rental 




Nubian gin today  
 
The chang’aa business, still illegal in Kenya, remains an important source 
of income for quite a number of women in Kibera, though not for the Nubis 
– the days of their ethnic economic niche have long gone. Nowadays the 
„newcomers‟ are in that line of business, often the poorest women, and of all 
ethnic groups. Chang’aa is sold mainly by the glass, from home (usually 
just one room), which in day time serves as bar, and at night as bedroom. 
However, prices and income are low, and much of the profit goes to the 
policemen that know the offenders and visit almost every day for their 
“commission”; some women said there are days they even make a loss. 
There is also a risk for the drinkers: they can get arrested or be forced to pay 
a bribe, and with all the chemicals being used in the production of chang’aa, 
their lives are in danger as well. In 2000, more than 140 people were killed 
in one incident in Nairobi, and this kind of incidents is a regularly recurring 
news item. Of course, in these cases one can hardly speak of chang’aa as a 
distillate; rather it is simply a concoction of chemicals sold as distilled 
alcohol. 
 
Though some chang’aa is still being produced in Kibera, most of the liquor 
sold there is „imported‟ from Mathare slums. Transporting chang’aa from 
Mathare to Kibera is also risky: the traffic police know who is involved in 
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this business, and they take their „commission‟, searching the mini-buses 
leaving Mathare.   
 
Over the years, men have taken over the manufacturing of alcohol from 
women in Mathare, causing impoverishment of the women who had 
previously made a good living with the alcohol.
602
 The Nubi women of 
Kibera never suffered the same fate; their men never took over their alcohol 
business, and the Nubi women switched in time to the rental business. That 
option is no longer open to „newcomers‟, there is hardly space left for 
construction in Kibera (and Mathare); they have to make do with selling 
cheap chang’aa. 
 
Only a few Nubi women, probably less than five, continue distilling Nubian 
gin in Kibera, according to the old recipe, but on a very limited scale, 10-15 
litres per week, and sometimes only on “special order”. Business is not bad, 
but with a small regular clientele, and high secrecy because of the police. 
Nubian gin is much more expensive than the chang’aa that is being sold all 
over the place at 10 Ksh per glass
603
, but apparently there are people in 
Kibera that can afford, and are willing to spend, 100 Ksh
604
 for a glass of 
decent, old-fashioned Nubian gin. 
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“No Raila, no peace!” 
 
„Big man‟ politics and the impact of the 2007 post-election 
violence on Kibera 
 
 
When on 30 December 2007 the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki of the 
Party of National Unity (PNU) was suddenly declared the winner of the 
presidential elections – turning his main opponent Raila Odinga of the 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), into the loser – violence erupted in 
many parts of Kenya. Previous elections in the 1990s had seen similar 
“ethnic clashes”, but this time it was at an unprecedented scale and intensity, 
creating the worst crisis since Independence. 
 
The initial demonstrations rapidly turned into revenge killings, targeting 
ethnic groups linked to the “other political camp”, and resulting in what 
could be labelled “ethnic cleansing”
605
: Kikuyu were chased from Kalenjin-
dominated Rift Valley and areas (including slums) dominated by Luo and 
Luhya; Luos, Kalenjins and others were attacked in Nakuru and Naivasha, 
and evicted from Kikuyu-dominated areas like Kawangware and Dagoretti. 
Violence continued until a power sharing agreement was signed on 28 
February 2008, after more than one month of negotiations led by former UN 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The two months of violence caused over 
1100 deaths and up to 350,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), while 




Kibera was one of the places in Kenya most affected by the violence. Here, 
violence started immediately after Kibaki was announced the winner: most 
Kikuyu were chased away, shops and houses looted, property destroyed and 
burnt, people killed, women raped, and for several weeks angry crowds 
engaged the Police in running battles, leaving scores of protestors and 
innocent bystanders dead.  
                                                          
605
 Ethnic cleansing can be defined as: various policies or practices, often including the use 
of force and intimidation, aimed at the displacement of an ethnic group (or groups) from a 
particular area in order to create an ethnically "pure" territory.  
606
 Human Rights Watch, „Ballots to bullets. Organised political violence and Kenya‟s 
crisis of governance‟ (HRW report, 03/08), International Crisis Group, „Kenya in Crisis‟, 
Africa report N
o
 137, 21/02/08. See the so-called „Waki Report‟ (2007). Judge Waki 
headed the „Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence‟. Report from internet < 




This chapter is about the role of „ethnic politics‟ in Kibera (and Kenya). It 
describes what happened in Kibera during the 2007 post-election violence 
and previous violent episodes, before exploring the possible underlying 
causes for the violence in Kibera and interpreting this more broadly against 
the background of Kenyan and Kiberian history and politics, where some of 
the root causes of this conflict lie. It shows that ethnicity, far from 
disappearing after Independence, has become important as a mechanism for 
mobilisation in national politics: political leaders resort to the deliberate use 
and manipulation of ethnic identity in political competition with other 
groups, to secure political power and, often as well, their own wealth. It 
demonstrates how, partly as a result of this, the situation in Kibera has 
changed in the last two decades, and how insignificant the Nubis have 
become within the context of Kibera, after a decades-long struggle to keep 
control over their land. As a small community they have no political 
leverage, and without this political (ethnic) support the Nubis have lost their 
supremacy in Kibera. The Luos, who do have this leverage, use it to their 
advantage, and have taken over as the main powerbrokers in Kibera; the role 
(and dilemmas) of one of the „big men‟ of Kenya politics, the Luo leader 
Raila Odinga, will be looked at more closely in relation to this growing 
dominance of the Luos in Kibera. Significantly though, the Nubis (as 
landlords) have not been a specific target during the violence, in order to get 
them out of Kibera (unlike the Kikuyus); rather, it seems they are respected 
as people with certain rights and claims on the land. This fits obviously very 
well in the way the Nubis see it themselves, but the current situation has 
also made it very clear to them that they are no longer the „masters of 
Kibera‟, but merely „one of the masters‟, in their own small part of Kibera. 
 
 
Post-election violence in Kibera 
 
Chapter 2, „From shamba to slum‟, has shown how Kibera became, in a 
short time, a congested slum area with possibly around 250,000 inhabitants. 
Most of these people are tenants; they are of all ethnic groups, including 
people from outside Kenya. Internal mobility is quite low, and finding a 
room is not always easy. People often live in “compounds”, a number of 
blocks of rooms together (not necessarily all belonging to the same person), 
with its own gate (or gates), that can be locked at night. Compounds usually 
have a mix of tenants from different ethnic groups; landlords prefer this mix 
of people to having only or many people of one community, to avoid them 
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ganging up against him or her. The landlord may live with his tenants in the 
same compound. 
 
Kibera‟s villages, with their own characteristics in terms of dominating 
ethnic group and relative wealth, and because of their different locations 
relative to the main road, experienced different levels of violence and chaos 
during the post-election violence; some villages were seriously affected, 
others hardly at all. 
 
Kibera is Kenya in microcosm: as it is home to members of all Kenyan 
(African) ethnic groups, the relationships between the ethnic groups at 
national level are reflected here as well. Though people from the same 
ethnic group tend to live close together, they are also mixed with other 
ethnic groups, and there is a certain amount of (urban) intermarriage. The 
mistrust between the ethnic groups at the national level is also visible in 
Kibera – politics plays a role in this: politics in Kenya is to a large extent 
about competition between ethnic groups, and Kibera is an important 
„battleground‟: Raila Odinga, the Luo leader of ODM, has his support base 
here. He has been the area MP (Lang‟ata constituency) since 1992, when the 
first multi-party elections were held since 1966.
607
 Before these elections, he 
allegedly made many Luos move to or register in Kibera, so they could vote 
him into Parliament
608
, a strategy also used by a previous (Kikuyu) MP, 
Wmangi Maathai, in the 1970s. After Raila was elected, Luos continued 
moving into Kibera, probably as part of Raila‟s plan to remain the Lang‟ata 
MP. Currently, the Luo probably form the largest ethnic group in Kibera, 
followed by the Luhya (reliable statistics are not available).  
 
Kibera has experienced serious conflict in the past – usually about the rent 
levels, and usually between the Luo and Nubi communities. After living 
through several of these clashes, many Kikuyus sold their houses in Kibera, 
and more people of other ethnic groups had the chance to become (often 
small, resident) landlords, including many Kisii, Luhya and some Luo. 
 
 
The 2007 elections  
 
The main contenders in the 2007 presidential elections were the incumbent 
president Kibaki (PNU) and his former ally Raila Odinga (ODM). In the run 
up towards the elections, Raila had taken a big lead on Kibaki, though 
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towards Election Day (27 December) this lead had dwindled to almost 




In Kibera there was no doubt who would be the next Lang‟ata MP; Raila 
Odinga would certainly retain it. He has a large Luo following in Kibera, 
which is only a small part of Lang‟ata Constituency (probably less than 2% 
of the area), but with more than 60% of its population. There were only few 
other contestants; the main one Stanley Livondo of PNU, but he posed no 
serious threat to Raila. The general feeling was however, that PNU would 
try to rig the elections in Kibera to keep Raila out of Parliament, and thus 
automatically disqualify him for the presidency: the president has to be an 
elected MP. One Luo youth explained, “Everybody was expecting the 
elections to be rigged, for many months, and everyone had been telling 
themselves „we will not accept it‟; they were all hyped up.”
610
 In the months 
before the elections, there had therefore been tension in Kibera, but no 
serious problems. The Kibera population, being pre-dominantly Luo and 
Luhya, was mainly in support of ODM. Kikuyus were mainly PNU (though 
apparently many young Kikuyus voted for Raila), but they are a minority in 
Kibera, like the Nubis, who in this case were divided between ODM and 
PNU. 
 
In general there had been no problem between the different ethnic groups 
(within Kibera), except that many Kikuyu, especially in the Luo-dominated 
areas, reported to have been told by their (Luo) neighbours or customers, 
that “after the elections, no matter the result, this house / your shop will be 
mine”, or “once Raila is president, you Kikuyus will have to go”, and 
similar things. They took it as a (bad) joke.
611
  Closer to Election Day, the 
situation became more volatile; people wearing PNU shirts were attacked in 
areas like Laini Saba, and their shirts taken away. In Luo-dominated areas 
like Gatwikira, PNU supporters usually kept a low profile. 
 
On polling day there were some irregularities in Kibera: some voters‟ lists 
did not contain any name starting with R or O (most Luo names start with 
“O”). The problem was quickly solved, so voting could continue. On that 
same day, Luo youths
612
 occupied and controlled all polling stations in 
Kibera to ensure that “no irregularities would take place”, and to prevent the 
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expected rigging by the government; people and cars were checked, even 
Police cars, to prevent stuffed ballot boxes being brought in.
613
 Unknown 
people from outside Kibera, who just came to vote, were given a hard time, 
unless they voted for Raila. Some Raila supporters had come from as far as 
Mombasa to vote in Kibera.
614
 There were allegations about other 
irregularities: Kikuyus were not allowed to enter the polling stations to vote, 
or forced to vote ODM, PNU agents were not allowed to supervise what 
was happening in the polling stations, etcetera, though these allegations 
have been disputed by others. Despite these irregularities, the voting itself 
went on generally peacefully.  
 
The incoming election results were shown live on TV, updating the public 
of each constituency that had counted its votes. It was clear that PNU was 
losing: a large number of ministers and political veterans, allies of Kibaki, 
lost their parliamentary seat. The party got only 43 seats out of 210, though 
including Kibaki‟s allies‟ seats, PNU had only slightly below ODM‟s total 
of 99 seats. Raila retained his Lang‟ata seat without much problem; he got 
70% of the vote: close to 60,000 votes, but his nearest rival Stanley Livondo 
(PNU) got almost 24,000 votes (28%), still a substantial number and much 
more than expected. Voter turnout in Lang‟ata was low
615
, apparently only 
around 54% – this is remarkable considering the importance of these 
elections. Were voters scared of possible violence, did registered voters 
from outside Kibera stay away? In fact, though the total nation-wide voter 
turnout was slightly above 69%, there were many constituencies with a low 




When Raila was leading in the presidential elections with more than one 
million votes, ODM supporters started celebrating, sure of their victory. 
However, Raila was leading because the first election results had come 
mainly from ODM areas; results from Central Province, Kibaki‟s 
stronghold, came in later. But as some opinion polls had led people to 
believe that Raila would certainly win, they saw his initial lead as a 
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 With results from Central Province coming in, Raila‟s lead 
on Kibaki dwindled.  
 
Suddenly, results from Central Province stopped coming in, and the first 
suspicions of rigging started. It then seemed clear that the tallying and 
compiling of the results was being rigged at Nairobi level – ODM noted that 
there were big discrepancies between the results announced at constituency 
level and the results shown live on TV. Moreover, there was a discrepancy 
of more than 325,000 between votes cast in the parliamentary elections and 
votes cast in the presidential elections, which was considered very 
suspicious indeed – which voter would come to the polling station to vote 
only for the presidential elections, and not at the same time vote for the 
parliamentary elections? Nevertheless, David Throup has doubts about these 
allegations, and plausible explanations: according to him it is clear that both 
sides rigged, but it remains unclear how this would have affected the final 




Despite the fact that there were serious doubts about the results and protests 
from ODM side, Kibaki was suddenly, on 30 December at around 5:30 pm, 
declared the winner of the presidential elections, and quickly sworn in at 
State House less than an hour later, without playing the national anthem and 
in the absence of the diplomatic corps. The Kenyan Constitution states that 
all parliamentary and presidential candidates have 24 hours to lodge 
complaints, with the next 48 hours to be used to solve any disputes; only 
then can the winners be announced.
619
 According to Human Rights Watch: 
  
The entire process quickly fell apart in confusion. In the face 
of public outrage and mounting pressure to reverse the move, 
five electoral commissioners publicly denounced the 
apparent fraud. Even the head of the ECK later said that he 
could not determine who actually won the vote. Nonetheless, 
Mr. Kibaki tried to pre-empt any challenge by having himself 
hurriedly sworn in to a second term in office before Kenyans 
even had time to register their anger and concern. All 
domestic and international observer missions swiftly issued 
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statements condemning the tallying process and casting 




Immediately after Kibaki was announced the winner, people in Kibera (and 
in many parts of Kenya) took to the street.  
 
 
The violence in Kibera 
 
People in Kibera had been keenly watching the live broadcast of the election 
results. On the 29 December, people were getting anxious and suspicious 
when the results from Central Province stopped coming in. Some shops 
were looted; tension was high. On 30 December, immediately after the 





Immediately we saw on TV that Kibaki had won the 
elections, people went on a rampage, destroying things. 
Kikuyu started moving out immediately. People took to the 
streets, shouting “Kikuyu have to go”, everyone went to 
Kibera Drive [the main road through Kibera], shouting. 
People also started breaking into houses, looting, especially 
Kikuyu houses and Kikuyu businesses along the main road. 
 
Shops and houses were looted (and sometimes demolished) all over Kibera, 
mainly those belonging to Kikuyus and known PNU supporters. Kikuyus 
were seen as “the same thing as PNU”; it was therefore justified to attack 
“everything Kikuyu”, as well as everything and everyone linked to PNU, 
irrespective of their ethnic origin. Kikuyus were also told to leave 
immediately, and “go to Othaya
622
”. Toi Market, an informal market in 
Makina, mainly controlled by Kikuyu traders, went up in flames; also the 
shopping centre in Olympic (an upgraded residential area, situated almost 
within the slum area) was looted and burnt, as well as many of the churches 
along Kibera Drive. During the violence, people were beaten up, robbed, 
some killed, women and girls raped. 
 
Much of the violence became simply looting: the rigging of the elections 
was used as an excuse for people to loot shops and houses. People in Kibera 
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are generally poor, and an opportunity to get something for free cannot be 
ignored, certainly by unemployed, frustrated young men. However, not only 
young men were involved in the looting: also adults, women, girls and 
children – they were called „siafu‟ (safari ants), carrying everything away in 
long columns. Looting groups were (to some extent) randomly formed; 
youths from all parts of Kibera took part, and even from outside Kibera, of 
all ethnic groups mixed in different groups, including even Kikuyu youths 
in some areas. Some groups were organised by local (youth) leaders, often 
linked to a political party or candidate. According to most informants, the 
violence was mainly instigated by youths from Gatwikira:  
 
Groups of youths came looking for Kikuyus, especially 
youths from Gatwikira: in that area many Kikuyus were 
chased some years ago. Many people followed those groups, 





They went all over Kibera, looking for shops and houses to loot: “tufanye 
shopping!”.
624
 After the initial “shopping spree” at Kikuyu shops and 
houses, they turned to shops of people of other ethnic groups as well, and 
even houses (of the well-to-do) were not spared. Sometimes shops and 
houses were also demolished: doors, windows and roofs were removed. The 
main affected areas were Kianda and Olympic, basically the richer areas of 
Kibera. In some areas looting was limited: in Lindi for example, only few 
shops were looted, the majority (including Kikuyu-owned shops) were 
protected by the Nubis and tenants. In other areas looting was limited 
because most shops were owned by non-Kikuyus. The upper side of Laini 
Saba, with many Kikuyu shops, was guarded by Kikuyu vigilante groups 
and also escaped most of the looting. Police did not do much to stop the 
looting, often just standing by and watching, but sometimes actively 




Burning of property was not widespread: the risk of burning down hundreds 
of houses, including the perpetrators‟ own houses, is high in a place like 
Kibera, and fire was therefore avoided. It was mainly the shops along 
Kibera Drive that were burnt down, and some houses behind them. There 
was not much killing either, the aim being to chase away the Kikuyus; they 
usually lost all their belonging, but many were actually escorted out of 
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Kibera to safety by their Luo neighbours. In some cases, if they were lucky, 
they could come back later with a (paid) Police escort, to collect their 
belongings, that had been kept by their neighbours or landlord.  
 
In Kikuyu-dominated Laini Saba, in revenge, the same thing happened to 
the Luos living there: they were told to leave the area, and in some cases 
beaten; their homes were looted and mostly occupied by Kikuyus fleeing 
other parts of Kibera, mainly Shilanga. The Luos fleeing Laini Saba often 
found refuge in other parts of Kibera, in rooms deserted by Kikuyus. 
 
Kibera was rife with rumour during this violent period: about a plot to 
assassinate Raila, that the army would take power, and many more. These 
rumours spread fast and wide, using modern technology like text/SMS 
messaging, while local radio stations broadcasting in vernacular (mainly 
Kalenjin and Kikuyu, but also Luo) also played a role in further inciting the 
people, fuelling fear and panic, and exacerbating violence, displacement, 
and the destruction of property. Rumour plays an important role in Kenyan 
politics; politicians may start rumours themselves, exploiting it to their own 
benefit. In this case, Michelle Osborn shows how the rumour on Raila‟s 
arrest brought many ODM supporters onto the streets to vent their 
frustration. The ODM leadership did nothing to quash that baseless rumour, 
instead using misinformation in an obvious attempt to keep their supporters 
on the streets, thus directly contributing to the violence. Text messaging 





After the announcement that Kibaki had won, violence had also erupted in 
other parts of Kenya, mainly Rift Valley where the Kalenjin community 
were destroying Kikuyu property, killing people and chasing away Kikuyus 
from villages where they had lived for several generations. Kikuyus took 
revenge and chased away Luos and Luhyas from Kikuyu-dominated areas 
like Limuru, Dagoretti and Kawangware. PNU and ODM started 
negotiations to stop the violence, but PNU hardliners seemed to block any 
agreement that risked invalidating Kibaki‟s election.
627
 ODM called several 
times for nationwide demonstrations to put pressure on Kibaki; one of the 
popular slogans during mass action was “No Raila, no peace!”, a slogan that 
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resonated particularly strongly in Kibera. Demonstrations were invariably 
stopped by security forces using water cannon and teargas, resulting in more 
clashes all over the country.  
 
In Nairobi, the security forces tried to keep people inside Kibera, to stop 
them from participating in the rallies and demonstrations. They succeeded in 
this: people from Kibera trying to march towards Uhuru Park were stopped 
and had to turn back into Kibera, where they went on a rampage, looting and 
fighting the Police in serious clashes, and causing loss of property and lives 
within the slums. The main road, Kibera Drive, was then barricaded by 
youths to prevent the Police from entering Kibera. 
 
Meanwhile a rumour had started that the Mungiki, a violent, semi-religious, 
pre-dominantly Kikuyu sect
628
, was coming to Kibera, to take revenge for 
what was done to the Kikuyus in Kibera. In many parts of Kibera vigilante 
groups were organised, from the first days of January: most men would stay 
at night in the streets to be ready for defence against Mungiki. Since Police 
had no access to many parts of Kibera, or at least, were not around to protect 
them, people had to provide security themselves: against Mungiki, but also 
to prevent more chaos, more looting from taking place, or burning of the 
houses. Despite all the rumours, there is little evidence that the Mungiki 
were actually there – most people appear to have only heard from others, 
and the ones that claim they saw Mungiki, saw only „dark shapes at night‟. 
It is possible that Mungiki were in Laini Saba, assisting the Kikuyus there 
with their defence against marauding Luos from Gatwikira, but it seems 
unlikely that they actually tried to attack or burn down Kibera.  
 
The vigilantes continued their nightly vigils for a few weeks, until calm had 
returned. In some hard-core areas like Laini Saba and Gatwikira these 
groups of youths also checked people during the day, asking for the ID: if 
you were of the wrong ethnic group, you could be in serious trouble. There 
were also some clashes between different groups, notably the groups from 
Gatwikira (Luo) and the “defence force” of Laini Saba (Kikuyu), in which 
quite a number of people appear to have been killed.  
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As the violence continued, life in Kibera became more difficult: in most 
areas the shops had were either empty after looting, or had closed as a 
security measure. Fresh food, if available, was very expensive. The 
supermarkets around Kibera could not always be reached, and even if most 
of the loot was for sale in the streets of Gatwikira, it was at highly inflated 
prices that few could afford. Some food aid was given by some churches 
(food vouchers for Nakumatt or Uchumi) and the Red Cross, but this was 
insufficient to cover the needs of the population. 
 
Youths that initially had made money from looting, now started levying 
taxes on the inhabitants, for “protection”, for being out in the streets at night 
as “vigilantes”. Some put up roadblocks on Kibera Drive to collect money 
from passing traffic. Others offered their services for transporting furniture 
of Kikuyus out of Kibera, or for finding homes for „newcomers‟: many of 
the Luos and Luhyas chased away from Kikuyu-dominated areas around 
Nairobi, like Kawangware and Dagoretti, came to Kibera, looking for 
accommodation. For 1000 Kenyan Shillings they would find you an empty 
house, and with some luck the house would not even have a landlord. Most 
of the houses that were vacated by the Kikuyus (tenants and/or landlords) 





The first wave of violence lasted for about a week; after that Kibera calmed 
down, and shops opened again here and there. The situation remained very 
tense, though, pending negotiations between the political parties, with 
mediators like Desmond Tutu, John Kufuor (President of Ghana and 
Chairman of the African Union) and Jendayi Fraser (US Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs). The calm was now and again interrupted by 
new clashes. When on 8 January Kalonzo Musyoka, the Kamba ODM-
Kenya leader who had also run for president, was announced to be the new 
Vice President in Kibaki‟s cabinet, the Kambas also became a target in 
some parts of Kibera. Another round of riots occurred mid-January when 
ODM called for three days of mass action to put again pressure on Kibaki; 
in Kibera the railway line to Kisumu / Uganda was uprooted over a stretch 
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 This was to punish Museveni for supporting Kibaki; the destruction of the railway line 
would prevent supplies being transported from Mombasa to Kampala.  
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After Kofi Annan arrived in Kenya on 22 January to mediate between 
Kibaki and Raila, the situation in Kibera calmed down significantly, and 
most vigilante groups stopped their nightly vigils. However, violence in the 
Rift Valley continued, and even exploded again when on 24 January 
Kikuyus and Kalenjins started fighting in Nakuru, and then Naivasha. These 
events did not have a huge impact on Kibera, though there was increased 
tension and some revenge when a Luo traveller was taken from a bus in 
Naivasha and killed.  
 
 





The relative calm in Kibera was however disrupted by the assassination of 
the Embakasi MP Mugabe Were on 29 January. Mugabe Were of ODM was 
the unexpected winner in the Embakasi constituency, a Kikuyu stronghold; 
he won the seat because the Kikuyu vote was split between three Kikuyu 
candidates. His murder was seen as clearly politically motivated – this was a 
seat that PNU could win back easily, which was important in the attempt to 
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get a parliamentary majority.
630
 The killing of Were triggered renewed 
attacks on Kikuyus in most parts of Kibera, with groups of youths now 
going from door to door to flush out all remaining Kikuyus, in some areas 
destroying rooms and shops belonging to Kikuyus. This time more people 
were killed, resulting in revenge killings of Luos and Luhyas in Laini Saba, 
the only Kikuyu stronghold in Kibera. In total between 50 and 60 people 





The Kikuyus after the first wave of violence 
 
Being the main target of the anger and violence, many Kikuyus had left their 
homes in Kibera almost immediately the violence started. This was certainly 
necessary in areas with a high Luo or Luhya population: Gatwikira and 
Kisumu Ndogo, Kianda (where groups from Gatwikira came to loot and 
“assist” the local Luos to remove the Kikuyus), Shilanga and Mashimoni. 
Also in other areas most Kikuyu left, sometimes only for a short while. 
Laini Saba was probably the only area where Kikuyu did not leave, and 
even received fleeing Kikuyus from other parts of Kibera, mainly Shilanga.  
 
Many Kikuyus had gone to the nearby Agricultural Showground in Jamhuri 
Park, or further away from Kibera, to relatives or friends. A few thousand 
people ended up in the makeshift camp at the Showground; not only 
Kikuyus, but also people from other ethnic groups (including Luo), sending 
their wives and children to safety from the chaos in Kibera, and to a place 
where food (aid) was available. For non-Kikuyus this was usually 
temporarily, for one or two weeks, until calm had returned to Kibera.  
 
In many cases, the fleeing Kikuyus were protected by their (Luo) 
neighbours, or could store their belongings in friends and neighbours‟ 
houses, certainly if they had lived together for a long time; some asked Luo 
friends to stay in their rooms to prevent looting. Quite a number of Kikuyus 
stayed on for a few days, but as the chaos continued, most of them left, 
sometimes under pressure of their neighbours, increasingly worried about 
their own safety with a Kikuyu „hiding‟ in the compound. Only a few 
Kikuyus stayed on throughout the chaos; these were mainly young men that 
were born in Kibera. As one of them (from Gatwikira) explained: “I had no 
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 In the elections ODM had become the biggest party in Parliament, while PNU and 
affiliated parties together had just a few seats less than ODM – any extra seat would count. 
See also Cheeseman: 178-9. 
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 Luo Youth in Gatwikira involved in data collection for NGO; see Waki Report p307. 
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problem, the guys that came to the house, I knew all of them, they are my 
friends, we grew up together.”
632
 Most Kikuyus however lost all their 
belongings, leaving everything behind when fleeing. Their shops and rooms 
were looted as soon as they had gone, sometimes even by their direct 
neighbours. Their rooms were occupied by others: local youths, or 
newcomers chased from Kikuyu-dominated areas. At the end of January, 
there was hardly anything left in Kibera that could remind the random 
visitor of a previous Kikuyu presence. 
 
 
A government of national unity 
 
Throughout February, sporadic fighting and ethnic violence continued in 
Rift Valley and Western Kenya. Travelling remained risky, and thousands 
of (mainly Kikuyu) displaced people (IDPs) were transported by the 
government from makeshift IDP camps back to their rural homes of origin, 
in essence aiding the ethnic cleansing taking place. In Kibera the situation 
remained relatively calm, though tense, as people were watching how their 
political leaders negotiated with ups and downs; for many people the 
announcement of an agreement would be the sign that everything would be 
okay. The IDP camp at the Showground next to Kibera was closed on 19 
February and the remaining people, mostly Kikuyu, were forced to find 
another place to stay. Some went to friends or relatives, up-country, a few 
went back to Kibera, but many others ended up at other camps, at the DO‟s 
office in Kibera, or places like Waithaka (10 kilometres from Nairobi), 
where a new IDP camp was established in the chief‟s camp – most IDPs 
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 Young Kikuyu man, Gatwikira, April 2008. 
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 They were mainly small, resident landlords; one (female) had more than 200 rooms in 
Kibera, an exceptionally high number for a resident landlord. 
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As towards the end of February the negotiations seemed to have ended in 
failure, Kofi Annan was preparing to leave Kenya; tension rose all over the 
country, and it looked like a new wave of violence would follow as political 
leaders appeared unable to control their supporters anymore. Suddenly, on 
28 February a peace and power sharing agreement was signed, surprising 
everyone – Kibaki remained president, Raila became prime minister. 
Demonstrations planned for that day were called off, and calm was restored 
instantly almost everywhere. The peace agreement was the sign many 
people had been waiting for: expectations were that now everything would 
go back to normal, and displaced people would return back home. This is 
not what happened, though: most IDPs in displaced camps around Kenya 
(mainly in Rift Valley) remained in their camps, and only few Kikuyus 
returned to Kibera.  
 
In a relatively quiet area like Nubi-controlled Makina most Kikuyus came 
back home. In Kianda, where Kikuyus and Luo had for many years lived 
together peacefully, a good number of Kikuyus came back, but not to live 
there: most of their rooms were still occupied, and they did not feel safe. In 
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some cases people managed to get their rooms back after talking to the 
people occupying their house, or with the Chief as intermediary, but it was 
always through negotiation, not eviction. Most landlords decided to let 
things cool down further before talking to the new occupants to come to 
some agreement about them leaving, or taking action to evict people. The 
Kikuyu businessmen came back mainly for the reconstruction of their shops, 
or for renting a new shop, along Kibera Drive – due to the high population 
density, Kibera is a very good place for business, and staying away might 
invite others to take your plot. Along Kibera Drive most shops had been 
rebuilt, and many re-opened. But, as one of the shopkeepers said: “Even if 
we do business here, we do it in fear”. Ironically, it was mainly Luo youths 
from Gatwikira that were employed for the reconstruction of the shops, 
possibly the same ones that destroyed them. Also in Shilanga a number of 
Kikuyus came back, rebuilding their shops, but not always sure about 
actually opening or waiting for things to cool down. In those relatively safe 
areas, like Kianda and Lindi (areas not dominated by hard-core Luos), most 
Kikuyu business people would come in the morning to open their shop, and 
then leave again in the afternoon. They were still too scared to come back to 
live in Kibera, and mostly commuted from (for Kikuyus) safer areas like 
Dagoretti or Racecourse where they rented accommodation. Even if they 
would want to come back to stay, like some did, they would not be able to 
move back to their own house or old room, or even find a new place to live, 
since all rooms were occupied, often by people from outside Kibera. 
Sometimes these new people would be willing to leave, but had the same 
problem: where would they go to? 
 
In most other parts of Kibera, no or very few Kikuyus came back. The few 
that did come back continued to experience aggression and threats; even 
Kikuyus that came back during the day for a quick visit to assess the 
situation were harassed:  
 
I went back with the District Commissioner (DC) and some 
other people; the DC (a Kisii) is new and wanted to see the 
situation for himself – he organised the trip. On the road I 
met some friends that told me, „it‟s not a good time to come 
back‟. We proceeded to Gatwikira, and at the Kamukunji 
ground [open space for meetings], when people saw us, they 
became rowdy, and we all had to run back… So, now it‟s 
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clear that we will have to wait a bit longer… even the Police 




The problem was that their rooms were still occupied by other people, who 
were often even using the Kikuyus‟ furniture and everything else they had 
left behind. In a number of places (Shilanga and Mashimoni for example) 
some Kikuyu rooms were completely destroyed and the plots grabbed by 
Luos, building houses for themselves or for renting out. In most parts of 
Kibera (even in „safe areas‟ like Kianda), with the Kikuyu landlords absent, 
no rent was being paid since January 2008 (sometimes also other landlords 
suffered the same fate, not only Kikuyus), though in some cases it was 
collected by the Luo youths that had chased away the owners (unless they 
were occupying the rooms themselves). Any returning Kikuyu was therefore 
perceived as a threat – he would surely try to get his house and rooms back 
and collect rent. Whereas in the safer areas (not Luo-dominated) some 
Kikuyu landlords managed to get (some of) their rooms back, in the Luo-
dominated areas this appeared impossible; any returning Kikuyu would be 
met with aggression. The only Kikuyus that returned here were a few of the 
young men that were born there, not considered an “enemy”. Assistance 
from the local authorities (District Officer, Chiefs) to recover rooms was not 
forthcoming, certainly not in Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo, as they too 
were scared of going into those areas. Moreover, they were not able (or 
willing) to enforce rent payment, because of Raila‟s connection here – with 
Raila the prime minster, the Luos were now basically „in power‟ in Kibera. 
It would be difficult and pointless to go against the people of the prime 
minister, and they (DO, chiefs) might even have been worried about losing 
their jobs. Besides, it was risky for the landlords as well – they realised that 
“the police is not going to guard me day and night; the Luos will just kill 
me.”
635
 Therefore, most Kikuyus preferred to stay in IDP camps or 
elsewhere, “waiting for things to cool down”. 
 
However, the problems between PNU and ODM continued – the delay in 
agreeing on a new cabinet (numbers of ministries, who would be 
minister…) resulted in increased tension again. When in early April the 
negotiations collapsed, Kibera became, on 8 and 9 April, again the scene of 
burning tires and clashes with the Police; the railway was uprooted again in 
Gatwikira. Nevertheless, in the end those problems were sorted out and on 
13 April a new cabinet was at last announced, with Raila as prime minister. 
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 Young Kikuyu man, small landlord from Gatwikira, staying at Waithaka IDP camp, 
March 2008. 
635
 Kikuyu man from Gatwikira, in IDP camp, April 08.  
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However, this did not change the situation in Kibera, or in other parts of 
Kenya: Kikuyus remained unwelcome. In Rift Valley, where leaflets 
appeared threatening displaced people (mainly Kikuyu) not to come back, 
the underlying cause for the resentment against „outsiders‟ seems to be the 
„land issue‟, which essentially has remained unresolved since Independence. 
Likewise, in Kibera, there are underlying causes for the continued tension 
and aggression against Kikuyus: to understand the issues, a brief review of 
the historical context of Kikuyu and Luo presence in Kibera is useful. 
Kibera‟s demography is more complex than can be captured here; for the 
purpose of this chapter, the focus is on the Kikuyus and Luos, the main 
„actors‟ in the post-election violence. 
 
 
The Kikuyus and Luos in Kibera 
 
The first Kikuyus came to Kibera in the 1920s, and their numbers increased 
during the next decades; having lost most of their land to the white settlers, 
they were desperately looking for places where they could settle. From the 
early 1970s, when construction of rental rooms started on a large scale, the 
Kikuyus were the first to seize the opportunity. They built many rooms all 
over Kibera; some people invested their pension in the construction of a 
small house and a few rental rooms, others with more money (civil servants, 
businessmen, politicians), used large sums to construct hundreds of rooms. 
In 2007, the Kikuyus possibly owned about 50% of the rooms in Kibera.
636
 
The big, usually „absentee‟ landlords, with many rooms, didn‟t usually live 
in Kibera; the small resident landlords, with up to 20 rooms, usually lived in 
Kibera, often in the same compound as their tenants, and in the same 




Already in the 1940s many Luos lived in Kibera
638
, probably mainly as 
tenants of Nubis. In the 1950s, the Kikuyu workers that were removed from 
Nairobi in “Operation Anvil” were replaced by Luos and Luhyas, many of 
whom moved into Kibera. In July 1969 the number of Luos in Kibera 
increased suddenly: the murder of Tom Mboya created conflict between 
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 Informant NN4, chairman of the Kibera Landlord and Housing Cooperative, a (Kikuyu) 
landlord organisation. There are no reliable statistics. 
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 I have no statistics on this, but the majority of Kikuyu landlords I interviewed are 
actually „landladies‟. 
638
 Around 26% of outsider population, 392 out of 1472 (both probably underestimated), 
according to the “Census of August 23, 1948”, by Kibera Superintendent Kitching, 
13/9/1948, KNA RCA (MAA) – 2/1/3 ii. 
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Kikuyus and Luos and forced Luos to flee Kikuyu-dominated areas like 
Kawangware; they found refuge with the Nubis in Kibera. However, unlike 
the Kikuyus and Nubis, the Luos seemed less interested in investing in 
construction of houses or rental rooms; they preferred to invest in education 
of their children. Furthermore, they planned to eventually go back home to 
Nyanza, so there was no need to own a house in Kibera. The Kikuyus and 
Nubis had no other place to go or return to; they had no choice but to build 
their life in Kibera. At the time Luos may have become more interested in 
owning property in the Nairobi area, Kibera was already divided, and full of 





Before the 1992 elections many more Luos moved to Kibera, to ensure that 
Raila Odinga would win the Lang‟ata parliamentary seat; in previous 
elections, other Luos (Achieng‟ Oneko, Omolo) had tried to win the 
Lang‟ata seat, but unsuccessfully, as in the single party era basically the 
president decided who would win. With multi-party elections, the contest 
was more open and there was a chance to win the seat. In subsequent years, 
this flow of Luos into Kibera was to be maintained, to ensure the retention 
of the Lang‟ata seat.
640
 These new arrivals from Nyanza usually stayed with 
or close to relatives; an older brother, a cousin, an uncle, someone who 
could take care of them, pay school fees or assist in finding a job. The 
majority of Luos thus settled together, in Gatwikira (including Kisumu 
Ndogo). The trend continued throughout the years: many young people, 
mainly men, coming to Nairobi looking for work or for studies, settled 
there, and later, when Gatwikira became congested, in the surrounding 
villages. Currently the Luos are the largest ethnic group in Kibera
641
 – most 
of the tenants in Gatwikira and Kisumu Ndogo are Luo, and so are a large 
part of the tenants in Shilanga, Lindi and Kianda. However, Kianda is 
different from the other villages in the sense that most Luos that live there 
came in the late 1960s, many were even born there: „newcomers‟ are a 
minority here. In practice this means there is more understanding between 
the ethnic groups, and a peaceful co-existence with the Kikuyus. As many 
people said: “The Luos there are not fanatics like in Gatwikira”. During the 
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 I‟m not claiming that there were no Luo landlords; there were, but relatively few. 
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 Many informants, from Gatwikira. See also Goux: 328 and Osborn 2006: 38. One of the 
Kibera chiefs told me in February 2006 that “Luos keep coming, every day Luos are 
registering at the DO‟s office” (informant M7). 
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 It must be emphasised that there are no reliable statistics. This statement is based on 
information from Kibera residents. See also Marras 2008 on Kianda. 
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recent upheavals the Kianda Luos were abused by the Gatwikira Luos for 
being soft and for living (peacefully) with Kikuyus. 
 
Over the years, Gatwikira / Kisumu Ndogo became a hard-core Luo 
stronghold. Its population consists of many young men (possibly more than 
50%), fresh from the rural areas in Nyanza, where they would hardly meet 
people from other ethnic groups. They would find a similar situation in 
Gatwikira, and therefore often maintain a strong Luo identity. Moreover, 
due to the economic circumstances, many have remained unemployed, poor, 
and are often forced to share a room with up to 4-5 other youths; they are 
frustrated and angry, having come to Nairobi with high expectations. These 
young men hang around the streets, looking for jobs, for anything that can 
give them some income. They are available for anyone that pays them, be it 
to intimidate or beat up people, to loot, kill…. According to most 
informants, it was mainly these youths that were responsible for inciting 
(forcing) others to loot and destroy Kikuyu shops and houses, and remove 
Kikuyus from Kibera.  
 
Over the years, the existing situation, with Nubi and Kikuyu mainly as 




Previous conflicts in Kibera – growing Luo dominance  
 
Kibera has seen a number of violent conflicts over the years, always 
resulting in death, destruction and displacement. In 1992, at the advent of 
multiparty democracy in Kenya, the Luo candidate Raila Odinga had been 
elected MP for Lang‟ata Constituency, reflecting the dominant position of 
the Luos
642
 in Kibera, which became a political battlefield, a stronghold of 
opposition politics. Some months before the general elections, there were 
major rent clashes between the Nubis (landlords) and Luos (generally 
tenants), caused by the latter‟s refusal to pay the rent, claiming it was too 
high. Politics may have been involved as well, as the Nubis were supporting 
the ruling party KANU, while the Luos were in the opposition. The fighting 
spread over a large part of Kibera, and tension continued for many months, 
before calming down before the elections. The few Nubi landlords living in 
Gatwikira and other areas of high „Luo-density‟ negotiated with their 
tenants and reduced the rent. Though the Kikuyus stayed out of the fighting, 
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 The Luos had by then become (one of) the largest ethnic groups in Kibera, though it 
must be emphasised that there are no reliable statistics on the Kibera population. 
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they also suffered, owning most of the houses in those Luo-dominated 
areas; they also had to reduce the rent, but some tenants refused to pay any 
rent at all to Kikuyus, driving out some of the landlords. According to one 
inhabitant of Gatwikira:  
 
The reason for paying rent to the Nubis was that they saw the 
Nubis as the rightful owners of the land, and respected them 
for that; the Kikuyus were not, they were simply trying to 





Another round of clashes between the Nubis and Luos occurred in 1995 – 
this time it started with a problem between two individuals, but then the rent 
issue was brought in to mobilise people, which can be seen as symptomatic 
for the tension between landlords and tenants. These clashes could also have 
been the result of some pent-up anger against the „outsiders‟, or underlying 
tension between the different groups. Youth-led, these clashes were not 
organised, it was claimed; they just erupted. The fighting continued only for 
a few days, and though several people were killed, life returned to normal. 
Nevertheless, an underlying tension remained, between landlords and 
tenants, Nubis and Luos. 
 
The November 2001 clashes between Nubis and Luos came at a time when 
Raila‟s National Development Party (NDP) was about to merge with 
President Moi‟s party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), and join 
the government. In a public meeting in Kibera, Raila complained to 
President Moi about the high rent levels in Kibera. President Moi agreed 
and ordered the Provincial Commissioner (PC) to ensure that rents are 
lowered in Kibera, because, he claimed, the people living there were poor 
and the landlords did not really have any rights to be there – it was 
government land, not theirs. This was clearly a populist gimmick; it was 
about one year before the December 2002 general elections, and Moi, 
needing Raila‟s support, had to be generous to Raila‟s supporters (being 
mainly tenants). Lowering rent in Kibera was a way of securing support 
from Kibera‟s tenants for KANU and NDP, and Raila in particular. Raila 
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 Nubi man, landlord, March 2008. 
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While the PC recommended paying full rent pending negotiations between 
landlords and tenants, the tenants expected nothing less than paying no rent 
at all for the time being – NDP youth wingers were going around in Kibera 
threatening people not to pay any rent, and even Raila is alleged to have told 
his people (in the Luo language) at public meetings not to pay rent.
645
 
Depending almost completely on rental income, the Nubis generally refused 
to accept a reduction in rent; when a Nubi landlord in Lindi demanded his 
rent, the tenants refused to pay and fighting ensued. The clashes that erupted 
between (again) mainly Nubis and Luos made headlines all over the world. 
Houses went up in flames, and a mass exodus started: more than 30,000 
people were displaced, many fled Kibera with all their belongings, others 
camped at the Kibera District Officer‟s office or slept at the mosques‟ 




Calm returned after two weeks of violence, but Kibera had changed for 
good. In the Nubi-dominated areas, mainly the Makina area
647
, there had 
hardly been any problem during or after the clashes. Nubi landlords usually 
live within the same compound and have in general a good relationship with 
their tenants, many of whom have lived in the same house for a very long 
time; they continued to pay the same rent after the clashes. It was mainly in 
the Luo-dominated areas where the impact had been high; in these areas 
(Gatwikira, Kisumu Ndogo) hardly any rent was paid anymore, or lower 
rents. The absentee landlords (mostly Kikuyu
648
) lost control over their 
rooms; most of them gave up after a while and did not even bother to come 
for the rent anymore – their tenants became the de facto owners of the 
rooms. The smaller, resident landlords (some Nubi, and other ethnic groups) 
all negotiated lower rents with their tenants, and have had less problem with 
rent payments since. The small Kikuyu landlords, who had not been actively 
involved in the actual fighting, suffered more: it was mainly them that had 
problems getting paid. Some tenants did not pay at all, others would pay 
only half the rent or a token, depending on their mood or the money they 
had in their pocket. It was difficult to take action against the non-paying 
tenants, as the local administration (the Chiefs and District Officer that are 
based in Kibera) was not able to enforce rent payment there – they were said 
to be scared of the „violent and fanatical Luos‟ in Gatwikira. Quite a number 
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 PeaceNet: 28-9, 39. 
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 See Goux 2002 and PeaceNet 2001 for a more detailed description of the events; Osborn 
2006: 34. 
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 Makina area includes Kambi Lendu, Kambi Alur and Makongeni. 
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 Some of these „absentee‟ landlords were small Nubi landlords that lived elsewhere in 
Kibera – they also lost their rooms. 
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of the small Kikuyu landlords (an estimated 20%
649
) left the area, though the 
majority stayed and accepted the new situation; they tried to make do with 
whatever the tenants gave them, they had nowhere else to go. This situation 
actually caused an internal Luo movement within Kibera towards the “free 
houses” in Gatwikira, especially from Mashimoni (which subsequently 
became a Luhya-dominated area). 
 
Also in other areas with many Luo tenants, like Shilanga (and even Kianda), 
many Luos and even people of other ethnic groups stopped paying rent, or 
paid only a small amount once in a while. But here people were generally 
more willing to pay rent, and after meeting with the landlord or after 
intervention by the Chief, many would agree to start paying again, though 
usually at a lower rate. In general, rent levels went down in these parts of 
Kibera after negotiations between landlords and their tenants, though there 
remained a significant group of tenants that would not pay.
650
 In Nubi-
controlled parts of Kibera there had actually been very little problem with 
rent payments; nothing much changed there.  
 
This situation of non-payment of rent persisted up to the 2007 elections, and 
formed an important part of the local dynamics of the post-election violence. 
These recent clashes continued the process of growing Luo dominance and 
expansion in Kibera: the Luo hard-core areas of Gatwikira and Kisumu 
Ndogo were this time “cleansed” of all Kikuyus (with a few exceptions) – 
the Kikuyus‟ rooms and businesses have been taken over, and it seems 
unlikely that they will return anytime soon. Luos have become the de facto 
owners of those areas. In other parts of Kibera the same process is now 
(2008) in its initial stages, and essentially comparable to the situation that 
existed in Gatwikira before the 2007 elections: many Kikuyu landlords have 
been pushed out, lost control over a large part of their rooms, and are in 
most cases not being paid rent
651
, certainly not by Luo tenants. Some 
Kikuyus came back, re-opened shops, and occupied some of the rooms, but 
most were, six months after the events, still watching from a distance to see 
what would happen.  
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 Estimate of several informants from Gatwikira. 
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 Over time however, some rents went up again, certainly if a tenant left; the new tenants 
would have to pay the old, higher rent. 
651
 Some landlords of other ethnic groups experienced the same problem, certainly if they 
were women without husband or grown-up sons in the house – tenants simply refused to the 
pay rent, and even threatened the landlord. 
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Were these upheavals in Kibera “designed” to boost that process of growing 
Luo dominance, or are there other explanations? With this background on 
Kikuyu and Luo history in Kibera, we now return to the question of the 
underlying causes of the violence. 
 
 
Analysis of the causes of the violence in Kibera 
 
The 2007 elections and subsequent violence have already been extensively 
discussed, and there is general consensus that it is an oversimplification to 
see the violence as an ethnic, or tribal, problem.
652
 Instead most analyses 
emphasise „underlying precipitating factors‟, while „the elections provided 
the spark that ignited them‟.
653
 Some of these underlying causes are 
identified as historical grievances over resources (mainly access to land), 
deliberate weakening of government institutions (like the judiciary), and the 
gradual loss of the state‟s monopoly of legitimate force, allowing the large-
scale proliferation of militia and gangs, that were in turn used and mobilised 
by politicians in their pursuit of electoral victory. Other factors include 
economic and political exclusion, as well as the strongly ethnicised 
discourse of Kenyan politics.
654
 While these analyses point to the 
complexity and historical roots of this post-election violence, they all, to 
varying degrees, emphasise the importance of ethnicity and patron-client 
relations in Kenyan politics.  
 
This section will explore the relationship between national „big man‟ 
politics and violence at the grassroots in more detail. Raila appears to have 
an almost total control over his constituents in Kibera, and in the weeks 
after the elections the slogan „No Raila, no peace‟ was frequently heard on 
the streets and in demonstrations. A closer examination will show that „big 
man‟ politics cannot provide a full explanation of the post-election violence; 
local, socio-economic factors played a key role and lent the conflict its own 
specific dynamics. Moreover, while Raila‟s strong patron-client relationship 
with Kibera has in many ways empowered him as a national politician, in 
his current role as Prime Minister this relationship also restricts his political 
room for manoeuvre. As such, the focus on Raila‟s „big man‟ status in 
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Kibera illustrates the pressures faced by Kenyan politicians in mediating 
between their public roles and the demands of their constituents. 
 
 
Kenya‟s „big man‟ politics  
 
The politics of patronage occupies a central place in discussions of Kenya‟s 
political history, past and present. Patronage was one of the characteristics 
of pre-colonial ethnic communities: the local „big men‟ exercised authority 
by sharing out their wealth – the receivers of this redistribution, the poor, 
„inevitably owed obedience‟.
655
 During the colonial period, the British 
introduced ethnically defined administrative units - „tribes‟- and as a result, 
„ethnic groups became political tribes‟.
656
 The „big men‟ stayed. In 
independent Kenya, President Kenyatta‟s politics to a certain extent 
reflected the old „moral economy‟ of redistribution and obligation, but the 
encouragement and gradual emergence of ethnic big men, tied to Kenyatta 
through patron-client relationships, widened nascent ethnic divisions. This 
(new) elite colluded with Kenyatta to get and maintain access to wealth and 
privileges, without much concern or sympathy for the plight of the poor. In 
return they contained dissent from below.
657
 A system of ethnic patronage 
thus became entrenched in Kenyan politics, whereby eventually all the ties 
of local, ethnic big men led to the all-powerful president, the ultimate „big 
man‟. In analogy of a royal establishment, Colin Leys describes this as 
„Jomo Kenyatta's court‟, where the President is surrounded by close Kikuyu 
allies.
658
 Politicians who became too powerful, independent or popular, and 
appeared to be a threat, were removed. In 1966 Oginga Odinga, the Luo 
vice-president, was manoeuvred out of his post and sidelined; in 1969 the 
leading Luo politician Tom Mboya was killed, allegedly at high-level 
Kikuyus‟ orders. Later that year, Oginga was imprisoned and the Luo party 





When Kenyatta was succeeded by Moi, the patronage system remained in 
place, but the political elite, earlier united under Kenyatta, became more 
fragmented. Moi had fewer resources available for distribution and favoured 
his own Kalenjin, excluding other ethnic groups. Unable to maintain elite 
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cohesion, Moi increasingly resorted to oppression, further alienating the 
excluded elite and effectively undermining their willingness to contain 





Multi-partyism, re-introduced in 1992, created new opportunities for ethnic 
„big men‟, who could now profile themselves as the defenders of their 
ethnic group at the national platform, promising a piece of the national 
economic cake, including jobs, favours and hard cash, in return for votes. 
Though the presidency remains the biggest prize to be won in elections and 
„the ethnic identity of a new president defines patterns of favouritism‟
661
, it 
is no longer the only centre of power like it was in the one-party era. 
Instead, there are more centres of power and even the incumbent leadership 




With ethnicity seen as central in determining the distribution of national 
resources, many of these ethnic big men resort to what Lonsdale calls 
„political tribalism‟, the use of ethnic identity in political competition with 
other groups. This amounts to pitting one community against the other, 
exploiting latent (ethnic) grievances about scarce resources (often „land‟), 
and triggering ethnic violence through incitement, as a means of securing 
political power and facilitating their own accumulation of wealth. For 
„political tribalism‟ to be successful, politicians will have to suppress local 
debates of „moral ethnicity‟, that is ethnicity springing from „below‟, as an 
ordinary aspect of daily life and social intercourse. As Lonsdale describes it, 
in such everyday engagements, ethnicity is imbued with moral values, 
traditions, civic virtue and responsibility, and is not necessarily disruptive 
within communities. Moreover, all ethnic groups, he claims, have renewable 
traditions of how their members should treat honourably with strangers.
663
 
During the post-election violence it looks as if a trace of this „moral 
ethnicity‟ was at work within Kibera. There were quite a few cases where 
fleeing Kikuyus were protected by their Luo neighbours (and vice versa) – 
they were hidden, escorted out of Kibera, their belongings and rooms were 
kept safe. One young man for example moved his electronics to a friend‟s 
house, and hid for two days at another Luo friend‟s before dashing to safety; 
An elderly lady moved some of her things to a neighbour‟s house before she 
fled, the rest was later looted. When the looters also wanted to occupy her 
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rooms, a Luo neighbour said they were his rooms, so they left; another lady 
spent two weeks hidden in a neighbour‟s house, and there are many more 
stories. Although it is impossible to quantify the extent of such actions, it is 
clear that some people were able to defend moral values, and to resist 
succumbing to „political tribalism‟ towards their neighbours and friends. 
Lonsdale‟s „moral ethnicity‟ was thus not entirely absent within the 
(imagined) „Kibera community‟, resisting and challenging „political 
tribalism‟, albeit on a small scale. The violence, in other words, was not 
caused by ethnic differences per se, but rather by its politicisation. At this 
moment in time, however, it seems that Jacqueline Klopp might be correct 
in wondering whether moral ethnicity can present a serious challenge to 
political tribalism. Her case study of Nandi nationalism shows that, as was 
the case in Kibera, there is resistance at the grassroots level to the politics of 
ethnic hatred. However, given its success as a political strategy, the current 





Violence has thus become a normal part of Kenyan political culture. In the 
ethnic clashes of the 1990s, mostly instigated by politicians, over 3000 
people were killed and over 300,000 displaced.
665
 According to Human 
Rights Watch „... the 2007 election campaign had emphasized the ethnicity 
of the candidates and the parties. [...] It was unsurprising therefore that the 
violence following the rigging should take an ethnic form.‟ Politicians used 
the anti-Kikuyu sentiments in Kenya, stemming from the perceived bias in 
the Kibaki government towards the Kikuyu community, to whip up support. 
Kibaki, like before him Kenyatta and Moi, surrounded himself with his own 
„tribesmen‟, excluding other ethnic groups; this contributed to a growing 
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These „big men‟ usually have no specific political ideology, and a clear 
vision or political programme is thus largely absent. They use political 
parties primarily as vehicles for getting into power. According to Mueller, 
political parties, like „big men‟, are driven by „ethnic clientism, with a 
winner-takes-all view of political power and its associated economic by-
products‟.
667
 As a result, it is not uncommon for political leaders to move 
from party to party, and take their ethnic following with them. By the same 
token, alliances with other parties, in or outside government, are made and 
unmade with seemingly little regard for political ideology or agendas. For 
example, in the 1992 elections Raila Odinga was in FORD-Kenya, in 1997 
in NDP, in 2002 in NARC/LDP and in 2007 in ODM. He was imprisoned 
by President Moi several times in the 1980s, but nevertheless joined his 
government in 2001, before again returning to the opposition in 2002. 
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Today, Raila Odinga is one of Kenya‟s leading „big men‟. As ODM‟s 
charismatic Luo leader, he has been aptly described as „a man who stirs up 
the strongest of emotions – be it Railamania or Railaphobia. Yet, love him 
or hate him, Raila holds considerable political clout, because of his fiercely 
loyal support base‟.
668
 Raila appears at times to have an almost total control 
over his constituents, drawing large crowds when visiting Kibera. But the 
reality on the ground is not quite that straight-forward. The following 
sections analyse how Raila‟s „big man‟ machinations in Kibera (may) have 
contributed to the post-election violence. A key factor here is how during 
the violent episodes of the last 15 years, the Luos have managed to turn 
large parts of Kibera into „Luo territory‟, chasing away the (mainly) Kikuyu 
landlords. It also shows how Raila‟s recent half-hearted attempts, as prime 
minister, at correcting the situation have not endeared him to his Luo voters 
in Kibera – he has to walk a tightrope between being Raila the prime 
minister and Raila the Luo „big man‟.  
 
 
The underlying causes – economics, tribalism and Kenyan politics. 
 
It is evident that there was a lot of anger in Kibera at the alleged rigging of 
the elections, which resulted in rioting, which then transformed into „looting 
for economic benefit‟. Poverty plays a role here, but so does resentment and 
jealousy of the „rich‟ landlords, as the looters were mainly tenants. This was 
certainly not a politically motivated “rebellion against the existing social 
order”, against a “landlord class”, as Luos simply took over rooms and 
became landlords themselves.  
 
However, apart from the underlying tensions between the tenants and 
landlords, there is also an ethnic dimension to this: to many Luos, the 
Kikuyus are the representatives of an oppressive order. They seem to control 
everything in Kibera, and the Luos resent the fact that they have to pay them 
for everything they need: the monthly rent, for water (it‟s mainly Kikuyus 
that have piped water to their compound and sell water per 20 litre jerry 
can), for electricity (only landlords can get an account and meter from the 
Kenya Power and Lighting Company), and most shops in Kibera were run 
by Kikuyus as well. As one interviewee perceptively put it, 
 
The anti-Kikuyu feeling was there before the election; people 
are not happy to pay for the rent, for the water, the electricity 
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– these are all in the hands of the Kikuyu, and they resent 




There are historical reasons for the Luos‟ anti-Kikuyu sentiments as well; 
Kenya has a history of failed Kikuyu-Luo alliances. In 1966 Oginga Odinga, 
the Luo Vice-President, was manoeuvred out of his post, and later even 
imprisoned by Kenyatta. In 1969 the leading Luo politician Tom Mboya 
was killed, allegedly at high-level Kikuyus‟ orders, and the Luo party KPU 
was banned, effectively introducing the single-party state. With Kikuyus in 
most powerful positions, their Central Province got the lion‟s share of 
development funds, at the expense of Luo Nyanza, that became isolated and 
economically marginalised.
670
 In 2002, when Raila and Kibaki joined forces 
to oust President Moi and KANU, the Luos were betrayed by Kibaki (and 
by extension, again the Kikuyus) when he did not honour the agreement 
between him and Raila, in which the Constitution would be changed and 
Raila would become Prime Minister. As one young man summarised: 
 
The Kikuyus have now been chased from Gatwikira: it was a 
mix of dislike of Kikuyu and the fact that they are landlords. 
The Luo were economically marginalised by Kenyatta, and 
by extension, by the Kikuyus. It‟s the same now with Kibaki: 
the Luo were again cheated in 2002, it rekindled the hatred 
between the two tribes. It‟s all politics; the Luo again and 




These underlying anti-Kikuyu and anti-landlord sentiments were used by 
Raila (exploiting of this kind of sentiments is done by other Kenyan 
politicians as well) to his own benefit, to mobilise political support and 
voters: “Politicians see Kibera not as a large slum, but as a strategic 
reservoir for votes”.
672
   
 
Using ethnic discourse during election campaigns is not enough; the 
reciprocal nature of patronage demands „redistribution‟ in exchange for 
votes. However, as Mueller shows, once political tribalism has become 
entrenched there may be no need to reward your supporters all the time, as 
oftentimes people will vote for their co-ethnics as a „defensive strategy‟ in 
order to prevent another ethnic group from assuming power. This was 
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confirmed prior to the elections, when several Luos in conversation told me 
that they would vote for Raila, even though he hasn‟t done anything for 
Kibera in all those years as MP – „who else would I vote for?‟ In the longer 
term, however, if there is no reward, people may lose interest and not vote at 
all. The relatively low voter turnout in the 2007 elections (see above) may 
be an indication for this (in Lang‟ata 54%).
673
 Moreover, several informants 
mentioned that also Kikuyu youths voted for Raila – youths may not 
necessarily care for the ethnic identity of their political leaders, they might 
easily switch and vote for someone from another ethnic group.
674
 
Redistribution is therefore required at some point; „big men‟ need their 
followers‟ votes to stay in power.  
 
However, it is not only the votes that count. Additional „support‟ is just as 
important – for example coming to political rallies, and creating mayhem 
when required. Already in the late 1950s the People‟s Party Convention had 
Youth Wing militants, and in the 1960s KANU used its Youth Wing to 
intimidate political opponents. In Kibera the KANU youth wingers were 
notorious for terrorising the population: they were harassing people, beating 
them, arresting or falsely accusing them to be bribed, stealing; they were 
brutal, often drunk. Even the Police had no power over them or Kibera. 
Later most other political parties followed suit, including Raila‟s NDP 
Youth Wing, which was also notorious in Kibera. In the 1980s it became 
commonplace for politicians to have their own (violent) gangs of supporters, 
generally of the same ethnic group. In Gatwikira, ODM has an unofficial 
office, a base for the local party mobilizers. From here they organise the 
(mainly Luo) youths that hang around, ready for a “job” – they collect 
„protection fees‟ from shops, or „repair tax‟ if someone wants to repair a 
house. It is these young men that form and join gangs like the Taliban, or in 
the case of the Kikuyu, the Mungiki.
675
 This phenomenon is by no means 
unique to Gatwikira – most villages of Kibera and other slums have this 
kind of groups of youths, loosely organised gangs that easily adjust to the 
circumstances. Sometimes they are „vigilantes‟, sometimes they „support‟ 
landlords to kick out non-paying tenants, sometimes they are plain 
criminals. They are to a large extent ad-hoc gangs – one can join for a 
certain job, and thus be a „member‟ for the duration of the job, and then not 
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for another job. It‟s about economic survival, and ultimately, for many of 
them, it would not matter whom they work for, or what the „job‟ is. These 
youths can therefore also easily be mobilised for political interests – they 
make up the ODM youth wing, supporting Raila by doing anything 
necessary and required, whenever, to make him win the elections. „The 
Gatwikira Luos are fanatics, they follow Raila, who controls them 
completely; they worship him like a God‟.
676
 Many informants (including 
Luos) claimed that it was mainly these youths that were responsible for 
inciting (forcing) others to loot and destroy Kikuyu shops and houses, and 
remove Kikuyus from Kibera. It is this kind of „political‟ support that 




This reward can be simple and direct: informants revealed that the youths 
get paid for the job they do. For example, for uprooting the railway in 
Kibera at the height of the mass demonstrations in early January, they 
allegedly received 1-200 Shillings each.
678
 Rewards can also be indirect, 
more substantial or long-term. There are for example persistent rumours that 
Raila, for many years (especially during the economically difficult 1990s), 
has paid rent for many of his supporters, and monthly allowances to his 
main „mobilizers‟, although such information is of course notoriously 
difficult to verify. Furthermore, in 2001 Raila created a rent conflict in 
Kibera that he subsequently made no effort to solve – it would not be in the 
interest of his voters. In Kibera it is frequently claimed that during rallies, 
Raila would “talk peace” in Kiswahili but then throw in a few Luo words to 
the effect of “don‟t pay rent!”; as a result, many Luo tenants refused to pay 
rent because, as they claimed, “Raila told us not to pay rent”.
679
 While the 
veracity of these statements is difficult to ascertain, what matters in this 
context is the perception that political support results in material reward. In 
the recent clashes, these material rewards have been substantial: the looting; 
the burnt-down Toi Market, first Kikuyu-controlled, has been rebuilt and is 
now in the hands of Raila supporters; and most importantly, the expansion 
of „Luo territory‟ in Kibera where no rent is paid, and where Luos have 
effectively taken over from the Kikuyus as the new landlords.  
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Photo 11: Graffiti peace message on the wall of a shop that was burnt 





The question is whether this was part of a „Grand Plan‟, a reward for Raila‟s 
supporters. Already after the 2001 clashes, the Nubian Council of Elders in 
Kibera concluded that “the political target was the Kikuyu community”.
680
 
Understandably, many Kikuyus do believe that the violence was part of a 
plan to rid Kibera of Kikuyus and take over their rooms and businesses. 
Several people mentioned that before the elections Kikuyus received threats 
like “after the elections, this shop will belong to me”, and that Luos were 
already “booking” houses and shops that had been marked for takeover.
681
 
Moreover, many people from outside Kibera were said to have been 
involved in the looting and violence. All this seems to indicate a certain 
amount of advance planning.  
 
Many Kikuyu informants thought that it was probably not planned at a top 
ODM level, but at a lower, local, level: the “smaller” politicians, like 
councillors, the party-people on the ground, the youth leaders (the people 
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based in those unofficial party offices), that must be seen to champion the 
Luo cause to climb up in the ranks – it is assumed that Raila leaves it up to 
them to do whatever is needed on the ground. Evidence from the Rift Valley 
also suggest that local leaders have considerable autonomy and that they 
organise the youths and pay them part of what they receive from „above‟.
682
 
There was a general belief amongst Kikuyu informants that if Raila had won 
the elections, it would have been worse for them: they would have been 
removed from Kibera with even more conviction, violence and impunity, 
since the Luos would expect to be protected by the new president himself. 
This may be true, considering that the local Kibera administration appeared 
to be powerless (or rather: scared) to stop the Luos from taking control of 





Raila‟s dilemma – the complications of the patronage system 
 
On 24 April President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga started their 
so-called “Peace Tour” around Kenya to ensure an end to violence and a 
safe return home for displaced people (IDPs).
684
 In the Rift Valley the local 
Kalenjin MPs (mainly ODM) resisted a speedy return of IDPs to Rift 
Valley, at least not before an inquiry was held into the underlying causes of 
the problems and possible solutions. Leaflets were distributed, threatening 
people (displaced Kikuyus) not to return to Rift Valley
685
, a further 
illustration of how deep the problem runs. Nevertheless, from 5 May, 
despite security concerns and IDPs‟ fears for their safety, the government 
organised transport and many displaced people were taken back to their 
homes in Rift Valley; sometimes with some financial support, in most cases 





The situation in Kibera is comparable; though there have been no „hate 
leaflets‟, displaced Kikuyus are not welcome and their safety cannot be 
guaranteed. The Kikuyus are not looking for revenge (“revenge is bad for 
business”), but rather just a return to the previous situation, get their rooms 
back, or at least get their rent paid, if they really can‟t live there anymore. 
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However, it will not be easy to go back to the previous situation. A first 
newspaper article highlighting the plight of landlords in Kibera and other 
Nairobi slums appeared on 24 May 2008. In the following days the 
government said that illegal tenants have to move out, and charged a peace 
committee with organising talks between landlords and tenants. The Kenya 
Tenants Welfare Union wanted to involve politicians, as “the whole 
problem is political”, but the Deputy Provincial Commissioner stated “if the 
tenants will not heed our word to vacate the houses, we shall use force to 
evict them”.
687
 However, the use of force would not be effective as the lives 
of the landlords cannot be guaranteed after eviction of the tenants; it would 
have to be done through persuasion and negotiation, if at all possible. At 
first glance it may seem that Raila‟s intervention would be required, but 
would people listen to him and return the rooms to the Kikuyus? Besides, 
considering Raila did not make any effort to rectify the situation after the 
2001 clashes, would he do it now?  
 
On 29 May 2008 Raila came to Kibera (without Kibaki) for a peace meeting 
in which he mentioned the problem of people illegally squatting in other 
people‟s houses. He added that legal action would have to be taken by the 
Government against them, but that he himself was not in charge of that. 
With this diplomatic statement, “Raila the prime minister” confirmed that 
the occupation of rooms is illegal, but at the same time, “Raila the Luo 
politician” condoned it by not telling his people to get out of the rooms or 
pay rent. His not taking a position shows that patron-client relationships can 
be more complicated than „one leads, the others follow‟, with the patron in 
total control.  
 
Raila‟s Luo constituents expect resources, protection, and other advantages 
at national level from their „big man‟ Raila. His earlier call for blanket 
amnesty for all post-election violence offenders can be seen in that light – 
maintaining the patron-client relationship, votes and support in exchange for 
protection (most people arrested nationwide during the violence were ODM 
supporters).
688
 Being in such a powerful position, his supporters would 
expect even more from Raila – helping them to stay in their newly occupied 
houses, and keep their reward for supporting him. This puts him in a 
difficult position, wavering between being the prime minister and being the 
Luo politician. He is, to a certain extent, a prisoner of the political game he 
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plays, and his choice is in fact very limited: as prime minister he must be 
seen to follow the rule of law. However, this risks alienating many of his 
supporters in Kibera, and as such might ultimately affect his prospects of re-
election and political career. It was claimed that Raila had some informal 
meetings in Kibera in which he was told by his support base not to try to get 
them out of their „new‟ houses, at the peril of losing their support. 
Nevertheless, in October Raila‟s personal assistant Edward Ketta went, with 
the local administration, to Gatwikira for a meeting with the „support base‟, 
and brought up the issue again – people should leave the occupied houses. 
The crowd reacted violently (it clearly is a sensitive issue in the Luo areas of 
Kibera) and Ketta had to leave in a rush, his car damaged.
689
 This seems to 
indicate that Raila is not able to exert complete control over his support 
base, and that key constituents in Kibera do not automatically accept his 
authority. After this Raila‟s discourse changed; at his „home-coming party‟ 
on 29 November 2008, while PNU minister Martha Karua was jeered when 
she asked Raila to help out in the „house-issue‟
690
, Raila defended his 
people, saying that also many Luos were chased away, out of Kikuyu-
dominated areas, and have also lost property.  
 
Nevertheless, recent developments have shown that Raila‟s support in 
Kibera is being undermined by his failure to deliver, as prime minister and 
as Luo leader. His popularity in Kibera (and nation-wide) is decreasing 
because of rising prices of basic commodities (maize flour) and government 
corruption.
691
 At his home-coming party Raila was shocked by the negative 
response of the people. Usually at ODM rallies, when a politician shouts 
“ODM!”, the crowd answers “chungwa moja!” („one orange‟)
692
; this time, 
Mudavadi (one of the ODM leaders) shouted “ODM”, and the crowd 
answered: “unga!” („flour‟).
693
 There are rumours that in the next elections 
Raila will not stand in Kibera, since he is no longer sure to win there again 
after too many broken election promises. In the 2007 parliamentary 
elections he had only 70% of the votes against his rival Livondo 28%
694
; 
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This chapter has looked at the impact of „ethnic politics‟ on Kibera, which 
can (partly) explain the different episodes of violence that have rocked 
Kibera. It shows clearly that ethnicity has not disappeared after Kenya‟s 
Independence, but rather has become an important tool for mobilising 
support in national politics: leaders like Raila Odinga resort to the use and 
manipulation of ethnic identity in political competition to secure political 
power. The Luos have taken advantage of Raila‟s support, which has 
allowed them to become the main powerbrokers in Kibera, replacing the 
Nubis who are now only a small community in Kibera. Without political 
support or leverage the Nubis have lost their supremacy in Kibera, and even 
lost control over part of their rental rooms. This process in fact already 
started much earlier, when the Nubis could not stop the influx of „outsiders‟ 
in Kibera, in the 1970s; those outsiders were protected and aided by the 
authorities that were of the same ethnic group.  
 
Just like after the 2001 rent disputes, Raila will probably try to let the 
current situation –no Kikuyus in „Luo territory‟, no rent payment– slowly 
become the „normal situation‟ in Kibera; he knows that the government 
won‟t be able to do anything about it, and his voters will appreciate it. It‟s 
unlikely that he will intervene in favour of Kikuyu landlords, but even if he 
would, it‟s far from sure that the Luos in Kibera will heed his words. It 
looks like in the long run, with every new round of violent clashes, Kibera 
will increasingly become dominated by the Luos, with less space for 
Kikuyus.  
 
The Nubis will probably remain „in charge‟ in the areas they have continued 
to dominate for the last two decades, and where they have managed to keep 
the damage limited during the violence; no houses have been taken over by 
others and tenants continue to pay normal rents there. Though they lack 
political support, there does not seem to be, as yet, any reason to suspect 
that they will be, at some point, dislodged from their small territory within 








A visit to Kibera in February 2009 showed that the situation concerning the 
Kikuyus had developed further – many Kikuyu landlords were leaving 
Kibera, for „security reasons‟; they were selling off their rooms, mainly to 
Luos. Prices of the rooms had not really gone down – in Kianda they were 
still around 30,000 Ksh per room, though some, in a bad condition, were 
sold more cheaply at 15-17,000 Ksh.
695
 As it is now, it looks like a new 
round of clashes is not even needed to rid larger parts of Kibera of the 
Kikuyus. 
 
The IDP problem has not been solved: in February 2009 many Kikuyus (and 
other displaced persons) were still in camps. Most IDPs had not been able to 
return to their homes in the Rift Valley, or to Kibera. There does not seem to 
be any political interest in the fate of these people – this will probably 
change only a few months before the next elections... 
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Conclusion – future perspectives of Kibera and the Nubis 
 
 
The main theme of this thesis – ethnicity – returns in one form or another in 
all of its chapters. The first chapter is about the early history of the Nubis; it 
follows the Nubis of Kibera from their „birth‟ in Equatoria in the late 19
th
 
century, and shows how the Nubis were created out of a mix of people from 
various ethnic backgrounds. It is in fact the story of how they became a 
„tribe‟, or at least, passed through the initial stages of „becoming the Nubis‟. 
Their move from (what is now) southern Sudan into (what is now) Uganda, 
as a group of soldiers from very diverse ethnic backgrounds, with a large 
following of women, children, slaves and servants, determined to a large 
extent the survival of the Nubis as a group – had they stayed in southern 
Sudan, they might have broken up in smaller groups and eventually 
dissolved and disappeared. As it happened, they forged ever stronger ties 
between themselves, as „strangers‟ in a foreign land, to the extent that a new 
culture and a new identity was created, a new ethnic group. As highly 
regarded soldiers of the British (and German) colonial armies, the Nubis 
were scattered over East Africa and parts of Somalia, before settling down, 
demobilised, in numerous „Nubian villages‟ established near the army 
barracks. In this thesis the focus was on the most important „Nubian‟ village 
in Kenya: Kibera. 
 
The second chapter tells the „story of Kibera‟, how the area was gradually 
occupied by the Nubis, who lived a fairly good life there: apart from their 
shambas (farms) and livestock, they had the Nubian gin which generated 
much-needed income. Moreover, as a „better class African‟ it was easy for 
Nubis to find employment in Nairobi town. This chapter shows how the 
Nubis have tried to use their „being Nubi‟, foreigners brought into Kenya by 
the British, as a negotiation tool to deal with the British colonial government 
and keep control over the land in Kibera. They were relatively successful in 
this during the colonial era; they managed to remain in Kibera, despite 
several attempts at relocating them. However, at Independence this strategy 
no longer worked; to maintain their claim on Kibera the Nubis transformed 
their ethnic identity – from „Sudanese‟, „foreigners‟, they became „a Kenyan 
tribe‟. This helped only to some extent: the Nubis were not able to stop the 
influx of outsiders, who were supported by the new Kenyan authorities 
(who were largely of the same ethnic group as those outsiders) nor the large-
scale construction of rental rooms (also mainly by those outsiders). 
Independence brought other, major changes for the Nubis – with the 
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increasing influx of other people into Kibera, the Nubis became gradually 
more marginalised, and lost control over Kibera. Some of it was of their 
own making, as they themselves had started, already in the 1950s, building 
rooms to rent out to African workers looking for accommodation in Nairobi; 
some of it was beyond their control – the Nubian gin production had to be 
stopped, drying up their major source of income, and from 1975 the 
administration allowed many people, mainly Kikuyus, to construct rental 
rooms in Kibera, taking away land from Nubi families. The Nubis‟ protests 
were ignored, and in the end they had no choice but to participate in the 
wave of construction. Thousands of rooms were built, using all available 
space, eventually leading to Kibera being the large slum it is now, and 
where the Nubis form only a small and insignificant community.  
 
The third chapter deals with the ethnic identity of the Nubis, the many 
identity changes the Nubi community has gone through during its relatively 
short existence and how they tried to find their place within Independent 
Kenya as a Kenyan ethnic group. It also shows how non-Nubi women that 
married into the group were assimilated through marriage and „became 
Nubi‟, and how the Nubi ethnic markers changed over time. Nubi society 
has undergone significant changes in the short time of its existence. From a 
male-dominated military community it developed into a community where 
women were the economic force, and from a mix of individuals from many 
different ethnic groups, they became a „Kenyan tribe‟, gradually more 
homogeneous, more „Nubi‟, with the old Sudanese tribal differences 
disappearing. Some Nubi ethnic markers also disappeared, like female 
circumcision, or became less important, like dress code for women, while 
their religion, Islam, gained in importance. 
 
The Nubian gin chapter (4) shows how the alcohol business was exploited 
as an ethnic economic niche, mainly by the Nubi women, and later replaced 
by the rental business. Allowing the Nubis to maintain a relatively high 
standard of living (for Africans), the income from liquor also contributed to 
maintaining a distinction between Nubi and native – and this may have 
contributed to keeping the Nubi community together and the Nubi identity 
alive.  
 
The fifth chapter is about the role of „ethnic politics‟ in Kibera (and Kenya), 
describing how ethnicity became important as a mechanism for mobilisation 
in national Kenyan politics, to secure political power. As a result, the Nubis 
have become insignificant within the Kibera context – other ethnic groups 
have, due to their greater numbers and with the help of politically instigated 
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violence, taken over as the main powerbrokers in Kibera, notably the Luos 
that have in Raila Odinga, one of Kenya‟s political „big men‟, their 
undisputed leader. The Nubis have ultimately lost supremacy in their tribal 
land. 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this. The Nubis are a good 
example of the limits of the „invention theory‟ (that tribes were invented by 
the colonial powers) – the Nubis basically invented themselves, albeit under 
circumstances created by colonialism. They moved with all their dependents 
from Equatoria to Uganda and Kenya, laying the foundations for a new 
ethnic group, which, being strangers in their new homeland, increasingly 
became „Nubi‟. Secondly, the Nubi story shows that ethnic identities are 
actively made and remade, by people themselves, and used in a variety of 
manners, in changing political, social and economic contexts – the Nubis 
were first individual members of Sudanese ethnic groups, then became „the 
Sudanese (soldiers)‟, then became a „Kenyan tribe‟. Moreover, the Nubis 
incorporated many people (women) from other ethnic groups; they also 
became Nubi. It demonstrates clearly that ethnic identity is not static, but 
rather flexible, negotiable, and open to change and manipulation. Similarly, 
ethnic markers are also flexible and subject to change: the Nubis‟ language 
changed, their religion became more important, and female circumcision 
disappeared. This does however not (necessarily) lead to the disappearance 
of the (ethnic) identity – the Nubi identity is still very much alive in Kibera. 
Finally, it is clear that ethnicity has not disappeared after Independence (as 
was expected to happen); the Nubis became „more Nubi‟ in response to the 
influx of outsiders in Kibera, while in Kenyan politics ethnicity plays an 
important role in the quest for power („political tribalism‟). 
 
 
Kibera: future perspectives  
 
It looks like the Nubis have, so far, managed to save their „tribal land‟: 
Kibera is still there, and the Nubis are still in Kibera, against all 
expectations and intentions of the colonial masters that brought them to 
Kenya. Kibera is now considered to be one of the largest slums in sub-
Saharan Africa; an illegal, informal settlement, practically in the city centre, 
on land with a very high value – almost a contradiction in terms. The story 
of the Nubis is therefore not merely a story of the changing meaning of 
ethnicity, but it is at the same time a story about the meaning of Kibera as a 
place, in terms of land, housing and social differentiation / stratification in 
an urban setting. In this section the focus will therefore shift from „ethnicity‟ 
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to „place‟, in trying to answer the question of what the future holds in store 
for Kibera.  
 
A general picture emerges from the literature on African squatter life and 
settlements. After Independence, unprecedented urban migration coupled 
with ineffective or inadequate urban planning and disregard for housing for 
Africans, creates in many African countries a situation in which the urban 
poor are left to fend for themselves in the provision of housing, resulting in 
a proliferation of low-income informal settlements. The first squatters 
(possibly the most enterprising and ambitious of the urban workers) have no 
choice but to build their own dwellings without authorisation. In times of 
relative prosperity (this was often the case in the 1980s), they invest and 
upgrade their own houses as soon as there is some (perceived) security of 
tenure. As time passes, some sell their houses and go back home to the rural 
areas, some move to better urban areas, but many stay on and start renting 
out some rooms to newcomers. This emerging rental sector is a response to 
a demand for cheap housing from low-income groups that cannot afford to 
construct their own houses, and is at the same time an opportunity for the 
landlords to provide themselves with a continued income after retirement, 
some kind of pension. Those newcomers (tenants) usually come from the 
poorer segment of society, resulting in a general impoverishment of the 
area, as well as creating a higher population density. This process is 
accelerated in times of economic decline (generally the 1990s), when 
additional income from tenants is indispensable, and when more people 
need very cheap accommodation – this is usually a time when unauthorised 
settlements boom, „solving‟ both problems at once.
696
 The population 
density increases, not only because of growing numbers of tenants, but also 
because over time families have grown: the landlords (house owners) have 
now extended families depending on them, and jobless relatives staying at 
their compounds. Poverty plays a significant role in unauthorised 
settlements: house owners eventually often have similar socio-economic 
characteristics as their tenants (excluding absentee landlords, who usually 
own many more houses and are richer), and the younger generation has a 
difficult time, with rising unemployment, and no money to buy or even rent 
a house; women often take over as the main breadwinners. At the same 
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Broadly speaking, Kibera has followed a similar path, as described in 
chapter 2: a great demand for cheap accommodation at Independence, and 
an opportunity for Nubi (and later other) landlords to construct rooms and 
generate much-needed income to replace the loss of other income (from 
Nubian gin as well as normal employment), creating one of the largest 
slums of sub-Saharan Africa. As its existence was, for decades, tolerated by 
the colonial and independent Kenyan governments, it does look like „Kibera 
is here to stay‟, or at least, it seems to be getting ever more difficult to 
„remove‟ it. It is unlikely that Kibera will be demolished (by force) – there 
are politicians and civil servants with business interests in Kibera, while it 
provides livelihood and accommodation to many people. Besides, there are 
international laws on demolition which would force the government to 
provide alternative housing elsewhere, something that is currently not 
available in Nairobi. Nevertheless, the Kenyan government has ignored 
those international laws in the past, laws it had ratified. As shown in chapter 
2, on a number of occasions have houses been demolished in Kibera, houses 
that were too close to the railway line, on a road reserve, or in the way of 
planned construction of residential areas – often the people were not warned 
in advance, and lost their furniture and personal items; in none of the cases 
were people offered alternative housing or even a place to rebuild their 
homes. This has happened not only in Kibera and other slums, but also in 
towns, where from time to time road-side kiosks (shops, bars, restaurants), 
often licensed by the city councils, have been destroyed, bulldozed, without 
warning (owners did not have the time to remove their goods) or even 
against court orders. However, nothing in Kenya has been as extreme as in 
Zimbabwe during “Operation Murambatsvina”. 
 
Zimbabwe in the 1980s was a prosperous country, where the proportion of 
the urban population living below the poverty line reduced from 60% in 
1980 to 25-30% in 1990. During those years several slum upgrading 
programmes were successfully implemented, and slum areas like Kibera 
hardly existed in Zimbabwe – they had turned into upgraded High Density 
Areas (HDAs), albeit with many (illegal) backyard rental rooms to generate 
extra income. During the 1990s things changed dramatically – in 2003 72% 
of the urban population was deemed to be „poor‟ or „very poor‟, and 
Zimbabwe went through a phase of political instability, becoming 
increasingly isolated in the international community. In May 2005, the 
government suddenly declared that it intended to embark on a campaign to 
clean up the towns, enforce all by-laws and stop all illegal activities. 
Without much warning the Police started destroying, in towns all over the 
country, homes, kiosks (some licensed), informal workplaces, and many 
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people were forced back to the rural areas they had allegedly came from. 
Within two months up to 700.000 people had lost their livelihood and/or 
their homes, while an estimated 2.4 million people were affected in terms of 
health, education, shelter and income. This “Operation Murambatsvina” 
(„restore order‟, or „getting rid of the filth‟ in Shona language
698
) was 
immediately denounced by the international community as a violation of 
human right, and deemed to be a crime against humanity. The Zimbabwean 
government, however, didn‟t really care, it had nothing much to lose – the 
political leaders probably wanted to clean the main towns of opposition 
supporters, and did not care much for any international outcry; Zimbabwe 




It is unlikely that the Kenyan government would go quite as far as that; 
though internationally criticised for its ethnic politics and widespread 
corruption, Kenya is not an international pariah like Zimbabwe, and the 
donors‟ influence is unmistakably present. Moreover, with the government‟s 
plans for slum upgrading it is hard to believe that one day Kibera will be 
bulldozed without any organised relocation of the people concerned. 
Chapter 2 has already given a glimpse of the Kenyan government‟s plans 
for Kibera, plans that included building a „decanting site‟ a temporary 
accommodation for the inhabitants (both landlords and tenants) of (a small 
part of) Soweto-East, the first village of Kibera benefitting from the 
upgrading. The vacated houses would then be demolished to create space for 
flats for those people that had moved temporarily to the decanting site. The 
decanting site would constantly be in use as temporary accommodation for 
people waiting for their part of Kibera to be upgraded, until the whole of 
Kibera would have been upgraded. 
 
The upgrading of Kibera is one of the projects that fall under the Kenya 
Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP); other KENSUP projects are 
implemented in Kisumu, Mombasa and Thika, amongst others. The 
programme is jointly funded by UN-HABITAT, World Bank Cities 
Alliance and the Government of Kenya. While the first grant agreement was 
signed in July 2002, the first years (the preparatory phase) were marked by 
confusion and problems between the different partners; in 2008 a new 
strategy document was produced to sort out those problems and have a clear 
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strategy for the future.
700
 According to this strategy document, KENSUP is 
a programme of the Government of Kenya, implemented by the Ministry of 
Housing and the relevant local authorities, complemented and supplemented 
(mainly technical advice) by UN-HABITAT. The aim of KENSUP is „by 
2020 to have improved the livelihoods of at least 5.3 million urban slum 
dwellers (1.6 million households) countrywide‟.
701
 The total cost is 
estimated to be 13 billion USD (884 billion Ksh) for the period 2005-2020 
(this amount is for all KENSUP projects, not only Kibera). 
 
UN-HABITAT‟s KENSUP Strategy is based on several strategic principles 
and interventions: delegated decision-making, capacity building (of both the 
local communities and local authorities), participation of community 
members, social, environmental and economic sustainability, affordable 
housing finance (through cooperative saving schemes), partnerships within 
and between the local and central government as well as partnerships 
between local government on the one hand and civil society and private 
sector on the other; provision of basic infrastructure as an entry point to 
slum upgrading; communication and information; gender awareness, and 
others. Apart from the question where that amount of 13 billion USD should 
come from, KENSUP‟s objectives seem rather ambitious. Gulyani & 
Bassett
702
, reviewing slum upgrading programmes in Africa of the last thirty 
years, argue that, while in the 1970s upgrading programmes were very 
ambitious in scale and scope, focusing on land titles, housing and 
infrastructure, they evolved (from the late 1980s) into more modest 
interventions that focused on selected sectors -mainly infrastructure- and 
fewer settlements, while community participation became more important. 
In the 1990s slum upgrading, criticised for its failures, became rather 
unfashionable; however, with the United Nation‟s Millennium Development 
Goals focusing on poverty alleviation, slum upgrading became again a 
popular option in the third millennium, with a tendency to focus on 
infrastructure.  
 
One important conclusion of Gulyani & Bassett‟s review of upgrading 
programmes is that security of tenure is currently no longer seen as a 
precursor for housing and infrastructure investment, but rather the reverse: 
evidence shows that if a government (or municipal authorities, or project) 
invests in infrastructure and services for an informal settlement, its 
inhabitants will feel reasonably certain that their structure will not be 
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demolished. With a perceived tenure security, through informal agreements, 
people will be encouraged to invest in their own houses. Some level of 
security of tenure is of course important: residents will need some assurance 
that investments made will be recognised by the state and houses will not be 
confiscated or demolished. Moreover, secure tenure could also play a role in 




These conclusions are supported by examples from Zambia. Zambia has one 
of the highest urbanisation rates in sub-Saharan Africa: in 1990 an estimated 
50% of the population lived in towns.
704
 After Independence, Zambia‟s 
capital, Lusaka, experienced a rapid growth of unauthorised settlements, 
which in 1973 accommodated an estimated 40% of its population.
705
 
Unauthorised settlements were tolerated, because they provided cheap 
labour and a standby labour reserve, and thus allowed wages to be kept at 
low levels; however, there have been serious attempts at improving the low-
income housing situation in Lusaka. Schlyter shows how people improved 
on their own houses in George compound after they were given an 
occupancy licence; Hansen demonstrates this for Mtendere, a site-and-
service settlement where houses were only improved (by the owners) after 
services (infrastructure, electricity, markets, clinics, etc.) were provided by 
the City Council. Rakodi explains how Chawama was upgraded by the 
inhabitants themselves, without formal title to the land, after basic 
infrastructure was provided. Finally, Tait recounts the story of Kalingalinga, 
where inhabitants upgraded their area after being given a guarantee to (only) 
30-years occupancy right.
706
 Furthermore, striving for secure tenure in 
upgrading projects has its pitfalls – it can take a long time to get title deeds, 
which will delay the project; the trend nowadays is to avoid this and focus 
on infrastructure development to enhance tenure security. This can be fairly 
easily done, and depends mainly on the political will of the authorities 
involved: governments can remove the threat of eviction, by publicly 
announcing a cessation of eviction or including it in its urban policy, and 
explicitly allow and support infrastructure investment and basic services 
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Apart from enhancing security of tenure, upgrading projects that focus on 
infrastructure also seem to make sense because they are much easier to 
implement, and have a direct positive impact on living standards and quality 
of life of the majority of the inhabitants. The fact that most people in 
informal settlements are poor, leads to two major problems in 
implementation of infrastructure projects: building standards and cost 
recovery.  
 
Many African countries still have colonial building regulations, with high 
standards on housing materials used and sanitation. These standards are 
often based on non-tropical conditions, and thus inappropriate for African 
housing. During Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe „non-compliance 
with existing building regulations‟ was used as an excuse to demolish 
houses, whereas in Zambia in the Chawama upgrading project the building 
standards were lowered to an affordable (but still acceptable) level.
708
 „High 
standards‟ generally means „high cost‟ and these are therefore usually 
beyond the financial means of the low-income population – inhabitants of 
unauthorized settlements simply cannot afford such high standards. High 
standard infrastructure is also often too expensive for many African 
countries – if such standards are applied, it leaves little money for other 
services like water or clinics in those settlements. Though in practice many 
upgrading projects have advocated for appropriate (lower) infrastructure 
standards and the revision of building regulations, in many cases African 
governments and beneficiaries have preferred the more expensive and 
higher standards.
709
 No doubt the priorities of the beneficiaries of the project 
should be taken into account, but the question is what these beneficiaries are 
willing (and able) to contribute towards their future infrastructure and 
services – this raises the question of cost recovery.  
 
Cost recovery gradually became a more important objective of upgrading 
programmes. This was in the first place a means of reducing expenditure on 
the project itself; secondly, it reduced costs for services provided by local 
governments. Thirdly, it serves as an indicator of the participants‟ 
commitment to the project, and fourthly, encourages active participation, 
once people have invested in it. The question as to what percentage of cost 
could or should be recovered has been answered differently by projects. As 
urban middle and upper income groups generally benefit more from 
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government subsidies and investment, insisting on full cost recovery from 
the lowest income groups raises questions of equity, while it may also only 
assist relatively better-off communities that can mobilise resources, leaving 
the poorest communities un(der)served. In some cases communities have 
been asked to pay upfront for certain activities, as a prerequisite for being 
included in an upgrading project.
710
 In practice, cost recovery appears to 
have been quite problematic in most upgrading projects, with participants 
unable or unwilling to pay their contributions for a variety of reasons, while 
enforcing payment or evicting people has been an unpopular move. Gulyani 
and Bassett found that a modest 5-10% is about the maximum that projects 
have managed to recover; as such this seems a reasonable target for 
upgrading projects, generally affordable to low-income groups, and 
therefore collectable.  
  
How does KENSUP in Kibera fit into these general conclusions on 
upgrading projects? The overall aim of KENSUP‟s Kibera project is „to 
improve the livelihoods of people living and working in Kibera through 
targeted interventions to address shelter, infrastructure, services, land tenure 
and employment opportunities, as well as the impact of HIV/Aids in the 
settlements‟.
711
 Even though KENSUP claim that their focus is on provision 
of basic infrastructure (such as water and sanitation) as entry point to slum 
upgrading, in reality they appear to want to do everything: provide houses, 
financing, infrastructure (and more). This seems overly ambitious (like the 
upgrading projects of the 1970s), and indeed, in practice not many of its 
earlier mentioned „strategic principles‟ seem to have been adhered to in any 
meaningful way, while some of them appear to be simply lip service.  
 
Participation of the community and stakeholders, for example, was 
mentioned as one of KENSUP‟s strategic principles – to support the project 
and enhance ownership of the upgrading process. However, the community 
was not involved in any way in the house design and planning of the project. 
Soweto residents, according to a report, “argued that they had no 
contribution to make since the District Officer and KENSUP had visited the 
area and informed them about the kind of houses that would be constructed.  
The villagers felt that a decision on the mode of housing had already been 
decided“.
712
 There was a lot of confusion amongst the residents, and many 
rumours were going around, an uncertainty made worse by long experience 
with corruption, and mistrust due to previous demolitions without warning.  
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Another problem was that the housing financing plan was unclear to the 
Kibera population – the „cooperative saving schemes‟ mentioned in the 
KENSUP document do not seem to exist.
713
 The question was whether any 
financing plans actually existed: Kibera informants mentioned that Prime 
Minister Raila Odinga had proposed selling half of the houses (to richer 
non-Kiberians) to be able to pay for the other half for poor people – this was 
rejected by angry crowds. He later suggested people should rent out part of 
their unit to generate funds.
714
 The Kenyan government recently claimed to 
have allocated one billion Ksh to start construction in Kibera, but this is a 




In 2004, KENSUP carried out some socio-economic studies in Kibera
716
; 
the resulting reports contain information on the poverty of the people, their 
wishes regarding the new houses, and a warning concerning the security of 
tenure, specifically regarding the landlords. It seems, however, that 
KENSUP staff decided to ignore the advice of the researchers. One of the 
studies found that the Soweto inhabitants “did not express any wish to 
purchase the houses where they were living. For this reason, it is not 
realistic to assume that the proposed upgrading should entail purchasing of 
the new houses by the residents”, but rather that people should rent at levels 
not higher than the current level, around 1000 Ksh per month. Moreover, 
„tenants have a deep-rooted fear, that once the village is upgraded, the rents 
will go up‟. Nevertheless, KENSUP appeared to plan for 20-year mortgages 
costing 1500-2000 Ksh per month, even as they realised that this would 
exclude (a large) part of the population.
717
 This means that KENSUP was 
aiming for a 100% cost recovery, ignoring the information that most Kibera 
people cannot afford the flats and are not even interested in buying them. 
The risk in such a case is that eventually people will sell their apartment to 
the highest bidder (or rent it out) and move back to Kibera or another slum. 
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This is what has been labelled the “gentrification process”: in the end it is 
the better-off, the people that can afford to pay a higher rent, that benefit 
from slum upgrading.
718
 This process seems to have already started in the 
decanting site, soon after the first group of Soweto inhabitants moved there 
(see below). 
 
One of the reports contained a warning concerning the security of tenure and 
landlords:  
 
The proposed upgrading has also caused fear among the 
landlords.  Landlords fear that since they do not own the land 
where they have built houses, once the upgrading is effected, 
they would lose their tenure and consequently, their 
livelihoods. From their point of view, landlords would prefer 
to improve the quality of housing without disrupting the land 
tenure system prevalent in Kibera and without involving 
other stakeholders like the GoK [Government of Kenya]. In 
addition, they would like the GoK to issue them with title 
deeds.
719
   
 
Clearly, the landlords would like to control the upgrading and get more 
secure tenure, and remain landlords in the new Kibera. They would, as 
Gulyani and Bassett claimed, be encouraged to invest in their own houses if 
there is a level of perceived tenure security. However, the Government of 
Kenya has not announced a moratorium on evictions, nor withdrawn the 
rule that no permanent buildings may be erected in Kibera (at least, not 
outside the KENSUP project), and indeed, the upgrading of Kibera was not 
meant to be a project for slum landlords (which seems fair enough). 
However, also in this case KENSUP seems to have ignored the available 
information – they did not pay enough attention to the landlords‟ position, 
did not take away their fear or even anger, by offering suitable 
compensation or by taking any other course of action. As a result KENSUP 
now face a long delay in the construction of new houses, due to a court case 
the landlords initiated after the first people moved to the „decanting site‟.  
 
The decanting site, with more than 600 units, lies next to Kibera, just across 
the small stream that divides Kibera slums from Lang‟ata area (see map in 
Chapter 2). 
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After the decanting site was built (which took more than three years
720
), it 
was left standing empty from early 2008, amid rumours that the apartments 
were for sale; only on 16 September 2009 people moved from Soweto East 
to the new flats.
721
 However, after the people moved out, the landlords (who 
in principle also moved to the new flats in the decanting site, with their 
tenants) stopped the demolition and claim in a court case compensation for 
their (to-be) demolished rooms; they‟re obviously not happy with whatever 
(tenure) they will get in return after the new flats have been built.
722
 By 
August 2010 the court case had not progressed to a conclusion, and the 
rooms had (therefore) still not been demolished. Moreover, the vacated 
rooms in Soweto East had gradually filled up again, sometimes by the same 
people that had earlier moved to the decanting site. After the initial 
excitement of moving to a new flat, people complained that the flats were 
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expensive (1000 Ksh per room per month, as compared to 400-1000 Ksh in 
Kibera), while water and electricity were not yet connected. There was less 
space than they were used to in Kibera: in many cases, three families shared 
a two-bedroom flat (one family in the living room), the rooms were smaller, 
and they had to share the kitchen, bathrooms and even the key to the front 
door.
723
 In addition, the new place had less space for income generating 
activities.
724
 Soon after, some people decided to rent out their new room for 
3000 Ksh per month, and returned to Kibera, making a handsome profit of 
2000 Ksh or more (which is sufficient to buy food for the whole family for a 
month) – the „gentrification process‟ has already started.
725
 More people 
followed: one informant estimated that by July 2010 almost 50% of the 
people had returned to Kibera.  
 
In short, KENSUP in Kibera does not appear to be a great example of the 
way a modern slum upgrading project could function; basically the available 
information (and advice) on poverty and social differentiation in Kibera was 
ignored. Of course, the situation in Kibera is rather complicated for a variety 
of reasons. First of all, the sheer number of people living in Kibera makes it 
a very large project, which needs a huge budget; this in itself is problematic 
for a developing country like Kenya. Because of the extremely high 
population density the new houses will (have to) be apartment buildings, but 
there may still be an „overspill‟ of people that will not find space in a „New 
Kibera‟ – this may require more land and more investment in housing and 
infrastructure.
726
 The commercialisation of the low income housing has 
become the dominant process throughout African cities‟
727
; this is in itself 
positive, as it ensures a steady supply of cheap accommodation for the low 
income population and generates income for the (often also low income) 
owner (and as such it can guarantee repayment of loans in the case of 
upgrading projects with loans for house owners). However, the situation in 
Kibera is quite extreme, with most (possibly up to 95%) of its inhabitants 
being tenants, and relatively few landlords, some of them with hundreds of 
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rooms – many of these landlords are not poor people renting out one or two 
rooms to make some extra money. There is obviously a conflict of interest 
between the two groups when it comes to upgrading (demonstrated by the 
stand off created by the landlords‟ court case), and bringing the two 
different positions together can be difficult. This is more so in a strongly 
politicised environment where most tenants belong to one ethnic group 
(Luo); considering the prominent role ethnic politics plays in Kenya, it will 
be clear that upgrading Kibera is far from easy.  
 
The Nubi claim on Kibera land could be another complicating factor for the 
upgrading project. It is well possible that once the court case with the 
landlords has been concluded, the Nubis will again stop demolition (or 
rather, construction of permanent houses) in Kibera, and certainly in the 
area they claim for themselves, the „Nubian village‟
728
, as this is perceived 
as affecting their claim on the Kibera land. Some Nubis have declared that 
they would get a court injunction to stop construction, and if that does not 
work, create mayhem and use violence. How sensitive the issue is, was 
shown again in August 2007 when Nubi youths invaded a church plot in 
Kibera where a fence and some houses had been erected, and burnt down a 
number of structures (classrooms and houses). The youths claimed the land 




To sort out the „Nubi problem‟, the government has for a number of years 
been negotiating with the Nubis on some form of compensation. The Nubi 
Council of Elders have insisted on getting (compensation for) the original 
4200 acres (see Chapter 2); the Kibera Land Committee (KLC) seem more 
pragmatic, and have been negotiating for a communal title deed for the 
„Nubian Village‟, an area of about 300 acres, as a starting point (continued 
negotiations should sort out the rest of the compensation). A larger part of 
the Nubi community would probably be satisfied with this
730
 – they could 
then organise their own life in the Nubian Village within Kibera, and their 
own upgrading. Basic plans for the development of the Nubian Village had 
been developed some years ago by the KLC – these plans would include 
high-rise buildings with several apartments for each Nubi older than 18 
years, one to live in and the rest for renting out, while also providing 
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mortgage/loans to pay for the apartments
731
; apartments could only be re-
sold within the Nubi community. Current non-Nubi landlords in the Nubian 
Village might also be given opportunity to buy some apartments, while the 
plans would also include space for shops, clinics and schools. Clearly, the 
Nubian Village would not be a low-income area – apartments would 
probably cost at least 10,000 Kenyan Shillings (approx. 100 € in 2008) per 
month, an amount substantially higher than the 500-1000 Kenyan Shillings 




The question is how the other inhabitants of Kibera would react were the 
Nubis to receive a communal title deed for half of Kibera. For many years it 
did not look like a realistic option, maybe creating even more problems for 
the government. However, recent information shows that at the moment it 
seems that the Nubis will indeed get a communal title deed for the Nubian 
Village – in September 2009 the prime minister, Raila Odinga, stated 
publicly: “we have set aside and processed a communal title deed for the 
Nubian people whose ancestral land lies within the slum".
733
 Though 
creating a division within the Nubi community, negotiations between the 
KLC and the Government have continued; the Ministry of Lands has 
meanwhile determined the boundaries of the Nubian Village and is to start a 
process of verifying information on its inhabitants and structure owners, to 
ensure that the non-Nubi landlords get relocated and/or compensated. This 
should be the last obstacle before the title deed could be handed over to the 
community. It‟s ironic that the Nubis should be able to return to their former 
position of dominance in Kibera (albeit again a smaller Kibera than before), 
after many years of marginalisation. 
 
However, the question is whether this communal title deed will not open a 
Pandora‟s box of some sort, and create more problems for the Nubi 
community. Part of the community, including the Council of Elders, is 
against „selling‟ their Kibera land, and see the KLC as traitors and liars.
734
 If 
the Nubis would indeed get their title deed, the opposing groups will have to 
overcome their differences and agree on a way forward, together. 
Furthermore, if they would then find donors to fund their own upgrading of 
the Nubian Village, a huge amount of money will become available; it‟s 
hard to believe that this would go without any serious problems as, 
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obviously, the Nubi community, like any other community, is not free from 
corruption and embezzlement. 
 
As for the upgrading of (the rest of) Kibera, at the pace KENSUP‟s plans 
are being implemented, it would take hundreds of years before the whole of 
Kibera would have been upgraded (even if the Nubian Village would be 
excluded). It seems likely that the project will continue to face delays 
(maybe eventually only financial) and maybe fizzle out after building some 
new houses in Soweto East village. In any case, while no real upgrading is 
done, or at slow pace, Kibera will largely remain the way it is: cheap, low-
standard housing for poor people, with landlords doing little more than 
collecting rent. There is a big market for cheap housing in Nairobi, and that 
market will be there as long as there are poor people. Even if Kenya‟s 
economy is currently doing better than during the last decades, this does not 
mean that the urban (or rural) poor will benefit in any way.  
 
 
The future of the Nubi community and culture 
 
The future (or fate) of the Nubi community is closely linked to that of 
Kibera. It seems likely that, as long as Kibera exists, the Nubis will stay 
there – they have nowhere else to go. Kibera is for many Nubis the only 
hope for a future, for some kind of compensation for their houses, or for 
new houses in a “New Kibera” – they will have to hold on to Kibera and 
their claims on land rights. But the Nubis find themselves in a dilemma: 
something would have to change in Kibera, because the way it is now, it 
holds no future for the Nubis; income from the rental rooms remains the 
same, while due to growing families and high levels of unemployment, 
increasing numbers of Nubis depend on them for survival. Young Nubis, 
employed or looking for employment, or marrying elsewhere, leave Kibera 
if they have the chance
735
, but the older generation stays put – they will 
probably never leave, and rather die in Kibera.  
 
Therefore, getting that communal title deed would make an enormous 
difference for the Nubis; it would confirm their claim on Kibera, give them 
security of tenure, and provide them with a possibility to generate a 
reasonable income. That is, if indeed the Nubis would manage to find 
funding to upgrade the Nubian Village and build enough apartments for 
each individual Nubi to have one to live in and two to rent out (or some 
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similar arrangement). On the other hand, with an upgraded Nubian Village, 
Kibera would change for good, and life there would be very different from 
what it had been before. Would those new apartments provide enough space 
for large or extended families, and to receive and lodge visitors from 
Uganda? Or would the Nubis in the end rent out all Kibera apartments and 
move somewhere else to live, scatter, and lose their sense of community? 
Would there be space for the traditional dholuka dances and other public 
events? And would Kibera continue to play its pivotal role in the East 
African Nubi community? 
 
If the communal title deed in the end does not materialise (for whatever 
reason), and the upgrading continues at the same slow pace of the last ten 
years, a likely scenario would be that the Nubi community will stay in 
Kibera, but become smaller as younger Nubis will leave Kibera if they have 
the chance, and as older people pass away. Eventually, some Nubis will 
remain in Kibera, even if it is only to „hold the fort‟, while continuing to 
hope for a solution to the „land issue‟: compensation or part of the Kibera 
land (title deed). Nevertheless, Kibera would remain an important place of 
reference for the community as a whole; during Ramadhan, holidays, 
funerals and weddings, many Nubis living outside Nairobi or even outside 
Kenya come to Kibera, and the annual Nubi cultural festivals will probably 
continue to take place as well.  
 
Likewise, the „defence of Kibera‟ would also draw many Nubis back home, 
to their „tribal land‟ – the Nubis still have some reputation as a „martial 
race‟, which they again confirmed during the 2001 clashes, instilling fear in 
the Luos who lost quite a number of their men.
736
 In 2009, many Kikuyu 
(landlords) were leaving Kibera, selling their houses, apparently mostly to 
Luos. It looks certain that Luos will increasingly dominate Kibera, and a 
sharper division between the different ethnic groups could mean that Kibera 
gets divided into „ethnic zones‟, where one ethnic group dominates not only 
in terms of absolute numbers, but also in terms of house ownership and 
„village politics‟. These could be three or four zones: one large area 
dominated by the Luos, one area for the Nubis, one small part -Laini Saba- 
would remain for the Kikuyus, and (if the Nubis don‟t get a communal title 
to the Nubian Village) Mashimoni may eventually become Luhya-
dominated territory, though many houses are owned by Nubis. Many Nubis 
claim they would defend (their rights in) Kibera with their life, whereas 
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most people of the other communities probably would not – Kibera is not 
their tribal homeland. 
 
The question is if the Kibera Nubis, increasingly scattered over and around 
Kenya, will be able to maintain their ethnic identity and their culture, with 
or without communal title deed. Many older Nubis see that the younger 
generation increasingly marries non-Nubis and hardly uses the Kinubi 
language anymore; some fear that the Nubi culture will eventually 
disappear. Nonetheless, even in town „tribal‟ affiliations remain important – 
many people in Kibera (and in other slums and towns) keep their links with 
home, the rural „up-country‟, where the wife (or one of the wives) looks 
after the shamba and the homestead, where they go for their annual 
Christmas holidays and where they will eventually be buried. Some of their 
traditions may disappear or change, but people remain „Luo‟ or „Kikuyu‟, 
with strong links to the family and culture back home, even after many 
years in town. The same should apply to the Nubis; with important 
occasions like weddings, funerals and annual Nubian festivals, many Nubis 
should continue getting together, keeping the Nubi culture alive, and the 
community together. Whether that would be in old, traditional Kibera, or in 
a newly upgraded Nubian Village, or elsewhere, remains to be seen. 
 
 
This thesis has touched upon a wide variety of topics related to the Nubis 
and Kibera, ranging from the Nubis‟ origin, to Kibera‟s development within 
the context of Nairobi‟s colonial and post-colonial history, its development 
into a slum, Kibera upgrading, Nubi identity, alcohol production (and 
consumption), „big men‟ and ethnic politics at Kibera grass-roots, and 
female circumcision. There are still many topics left in Kibera and in the 
Nubi community that are interesting and important to research and to write 
about. One could for example further investigate the „exodus‟ of Nubis from 
Kibera – not only in recent years, but apparently even in the 1930s and 
1940s some Nubi families moved out of Kibera to other towns like 
Mombasa, or to Uganda, but also to other Nubi villages in Kenya. It would 
be interesting to find out who these people were, why they left, where they 
went to, and what link did/do they keep with Kibera and the other Nubis. 
Another topic would be the Nubi youths, their aspirations and plans for the 
future, how they are surviving now, and how they see their life and future in 
Kibera. The „female circumcision story‟ would require additional research, 
to get to the bottom of what happened in Kibera – exactly what „type‟ of 
FGC was done, and why and how it was abandoned. Very interesting as 
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well would be to study more closely the different gangs in Kibera, 
especially the Luo youths in Gatwikira.  
 
This thesis contributes to a general understanding of urban slums, in 
particular of Kibera, and to the city of Nairobi during the colonial era. By 
presenting a case study of violence in Kibera, it hopefully also facilitates a 
perceptive view into the machinations of Kenyan ethnic politics at the grass-
root level. The ultimate aim, however, of this thesis was to tell the story of 
the Nubis and Kibera. I hope it has done that without offending the Nubi 
community with some of the stories of the past, on slavery and Nubi 
„misbehaviour‟ in the old days in Equatoria and Uganda, or about their „un-
Islamic‟ distillation and sale of Nubian gin. But, as some Nubi friends said, 
“it is all part of our history”, and therefore it is unavoidably part of this 
story. I hope they can also find here (and in Nubi history) some things to be 
proud of, like the bravery of their grandfathers in military combat, and the 
cunning and intelligence of their grandmothers to outwit the colonial police 











This research was undertaken out of interest in Kibera and the Sudanese 
community; I was not part of any official PhD programme, or affiliated to 
any university. I moved to Nairobi in 1998 to work with the NGO Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF, Doctors without Borders) which had a small 
community project with a dispensary in Kianda in Kibera. After a number of 
years, when I had stopped working with MSF, I decided to do some research 
in Kibera; I simply started talking to people about „life in Kibera, and its 
problems‟ in general, absorbing information. I knew there were „Sudanese‟ 
in Kibera, but in general, no one could tell me much about them, not even 
these „Sudanese‟ themselves, other than that their grandfathers had been in 
the British army. One lady living in „Highrise‟ estate (apartment buildings 
looking out over Kibera) told me that when she was small, her mother used 
to threaten her that, if she did not finish her plate, the „Nubi would come and 
take her away‟ – the Nubi as bogeyman, almost an imaginary being. Only 
later, when I had spoken to a number of Nubis and had a better idea of the 
story behind them, did it become clear to me that this was a great story to 
research and write about, and I became convinced that the „Nubi and Kibera 
story‟ should be written down, also for the benefit of the Nubi community. 
Despite the pride they take in their military past, most Kibera Nubis, 
especially the younger generation, know very little about their own history. 
Many know that their grandfathers were in the army, some may even have 
picked up some historical names and a few shreds of family history from 
their grandparents, but the information is incomplete and often incorrect. A 
few documents circulate in the Nubi community in Kibera, „home-made‟ 
summaries of one book or another, even one attempt to completely re-write 
south Sudanese and East African history, with people that lived in different 
centuries fighting each other. Likewise, many of the official written sources, 
as well as the audiovisual media, that refer to the „Nubians of Kibera‟ 
contain incomplete or incorrect information (of unclear and sometimes 
obviously dubious origin) on the history of these people, and of Kibera. This 
incomplete and incorrect information is being re-used again and again and 
has taken on a life of its own; with this thesis I try to correct the general 
(mis-)information on the Nubis and Kibera. 
 
Another important motivation to write this thesis has been my interest in 
history – as an 18-year old school leaver I (briefly) hesitated in choosing 
between studying anthropology or history. Both subjects are actually closely 
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linked; one is not complete without the other. Anthropology needs historical 
depth in order to be able to understand and explain (African) society. In the 
colonial era anthropologists often ignored local history, and African 
societies were portrayed as a-historic, societies without history; 
anthropologists must look beyond what they themselves observe in the field, 
which is in fact merely a brief episode, a point in time, in the life or history 
of (ethnic) groups. Likewise, historical studies are not complete without 
analysis of sociological characteristics of societies, making anthropology an 
essential source for historians. A closer collaboration evidently does not 
mean a merging of sciences, and each of the disciplines will continue to use 
its own distinctive methods as well.
737
 This thesis is in essence a historical 
ethnography, combining anthropological and historical methods and 
approaches (and reflecting my specific interests in anthropology and 
history).  
 
I started my field work in early 2004, and stopped when we left Kenya in 
July 2008 (though I have kept in contact with several people in Kibera – 
everyone has mobile phone these days, even in Kibera, and many people 
have email). The research was undertaken more or less continuously but 
usually part-time as I continued working in humanitarian aid, for Oxfam 
Novib and other NGOs, in southern Sudan or Somalia (though always based 
in Nairobi); only from April 2005 to April 2006 did I work full-time on the 
research, before again taking on other assignments. 
 
The fact that I lived in Nairobi has on the one hand facilitated my research 
and the writing up of the thesis (some chapters were drafted while in 
Kenya), but on the other hand, it has made it more difficult. Easier, because 
I could take my time to do the research, even while being employed. I could 
pop over on a Saturday afternoon, or on a day off from work (I lived five 
minutes away by car from Kibera). As many people have a mobile phone, it 
was also easy to make appointments at short notice for days / hours I was 
off work. In between jobs I would have more time and spend more time in 
Kibera. Besides, I always had the opportunity to go to Kibera for special 
events like a wedding or a political meeting, or, more importantly, to find 
people to verify something, or get feedback to something I had written. 
Living in Nairobi also made the research more difficult, because I was 
rather isolated from books and other literature, which were near impossible 
to find – I depended on annual visits in the summer holidays to (mainly) the 
Africa Studies Centre‟s library at Leiden University to get the books and 
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The main, or maybe it is just the most well-known, research method used in 
social anthropology is „participant observation‟: by immersing him/herself 
in a society for an extended period of time, the anthropologist gains a deep 
understanding of that society, an understanding that can only come from 
personal experience. It involves living with the members of that society, 
eating what they eat, doing what they do –in short, participating in daily 
life– as well as direct observation of the behaviour of the group members, 
and asking questions, often through informal conversation. The group 
members may be aware that the „outsider‟ is doing research, or the real 
identity and purpose of the researcher may be kept secret (this is easier if the 
researcher does not stand out in skin colour, language or other 
characteristics and is thus not easily identified as a stranger – impossible in 
the classic case of the white anthropologist studying an African „tribe‟). The 
researcher may actively participate (and even initiate) in the activities, or, 
the other extreme, limit him/herself to mainly observation. 
 
The advantages of this method will be clear: the anthropologist gets detailed 
and first-hand information (including on hidden or secret behaviour), can 
verify what people tell him (by observing whether they really do what they 
say they do), and the method is relatively simple and cheap. Drawbacks are 
that the presence of the researcher may influence, and change, the behaviour 
of the group („observer effect‟), while data gathering may be unsystematic. 
Furthermore, the method is time-consuming (may even require learning the 
local language), and the researcher‟s objectivity may be under threat: if the 
researcher identifies too much with the group, it becomes impossible to 
observe objectively – a certain measure of „distance‟ is required. If a 
researcher „goes native‟ (more or less becomes a member of the group under 
study), s/he is no longer able to do proper research.
739
 Although participant 
observation is usually classified as qualitative research, it uses a wide range 
of methods that can also include quantitative research techniques. Most 
anthropological research would use both qualitative and quantitative 
methods, and not only rely on „participant observation‟. In my research in 
Kibera I used many different research methods to collect and analyse data, 
both qualitative and quantitative; a number of these methods are part of 
„participant observation‟, others are not. 
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I did not really „immerse‟ myself in the Nubi society; I did not live in 
Kibera, and did not even spend a single night there in all those years. I was 
there off and on, sometimes every day of the week, then for a longer period 
not at all. My participation in Nubi daily life was therefore quite limited. 
Nevertheless, all those years spent in Kibera, in people‟s houses, on the 
street, have given me a wealth of information on Nubi behaviour and 
relationships through „observation‟, though also here I have to admit that, 
since my main topics were rather historical, observation was never a main 
research tool. Despite this relative „distance‟ from the Nubi community, 
after all those years many people seemed to know me – they had been 
interviewed, or they had seen me at weddings, funerals, or at their house 
when their grandfather was talking to me, or had heard about me. It‟s a 
small community, and word spread fairly quickly – people often seemed to 
know that the day before I had been at so-and-so‟s house. However, I 
obviously did not play any role of importance within the community. I don‟t 
suppose I influenced any major event, though may have had a small impact 
on the lives of the Nubis closest to me, with whom many hours were spent 
in in-depth discussions or relaxed conversations. 
 
Thus, my main research tool was the interview, formal and informal, 
unstructured and structured. A questionnaire was used only once, in the 
socio-economic census we did of the Nubi community in 2007 (see below). 
Interviews would usually take place in Kibera, at the homes of the 
informants; sometimes in a tea shop or restaurant in Kibera, sometimes at 
the Java House at Yaya Centre (a shopping mall near Kibera). I had studied 
Swahili for two and a half years at Leiden University (Department of 
African Languages), and, having also spent two years in Tanzania for 
studies and work, my Swahili was quite good (in the mid-90s). Initially I did 
some interviews in Swahili, but my Swahili was a bit rusty after not having 
used it for many years, and as I increasingly focused on interviewing Nubis, 
I stopped using Swahili for interviews. I had also learned Sudanese Arabic 
in the 1980s, and though largely forgotten twenty years later, it was still 
relatively easy for me to learn some basic Kinubi; at some point, I could 
more or less understand what people were talking about – though never 
speak it well enough to have a normal conversation, let alone conduct 
interviews. I used research assistants to organise interviews and to translate 
where necessary; most were Nubi, others were Luo, Kikuyu or from other 
communities. There is an advantage in being introduced by someone they 
know, someone from their own community; it creates a certain measure of 
trust, which makes people agree more easily to doing an interview, and may 
250 
 
make them more open. This has certainly been noticeable when talking to 
people about the post-election violence. Many Nubis speak good English, 
and, after the initial contact was established and I got more comfortable 
going alone into Kibera, I would increasingly go on my own to visit and 
interview people.  
 
I had started interviewing the people I knew from my time with MSF, 
people from the health centre‟s management committee that I had kept in 
contact with. Those first general interviews were about their lives and 
Kibera, until I decided to focus on the Nubi community. Through those first 
contacts I met some Nubis, and then „the snowball‟ rolled on from there. 
The Nubis were in general very willing to talk to me, and only few people 
have refused. In fact, I can remember only one very old man – he did not 
want to talk to me unless I paid him, which I refused. When he got sick I 
went to see him a few times, bringing him some tea, sugar and milk – he 
eventually suggested meeting the week after so I could ask my questions. 
Unfortunately he passed away before we could meet again.  
 
Interviews were conducted with Nubis old and young, men, women, people 
involved in producing and drinking Nubian Gin, midwives and 
circumcisers, boys involved in crime and boys involved in cultural clubs, 
immigrants from other Nubi villages including from Uganda, Nubis 
involved in politics, and Nubi chiefs. Included were many of the oldest 
Nubis in Kibera, like Burhan Marjan (born in 1915), Ali Bala (around 
1918), Aba Mai (early 1920s), Maze Gabai (1924) and Ahmed Fadlalla 
(1925) – during the years of my fieldwork many of them passed away. In 
that sense I was just in time to get first-hand information on the early days 
of Kibera, from the 1920s onward. For the period before that, I had to rely 
on what they and other people remembered of stories told by their 
(grand)fathers and mothers. There is an obvious risk in relying on (old) 
people‟s memory); this is clear in the article on Nubian Gin, when it looks 
as if there could be an exaggeration in the figures (of production and 
income) that people came up with. The information has been, as much as 
possible, verified with other people and cross-checked with information 
found elsewhere, for example in the national archives. Many interviews 
were also done with non-Nubi people: key civil servants of the local 
authorities of the old days, former chiefs, a former PC, people that had come 
to live in Kibera in the early days, tenants and businessmen of all different 
tribes, victims and perpetrators of violence, and non-Nubi women that 




For their protection, the identity of informants has not been exposed; this 
may have been necessary for the chapter on post-election violence, as up to 
today the lives of certain people (mainly Kikuyus) continue to be in danger. 
Also for chapters that deal with issues that many people did not really want 
to talk about, like the Nubian gin, I decided to use codes, to protect people‟s 
privacy, as I felt most people would be uncomfortable with other Nubis 
knowing they gave me that („secret‟) information. Moreover, there are no 
(extended) case studies in this thesis that would require a more personal 
touch by naming people (even fictitiously). When referring to specific Nubi 
informants, I often use a code like M16 or Wa5; the „M‟ refers to men, „Wa‟ 
to wazee (elders), „W‟ to women. I use „NN‟ to refer to non-Nubi 
informants. In the chapter on post-election violence in Kibera, I usually give 
some more information on the informant: his/her ethnic group, from which 
part of Kibera, whether tenant, landlord, businessman, young or old, to be 
able to place the informants‟ comments in the context of the violence. 
 
It‟s hard to say how many people I have interviewed over the years; a few 
hundred? Many people were interviewed only once, but I would keep 
meeting them in the streets or at other people‟s homes, and every short 
conversation could yield additional information. Other people I interviewed 
(formally or informally) or talked to so often in the course of those 5 years 
that I lost track and stopped writing down the dates. I also talked to people 
that I ran into in the Kibera streets, and such five or ten-minute 
conversations were sometimes very important in terms of collecting 
valuable and very varied information (I used this method a lot after the post-
election violence of 2007/2008). The information I got from all these people 
was used to write the chapters; I did not use individual stories or life-
histories, but rather distilled the chapters from the multitude of impressions, 
remarks and opinions that came from the interviews.  
 
Apart from oral sources, information was gathered from books, 
publications, journals, newspapers, and internet. The reference list shows 
the sources that were used to provide background information, and to 
complement, support and verify, or contradict, the oral information, and put 
it into a context. For the early history I relied almost entirely on books and 
articles, not always specifically about Nubis, but with references to Nubi 
soldiers. A Nubi historian from Kibera, Abubakr Sebit, had written his BA 
thesis on the history of the Nubis of Kibera, based on his interviews with the 
community‟s elders in the late 1960s. Unfortunately, despite efforts to find a 
copy of his thesis in the university libraries, or from his old professor, 
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nothing could be found anywhere – it would have been a valuable document 
in writing up the history of both the Nubis and Kibera.  
 
Archival material was used (mainly for the history of Kibera and the Nubian 
gin story), to corroborate (or to contradict) what people told me, or to create 
a context, looking at Kibera and the Nubis from the official perspective of 
the colonial power (though in the archives one finds references to the 
natives‟ responses to the colonial situation as well, of course). Much of the 
material of the Kenya National Archives (KNA) on Kibera was about 
Nubian gin, showing the obsession (and frustration) of the colonial 
authorities with the alcohol production in Kibera. In one of the files I found 
an old map of Kibera, of 1.5 x 2 meters, produced by the colonial authorities 
in 1934, with detailed demarcations of the farms and houses, with numbers 
and names of the owners. The map yielded information in discussions with 
old Nubis, but was also a welcome tool for the Nubis in their court cases on 
citizenship and land rights. I left some copies of the map in Kibera; these 
were copies made of my own copy – I could no longer find the original at 
the KNA. Though KNA staff was very helpful, many files could not be 
found, and with the carelessness they treated the files, it is likely that this 
will only get worse. For example, that old Kibera map was torn in two 
pieces in order to make a copy for me (it did not fit on the photocopier); it 
was then folded and carelessly stuffed back into the file which was closed 
and thrown on a pile somewhere. 
 
An important aspect of data collection was the feedback from the Nubi 
community: most of what is written in this thesis has been read by and 
discussed with Nubi friends (who also sometimes showed it to other 
people). They recognised the importance of having a proper „history of the 
Nubis‟, including the topics most people did not really want to talk or hear 
about. These discussions ensured that what I wrote was not incorrect in 
terms of factual information and also gave me some new ideas and insights. 
I take of course responsibility for all errors. 
 
A number of photographs were collected (scanned) in the community by 
some Nubis concerned with the Nubi heritage and general loss of artefacts 
(including documents, photos); they generously shared them with me. The 
photos, some of which appear in this thesis (as „photo from Kibera‟), give 
some idea on the life of the Nubis in Kibera, and their level of organisation 
in football and cultural groups, as well as on the relative wealth of the 
Nubis, in particular some families, in the 1940s and 1950s. The photos of 




I encountered few obstacles while doing research in Kibera. Insecurity was 
not one of them: walking through Kibera, or parking my car inside the slum, 
I never experienced any problem in this respect. Simple problems, like 
people cancelling interview appointments, or simply not being at home at 
the agreed time, is a normal part of doing research – it happened regularly 
(sometimes for good reasons). One difficulty I encountered was the 
„silences‟, the issues people did not want to talk about or be reminded of.
740
 
This was mainly about the Nubian Gin, the production of alcohol, which 
was for many people a shameful things of their past, something they did not 
want to be reminded of. Women denied having been involved in it; others 
said “it was a few lazy people doing that”, or they told me that it was 
produced by „lower class‟ people. In the end, however, I realised how 
important the alcohol had been in the Nubis‟ history, and discovered that a 
large part of the community had actually been involved in it, or benefited 
from it; many of the rich people, even prominent people of the community. 
Digging deeper, I found some people that told me much more about it. This 
was sometimes a long process, visiting the same person a number of times 
(at second visits I would usually bring some tea, sugar and milk or 
cigarettes), not only asking about the Nubian gin, but also about other things 
of the past and present; then gradually they would open up and tell me more 
about those „hidden issues‟. At some point I knew so much about it that I 
could ask very direct and focused questions, taking (reluctant) interviewees 
by surprise and making them answer where they might have preferred not 
to. Some other people had no qualms at all talking about it, and I was lucky 
to find a few of them. Bit by bit I managed to reconstruct the „Nubian gin 
story‟. 
 
Other „silences‟ were the Nubis‟ slave-raiding past and (Nubi) prostitution 
in Kibera: older Nubis reading and commenting on different chapters 
thought I should take those things out. But here again, other people said 
“this is what happened, you cannot leave it out”. They are of course 
discussed in this thesis. Most Nubis would not know about the slave raiding 
and trading past of their ancestors, but the older generation should know 
very well who was involved in prostitution. I once initiated an informal 
discussion about it (only a few women present), and the older lady, to the 
shock of the younger generation, started naming a number of women that 
had been prostitutes, women that are perfectly respectable members of the 
community. No one talks about these things, of course, though it may crop 
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up when people are arguing. In some cases, when trying to make a second 
appointment with people that had given me very interesting (almost secret) 
or personal information, informants tries to avoid me. They probably had 
the feeling that they had told me too much in the first interview, and were 
worried about telling me even more. This happened only in a few cases.  
 
Another problem encountered while doing research in Kibera was the lack 
of reliable statistics: estimates of Kibera‟s population vary between 220,000 
and more than one million. Likewise, there are no reliable statistics on the 
ethnic composition of Kibera‟s population, the numbers of houses, numbers 
and ethnic group of landlords, or on the Nubi community. Chapter 2 will go 
more into detail on estimations of Kibera‟s population. It seemed, however, 
relatively easy to remedy the lack of statistics on the Nubi community. 
Several attempts had been made earlier by the Nubis themselves, but these 
had been prematurely abandoned due to lack of financial means. In October 
2007 we managed to do a socio-economic census on the Nubi community – 
a project in collaboration with two Nubi friends, Jamaldin Yahya and the 
late Abubakr Yusuf.
741
 The purpose (for me) was to get an idea of how 
many Nubis there really are in Kibera, and some statistics on education, 
employment, income, rental room ownership, and such issues.
742
 My Nubi 
collaborators were also interested in specific work experience of individuals, 
in order to find ways to improve employment of community members, and 
also in drug (ab)use, and the number of Nubis with a voter card, an ID or 
passport.  
 
Unfortunately the census was fraught with problems, a malfunctioning data 
base, a computer crash in which all data were lost and prolonged absences 
of the IT collaborators; the data analysis is still pending. However, we do 
know that the number of Nubis in Kibera is much lower than estimated – we 
found only around 5350 people. Though the census may have missed some 
people, it seems hard to believe that there would be more than 6-7,000 
Nubis in Kibera. This is much less than the figure I had used till then, 
around 20,000 Nubis, which until then had seemed a reasonable 
„guesstimate‟ by educated Nubi friends. It is well possible, though, that 
there are fewer Nubis than people think; over the years, many Nubis have 
apparently left Kibera, to live in other parts of Nairobi, or they moved to 
Mombasa, Saudi Arabia (for work) or smaller towns around Nairobi. 
However, most of those have kept their property in Kibera, and left some 
family members there to take care of the rooms and collect rent. Apart from 
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data on population figures, the census could yield interesting information on 
for example the numbers of rental rooms the Nubis own, and the number of 
female room owners, to verify and substantiate some of the statements in the 
thesis. On the other hand, browsing through the filled-out questionnaire 
forms, we saw that respondents not always answered truthfully (as 
expected) and for example underreported the number of rooms they own, or 
a male respondent would claim that the rooms were his while it was known 
that they belong to his wife. Some other questions were unpopular: a 
question on the ID number was taken out (people did not like to answer that 
one), and one on „drug use‟ (cigarettes, alcohol, khat, etcetera) was only 
answered with „none‟. It therefore remains to be seen what the real value of 
this census is; for the time being we have got a reasonably accurate list of 
the Nubi families (their members, with basic information on sex, age) of 
Kibera – this may also prove useful should the question of „compensation‟ 







Appendix B  
“Elephants in Kibera”  
 
or: the abandonment of female circumcision. 
 
 
Female circumcision is a highly controversial issue which has generated 
much, and emotionally charged, debate worldwide. Activists claim it has 
serious effects on women‟s health and is a tool for continued oppression of 
women, and therefore, as a human rights violation, it has to be completely 
eradicated. Anthropologists ask for more respect for culture and 
understanding of local context and the reasons why people decide to 
circumcise their daughters; they point to the cultural importance the practice 
has, especially for women, in local (African) settings, the lack of which 
would be the main reason national and international eradication efforts have 
generally met with limited success. The women concerned, the „victims‟, 




Female circumcision, also called Female Genital Cutting (FGC) or, by 
feminists and activists, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), can be defined as 
“all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female 
genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for cultural or other 
non-therapeutic reasons‟.
744
 It is estimated that between 100 and 140 million 
women worldwide have undergone female circumcision and that each year 
up to 3 million girls are being „cut‟. The age at which girls undergo 
circumcision varies widely: though the majority is six and ten years old, 
circumcision is also done shortly after birth, just before marriage, or just 
before having a first baby, depending on the culture. Most circumcised 
women live in African countries, a few in the Middle East, Asian and South 
American countries, and increasingly in the Western world.
745
 Though the 
practice appears to be on the decline (mainly in urban areas
746
) in Africa, it 
remains widespread on the continent. The origins of female circumcision are 
unclear, but there is evidence that the practice is very old, and pre-dates both 
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 As such it is a cultural practice rather than a 
religious one, though oftentimes it has been (or is being) presented as a 
religious command. 
 
This section (appendix) tells the story of the abandonment of female 
circumcision by the Nubis of Kibera. The Nubis practised a severe form of 
„female circumcision‟ until the 1950s, when they started to gradually reduce 
the severity of the operation; by the late 1980s female circumcision was 
almost non-existent amongst the Nubis in Kibera. That‟s when „the 
elephants‟ came to Kibera... 
 
 




In Kenya most ethnic groups, including the Maasai, Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and 
Somali, circumcise their girls; the Luo and Luhya do not. While already in 
1906 Protestant missionaries in Kenya denounced the practice as „barbaric‟, 
subsequent campaigns and motions to ban female circumcision had little 
impact; it was outlawed only in 2001.
749
 However, female circumcision 
remains widespread in Kenya as the law is rarely enforced, though there is a 
noticeable decline in prevalence: from almost 48% in women older than 50 
years, to 32% in women between 15-49 years of age.
750
 While in general 
complete abandonment of the practice is limited, there are some examples of 
rapid abandonment. The “Tostan communities” in Senegal are one case in 
point
751
; the Nubis are another.  
 
The origin of female circumcision is quite clear in the case of the Nubis: it 
was introduced during the time of the “making of the Nubis”, when they 
were still part of the Egyptian army. Apparently none of the southern 
Sudanese ethnic groups where the Nubis find their origin have practiced 
female circumcision in any form. However, both Egypt and (northern) 
Sudan have a long history of female circumcision, with evidence indicating 
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that it was common already thousands of years ago.
752
 Almost 90% of 
northern Sudanese women were, and still are, subjected to it, mainly to the 
„pharaonic circumcision‟.
753
 This tradition logically became part of the 
army‟s (military) culture in relation to the local (southern Sudanese) wives 
of the army‟s officers and soldiers, who initially were mostly from northern 
Sudan. We can only guess as to how the first step to start circumcising the 
southern Sudanese women who married the soldiers was taken. Maybe only 
the younger girls (slaves and soldiers‟ children) were circumcised, but it is 
well possible that older (slave or free) uncircumcised girls and women, that 
wanted to be part of the army‟s entourage, had to undergo the cutting before 
being accepted as a wife. The Nubis incorporated the practice into their 




In the early days in Kibera, Nubi girls were mostly kept secluded inside the 
compound, and expected to be quiet and obedient. They were trained to be 
„good wives‟, and one of the prerequisites for marriage was that a girl 
should be circumcised; without that, there could be no wedding. All girls 
were cut in the most severe manner: both labia minora and majora as well 
as the (tip of the) clitoris were cut away, and covered with a paste of ground 
coffee or fermented flour which would stop the bleeding and reduce the 
chance of infection. It would be applied only once, become dry and fall off 
after some days, indicating that the wound had healed. There was no 
stitching of the wound; the legs were simply tied together for some days 
until the wound had healed, thus creating an opening smaller than before. 
The (grand)mothers
755
 would decide when the time was ripe for their 
daughters to be cut; usually when the girls were six to ten years old. This 
was often done in conjunction with the larger family and neighbours – a 
number (four or five) of age mates would be brought together for a 
collective, public ceremony.
756
 A Nubi midwife would be arranged to do the 
cutting, which would take place early morning. The girls would usually not 
know in advance what was going to happen; a few women would hold the 
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girl and the legs while the cutting was done. After the cutting a party would 
be organised, with food and drinks – the richer the family, the bigger the 
party. Family, friends and neighbours were invited, and there would be new 
clothes and some presents for the girls. The girls, with their legs tied 
together, would not be allowed to walk for the (usually around five) days 
that were needed for healing; during this time the girls would receive 




The cutting ceremony was not considered a transition ceremony, a “rite of 
passage” signifying that the girl was now a woman, ready to be married – a 
girl of 6 years old cannot be considered of marriageable age, even if in the 
old days girls married relatively young: from around 12 years (though 
usually they were older). A girl was considered marriageable only after 
reaching puberty; FGC was just one necessary step towards marriageability. 
Non-Nubi girls marrying into the Nubi community were circumcised as 
well, if that had not yet been done; some came straight from southern 
Sudan, others were from Kenyan ethnic groups that did not practise female 
circumcision.  
 
The common explanations given for cutting the girls was that it was “just a 
tradition, we follow our parents”, that it was in the Koran and therefore was 
a religious command, and to reduce the girls‟ sex drive and prevent them 
from becoming prostitutes. Nubi girls were usually not told more than that, 
nor was the occasion used to instruct them on sexual matters or marital 
duties. The girls only knew that taaru had to be done, because, as a rule, an 
uncircumcised girl could not marry.  
 
Despite the strong social pressure to have girls circumcised, there were girls 
that did not undergo the cut; some apparently still had to undergo it before 
getting married (thus at a more advanced age). Sometimes it was only found 
out during the wedding night, bringing shame upon the girl if she were sent 
back to her parents. Some men did not denounce their newly wedded wife 
for not being circumcised – they either did not realise it, or did not care. In 
some cases non-circumcision was only discovered when a woman was 
giving birth, in which case she would usually be circumcised on the spot, by 
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force if necessary (reinfibulation after giving birth was not practised). These 
people not circumcising their daughter may have been the „abandonment 
pioneers‟.  
 
Despite Nubi girls being circumcised, pre-marital pregnancies did occur in 
Kibera. In such a case the male culprit was traced and forced to marry the 
girl on the spot, or the girl was taken out of Kibera (to relatives in another 
Nubi village) to give birth secretly and her child was later presented as a 
child of her parents. A few cases ended in the death of the girl, killed, out of 
shame, by her father.  
 
 




 claim that already in the 1950s the Nubis started to 
reduce the severity of the female circumcision procedure; it gradually 
changed from the severe form to cutting only the tip of the clitoris, or just an 
incision or prick in the 1980s. Instead of doing it at home, people started 
taking the girls to modern clinics in Dagoretti and other places near Kibera.  
 
At the same time the ceremony also changed from a collective to an 
individual affair - in the 1970s it was a quiet ceremony, within the family, in 
the house. As a result, it was often no longer public knowledge who was 
circumcised and who wasn‟t, or in what way, severe or less severe. This 
change goes hand in hand with the reduction in severity of the cut, 
indicating the generally reduced significance of the ceremony and 
procedure. From the mid-90s female circumcision appeared to have stopped; 
most informants mentioned they had not heard about it anymore in the last 
10-15 years. Nevertheless, there are still some hidden cases: it is claimed 
that some people (secretly) take their daughter to clinics in Eastleigh, the 
Somali area of Nairobi, for a hygienic cut.  
 
How can this fast and (almost) complete FGC abandonment by the Nubis be 
explained? Such a fundamental change in the practice would require a 
„collective, coordinated choice‟ and an „explicit decision to abandon‟, or a 
critical mass of parents reducing or stopping female circumcision to 
convince others to do the same.
759
 There does not seem to have been any 
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collective decision on this within the Nubi community, but there must have 
been compelling reasons for it, or factors that contributed to such a 
significant change in tradition. It is all the more interesting as other ethnic 
communities in Kibera have continued practicing it, albeit at reduced levels.  
 
Informants came up with many different explanations for the abandonment 
of female circumcision. Some of these were fairly simple and 
straightforward, though not always satisfactory or convincing, for example, 
„People realised that “looseness” (immorality) cannot be controlled by 
cutting something‟, or „the old midwives died and they did not pass on their 
skills‟. Many referred to the increased education of Nubis in general and 
girls in particular: people could read what bad impact it had on the women‟s 
health. Nubi girls would meet girls from other ethnic groups in school, and 
be influenced by their new experiences – „when girls started going to 
school, female circumcision disappeared‟. However, education and 
economic development are usually not enough to reduce female 
circumcision prevalence, certainly not at the speed witnessed in Kibera; they 




What other contributing factors could there be? One is that the colonial 
government had tried to enforce the reduction of female circumcision. The 
Nubis had always been rather obedient towards the government, so it is 
possible that this legislation influenced the community‟s attitude. Moreover, 
one elderly woman mentioned that in the 1950s a midwife went for training 
to the King George Hospital and came back with a message against female 
circumcision, which had an impact in the community. Though the Kenyatta 
government did not do anything about it, the Moi government (from 1978) 
took a more active stance against it, which, according to some, also 
influenced the Nubi community. Some NGOs started campaigning through 
the mosques in Kibera, and it also became clear that it is not a religious 
command, not prescribed by the Koran. 
 
The increasing levels of education meant that women could read anti-female 
circumcision messages, and understand the link between female 
circumcision and medical complications as well as in giving birth (though 
several Nubi women mentioned that in general there were very few medical 
problems associated with female circumcision). One informant mentioned 
that „women did not want it anymore‟, though in general it had always been 
the women that had insisted on it – one woman mentioned that her father 
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supported her in her refusal to undergo the cut, though in the end (1970s) 
she did it anyway because of pressure from female relatives. Nevertheless, 
while Kibera in the early years was very much a (Nubi) man‟s world, in the 
1950s Nubi women became more confident: they had money (from Nubian 
gin or tenants), while girls‟ education may have played a role as well in 
building their confidence. Women had more say in matters, and decided 
against it: “The men had sex with uncircumcised women [prostitutes, 
concubines etc.] anyway, so why should we women suffer all this pain if in 
the end it does not add anything? It serves no purpose!”.
761
 The men did not 
object; according to some, men were never much in favour of female 
circumcision. 
 
The influx of other ethnic groups into Kibera and increased intermarriage 
was also mentioned as a reason; though most other ethnic groups in Kibera 
practise female circumcision, the larger part of Kibera‟s population does 
not: the Luo and the Luhya (together probably more than 55% of the Kibera 
population). Moreover, being in an urban area seems to have an impact: also 
the other ethnic groups in urban areas see a reduction in female circumcision 
levels.
762
 This is most likely due to a decreased (traditional) social control 
and peer pressure in a (for most people in Kibera) new environment. 
Nevertheless, the other ethnic communities in Kibera have only reduced 
female circumcision, not abandoned it – they probably still feel the pressure 
from their relatives that remain in their areas of origin, keeping to some 
extent the culture and traditions alive even in town. The Nubis never had 
that social pressure since they did not have any group of traditional relatives 
„back home‟ that could pressurise them into following traditional customs. 
 
Other factors could have played a role as well. In the 1950s the Nubi 
community was changing fast: the Nubian gin brought a lot of money but 
also encouraged the consumption of alcohol (including women), resulting, 
according to informants, in loose morals and many illegitimate children. 
How would this have impacted on the tradition? Controlling the sexuality of 
the Nubi girls was possibly not so important anymore. Moreover, female 
circumcision was relatively „new‟ in Nubi culture, just like Nubi culture 
itself – older people, born in southern Sudan and captured by the „Egyptian 
army‟, could have been still alive in the 1950s (in Kibera); they could have 
remembered, and passed on that information, that in their original southern 
Sudanese community the women were not circumcised. Could this have had 
an influence here as well? It is possible that female circumcision being a 
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relatively new phenomenon made it easier for the Nubis to discard this 
“tradition”.  
 
Nowadays the younger generation of Nubis, including the girls, don‟t even 
know there ever was something called „taaru‟. My female interpreter‟s first 
reaction, when I wanted her to translate a question on the topic, was: „why 
ask this? We don‟t do that!‟. She was subsequently shocked to hear about 
female circumcision traditions in her community in the past. At the end of 
the interview she also had reason to laugh, listening to the comments of one 
of the last traditional Nubi midwives in Kibera, in her eighties and with a 
great sense of humour: 
 
If it were up to me I would still circumcise the girls, because 
cutting and respect for women are one and the same thing. 
Look at all these uncircumcised girls nowadays, it‟s so ugly, 






Even though female circumcision remains widespread in Africa, there are 
examples of reduction and abandonment of the practice. The Nubis 
abandoned it relatively rapidly – in a period of 30-40 years the community 
reduced the severity of the procedure and finally left it altogether. Looking 
for “lessons learnt”, which could be used in other communities to reduce 
female circumcision and its impact on women‟s health, it seems difficult to 
draw conclusions from the case of the Nubis. It appears that here the 
abandonment has depended on a host of „contributing factors‟, that together 
created the conditions, a conducive environment, for female circumcision to 
be abandoned. 
 
My limited research on female circumcision in the Nubi community has in 
fact left many questions to be answered: exactly what form did circumcision 
on girls take in the early days, was it really „pharaonic‟? How, and why, did 
some parents decide not to circumcise their daughters? What problems, if 
any, did those first non-circumcised girls have in finding a marriage partner, 
or even in integrating in the community? Why did people stop the collective 
rituals? More research is needed to answer these questions, research which 
could, if possible, include physical examinations to investigate the extent of 
female circumcision across generations. 
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Appendix C – Questionnaire census Kibera 
 
Full name (of head of household)……………………………………………………  
Telephone: ………………..   P.O. Box: ………… 
Polygamous:  □  No    □  Yes   □  NR  Name husband/other wife + area in 
Kibera:……………………………………………… 
 
The rooms/house they live in is:    □ owned    □ rented    □ free of charge     □  NR 
 
Number of rooms occupied by household: …….. If rented, how much do they pay 
in total per month: …………. Ksh.  
 






























last school,   
















        
           
           
 










employments + years 














 of rooms:  
-------------------------- 
own / get rent / ‘lost’ 
         
         
         
Would you recommend Nubis to buy land outside Kibera?   □  No    □  Yes   □  N.R. 
Does this household own land outside Kibera:    □  No    □  Yes   □  N.R.   When 
acquired: ……..  Where: ...……….…………    
Acres: ……… How has it been developed?:  
Remarks: …………      THANK YOU! 
* monthly income categories:  no income  ;  < 5,000  ;  5-10,000  ;  10-20,000  ;  
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